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Abstract
The majority of the people in sub-Saharan Africa work in the informal sector. This
sector plays a significant role in the growth and development of many developing
countries as it contributes nearly two-thirds (63.6%) of the GDP in sub-Saharan
Africa. People in this sector characteristically have lower incomes than those in the
formal sector and are more susceptible to illness, while being less likely to receive
medical care. They struggle to generate adequate resources to pay their healthcare
expenses. This sometimes affects their healthcare access, health and the labour
market outcomes. In 2003, Ghana introduced health insurance to improve healthcare
access and the general health of Ghanaians. This thesis, therefore, uses Ghana as a
case study to scrutinise the nexus between health insurance, labour market outcomes
and healthcare utilisation in sub-Saharan Africa.
First, the thesis investigates how the expansion of health insurance coverage
affects the healthcare utilisation and labour market outcomes of the elderly in Ghana.
Using household-level data from the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS) and
adopting a difference-in-difference framework, the thesis examines the effect of health
insurance on the elderly’s healthcare utilisation, hours worked, earnings and food
consumption. The thesis finds that having health insurance increases the number of
visits the elderly make to a health facility and the probability of being treated by
health professionals. For labour market outcomes, the results indicate that having
health insurance increases both the number of hours worked and the earnings of the
elderly. In terms of consumption, it is found that having free health care increases
expenditure on food, with the size of the increase slightly larger for the elderly in the
high-wealth group than for those in the low-wealth group.
Second, the thesis studies whether or not health insurance affects the labour
productivity of workers in Ghana through illness-related absenteeism at the
workplace. Employing household-level data from the GLSS, the study applies
xi
count data estimation techniques to investigate how health insurance affects labour
productivity through the expected time workers spend out of work due to illness.
The results show that health insurance has a positive effect on labour productivity by
reducing the extent of illness-related absenteeism in the workplace, after accounting
for potential endogeneity in health insurance. A decline in the extent of illness-related
absenteeism at the workplace is observed for insured workers in both the formal and
informal sectors, but the reduction is lower in the informal sector than in the formal
sector.
Finally, the thesis examines the effect of health insurance on maternal healthcare
utilisation and abortion in Ghana. Unsafe abortion is the second largest cause of
maternal mortality in Africa, and in Ghana, unsafe abortion alone accounts for
about one-third of maternal deaths. This study uses cross-sectional data from
the Demographic and Health Survey of Ghana and employs non-parametric and
parametric estimation strategies for the analysis. The study finds that on average,
health insurance causes a sizeable and significant increase in maternal healthcare
utilisation. No evidence is found that the abortion rate responds to health insurance
in general. However, in subgroup analysis, the study finds a significant reduction
in abortion among young insured women aged 15-19 years compared with those in
the same age group without health insurance. The reduction in abortions is also
observed for unmarried women.
Keywords: health insurance, healthcare utilisation, abortion, labour market
outcomes, consumption expenditure, labour productivity.
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Healthcare access is a major issue confronting people in developing countries, who
nevertheless are faced with 92% of global deaths from communicable diseases, 68%
of deaths from non-communicable diseases and 80% of deaths from injuries. These
statistics differ among the developing countries and are more prevalent in Africa than
on other continents. This makes Africa the continent with the highest mortality and
morbidity rate. The differences in mortality rates across developing countries also
indicate that the issue is critical in some countries relative to others (Murray and
Lopez, 1997; Boutayeb and Boutayeb, 2005; Chirwa, 2016; Boutayeb, 2006).
Despite the high mortality and morbidity rate in Africa, healthcare access is a
major challenge for a large section of people, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa.
This has resulted in low utilisation of health care in the sub-region. One major factor
affecting healthcare access among people in Africa is the cost of medical treatment,
which constitutes a major financial burden on households, especially those in the
low-income group (Xu et al., 2003; Russell, 2004; Xu et al., 2006). According to
World Health Organization (2015), about 150 million people in developing countries
suffer financial catastrophe every year when faced with unexpected out-of-pocket
medical expenditure. This indicates that affordability of health care is a challenge in
developing countries.
Individuals who cannot afford medical costs sometimes defer their medical
treatment, others also resort to self-medication. Postponing treatment can have
serious consequence for individuals’ health, with wider implications for individuals
1
and households, in terms of household earnings, consumption, hours of work and
labour productivity (Leive and Xu, 2008; Sparrow et al., 2014; Mohanty et al., 2014;
Cheng et al., 2018). It also contributes to poverty because people, especially those
in the low-income group, have less access to health services and the lack of access
worsens their health, which in turn leads to lost income and higher medical expenses
which impair people’s welfare (Smith, 1999; Peters et al., 2008). For these reasons,
improving healthcare access and health has been a primary concern for policymakers
and researchers in many countries. Several interventions have been initiated and
better access to health insurance has been shown to improve healthcare utilisation and
general health (Wang et al., 2009; Card et al., 2008; Finkelstein et al., 2012; Cheng
et al., 2015; Duku et al., 2015). Despite the importance of health insurance, very
little research has focused on labour market outcomes and productivity of workers,
especially in sub-Saharan Africa.
Ghana, one of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa, introduced a health insurance
scheme in 2003 to improve healthcare access and the general health of Ghanaians.
This thesis, therefore, attempts to investigate the effect of health insurance on
healthcare utilisation, labour market outcomes and productivity in Ghana. The
thesis focuses on Ghana because factors that affect healthcare access, morbidity
and mortality are closely related to most countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Before
the introduction of health insurance, Ghana ranked highly among the countries in
the region with healthcare access challenges. Healthcare services were financed by
user fees, where individuals paid for healthcare services before receiving treatment.
This policy resulted in a huge decline in the utilisation of healthcare services
(Asenso-Okyere et al., 1998; World Bank, 2007; Ghana Health Service, 2009). The
decline in healthcare utilisation, especially in the 1990s and the early 2000s, prompted
the Government of Ghana to establish health insurance in 2003 to improve healthcare
access and the health of its citizenry (Arhin-Tenkorang, 2001; Ghana Health Service,
2009). Therefore, investigating how health insurance affects healthcare utilisation,
labour market outcomes and productivity in a society where the majority of people
are prone to illness is important.
2
There is evidence that people with health conditions are more likely to participate
in the health insurance program and therefore consume more health care. This makes
health insurance endogenous to outcome variables of interest which, in turn, affect
the results (Cameron et al., 1988; Cheng, 2014). This is because in the presence
of endogeneity, the error term and health insurance are correlated, and this render
the estimated parameters biased and inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2010). The study
accounts for this possible endogeneity issue in the health insurance program by
employing appropriate estimation strategies in our analysis.
This thesis comprises three main chapters and they examine three research
questions. Chapter 2 asks the question of whether exempting the elderly from health
insurance premium payments affects healthcare utilisation, hours of work, earnings,
and food consumption in Ghana. Chapter 3 seeks answers to the question of whether
health insurance affects labour productivity through illness-related absenteeism at
the workplace, with the investigation focusing largely on informal sector workers in
Ghana. Chapter 4 investigates whether health insurance affects maternal healthcare
utilisation and abortion in Ghana. This chapter attempts to determine if there
are heterogeneous effects of health insurance on abortion with respect to women’s
characteristics in terms of age, marital status, place of residence and educational
status, to understand whether the effects differ for different groups in the sample.
The following paragraphs explain the order of the thesis in more detail.
Chapter 2 investigates how health insurance affects healthcare utilisation, labour
market outcomes and consumption of the elderly in Ghana. The study concentrates
on the elderly, who for the purpose of this study are above 55 years of age and
are active in the informal sector of the economy, which accounts for the majority
of the labour force in the agricultural sector in Africa. Africa is a continent with a
youthful population; approximately 60% of the African population is below 24 years of
age. However, the average age of the labour force in the agriculture sector (farmers)
in Africa is 60 years (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2014). This indicates
that the majority of people in the agriculture sector in Africa are the elderly and
they contribute immensely to Africa’s economy which depends largely on agricultural
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outputs.
Despite their contribution to Africa’s economy (Ghana’s in particular), the
cost of healthcare access was a challenge for the elderly until the introduction
of health insurance in 2003, when those aged 70 years and over were exempted
from health insurance premium payments1 and thus given free healthcare. As the
informal sector, particularly the agricultural sector, plays a significant role in the
growth and development of many developing countries. It is therefore important
to investigate the effect of health insurance on healthcare utilisation, hours worked,
earnings and food consumption of the elderly. The study uses household-level data
from the Ghana Living Standard Survey from 1998/99 to 2012/13 and adopts a
difference-in-differences framework for this analysis. In the model specification, the
study assigns the elderly exempted from health insurance premium payments as
the treatment group, and those not exempted as the control group. A falsification
and pre-treatment balancing test was performed and the results suggest that the
differences in outcome between the elderly with free health care and those without
free health care could be attributed largely to the intervention of the National Health
Insurance Scheme (NHIS). The overall findings suggest that subsidising the elderly’s
healthcare expenses or exempting them from premium payments increases healthcare
utilisation, the number of hours of work and earnings, which in turn increases food
consumption.
In Chapter 3, the study extends the analysis by examining whether or not
health insurance affects labour productivity through illness-related absenteeism at
the workplace in Ghana. Individuals’ state of health influences their labour force
participation and labour productivity; where in this study labour productivity refers
to the amount of goods and services that a worker produces in a given time. This
indicates that the number of workdays missed affects worker productivity through
output loss. Most of the absenteeism at the workplace has been associated with
ill-health (Davis et al., 2005; Holden et al., 2011). There is evidence that suggests
1Most of the elderly in sub-Saharan Africa work in the informal sector of the economy, which is
characterised by low income, therefore, they struggle to generate adequate resources to finance their
healthcare expenses when ill.
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that people in sub-Saharan Africa are more disposed to illness compared with people
in other regions (Deaton and Tortora, 2015). This suggest that the effects of
illness-related absenteeism at the workplace are likely to be greater in developing
countries than in developed countries. The relationship between individuals’ health
and their work has been shown to be more observable in societies where the majority
of the people are vulnerable to illness (Currie and Madrian, 1999). Therefore,
investigating the relationship between health insurance and labour productivity
through illness-related absenteeism at the workplaces in Ghana is vital for policy
making in a developing country context, where people are more susceptible to illness.
The study uses two waves (2005/06 and 2012/13) of household-level data from
the GLSS and applies count data estimation techniques for this analysis. However,
the demand for health care and the probability of missed workdays may depend on
the health status of a worker, and those with poor health conditions or health risk
are more likely to miss workdays and also to participate in an insurance program.
This unobserved health status of workers may bias the estimates. On the other
hand, an individual with good health may be expected, ceteris paribus, to miss
fewer workdays. Therefore, ignoring the endogeneity issue in health insurance
would greatly affect the estimates. Thus, it would lead to the conclusion that
would suggest a reduction in the number of missed workdays even if there is no
effect. The study accounts for this potential endogeneity problem in the health
insurance program by employing regional-level average health insurance coverage as
an instrumental variable. This instrument is likely to reflect the exogenous variation
in the individuals’ participation in the health insurance scheme in Ghana. The
findings reveal that having health insurance increases labour productivity through a
reduction in illness-related absenteeism at the workplace. This increases the country’s
output through a reduction in output loss, which in turn increases economic growth
and development.
Chapter 4 studies the impact of health insurance on maternal healthcare
utilisation and abortion in Ghana. The study investigates this relationship
because maternal healthcare access and abortion contribute immensely to maternal
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mortality in sub-Saharan Africa. According to the World Health Organization
(2012), about 21.6 million unsafe abortion cases are reported annually. In terms
of abortion-related deaths, more than 99% cases occur in developing countries
particularly, in sub-Saharan Africa, Central and Southeast Asia, Latin America
and the Caribbean (Okonofua, 2006; Sedgh et al., 2016). This suggests that
abortion-related deaths in developing countries are of critical concern. In Ghana,
unsafe abortion is the second largest cause of maternal mortality, accounting for
15%-30% of maternal deaths (Asamoah et al., 2011). Ghana failed to meet most of
the 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set in the 1990s, in particular the
maternal mortality ratio,2 indicating that maternal mortality in Ghana remains high.
Despite the enormous contribution of abortion to maternal mortality in sub-Saharan
Africa, the study on the relationship between health insurance and abortion in
developing country settings is limited, particularly in the sub-Saharan Africa context.
This study, therefore, investigates how health insurance affects maternal
healthcare utilisation and abortion in Ghana. It further examines the heterogeneity in
abortion in terms of women’s age, marital status, place of residence and educational
status. The study uses two waves of cross-sectional data (2008 and 2014) from
the Demographic and Health Survey of Ghana and employs non-parametric and
parametric estimation strategies for the analysis. The findings show that the provision
of health insurance improves maternal healthcare utilisation and also reduces abortion
among young women aged 15-19 years and unmarried women.
Chapter 5 concludes the study by summarising the major findings, together with
the contribution of the study to the literature. It also discusses policy issues from
the study and suggests a direction for further research.
Background
Health insurance has been seen as a means for improving healthcare utilisation and
protecting households against impoverishment from out-of-pocket expenditures in
2In 2015, 319 deaths per 100,000 live births were recorded, and this exceeds the MDG 5 target
of 190 deaths per 100,000 live births between 1990 and 2015 (World Health Organization, 2015).
6
low-and middle-income countries (Hsiao and Shaw, 2007; Devadasan et al., 2007;
McIntyre et al., 2006). According to Nyman (1999), insurance reduces the financial
stress associated with user fees and this improves access to healthcare. In Ghana,
there are a number of studies that show how health insurance provides financial
protection to households (Nguyen et al., 2011; Strupat and Klohn, 2018; Aryeetey
et al., 2016; Okoroh et al., 2018). There are various types of health insurance.
National or social health insurance (SHI) is based on mandatory enrolment of all
individuals. Countries implementing this type of insurance include Thailand, the
Philippines and Vietnam. Voluntary insurance includes the private health insurance
(PHI) which is widely implemented in countries such as Brazil, Chile, Namibia, and
South Africa (Smith, 2007), and community-based health insurance (CBHI) which
is used in countries such as Congo, Ghana, Rwanda and Senegal (Ranson, 2002;
Ekman, 2004; Lagarde and Palmer, 2006; McIntyre, 2007). These insurance schemes
have different impacts on the population for instance, while the PHI is said to mainly
serve the affluent segments of a population, the CBHI also benefits the poor in terms
of health financing (Carrin et al., 2005; Smith and Sulzbach, 2008). The type of health
insurance operate in most of the sub-Saharan Africa countries is the CBHI. Several
studies have shown how the subsidisation of health expenditure through the CBHI
system has improved healthcare use and health in most developing countries (Wang
et al., 2016; Mensah et al., 2010; Aggarwal, 2010; Dzakpasu et al., 2012; Brugiavini
and Pace, 2016).
In Ghana, a number of studies have also shown how the introduction of health
insurance health insurance has improved healthcare utilisation in general. Most of
the findings are little different from findings in studies in other developing countries.
Thus, health insurance increases health care use (Mensah et al., 2010; Dzakpasu et al.,
2012; Brugiavini and Pace, 2016). In terms of maternal healthcare utilisation, studies
have revealed how health insurance increases maternal health care use, particularly,
the frequency of antenatal care visits, and delivery in a health facility (Mensah et al.,
2010; Dixon et al., 2014; Abrokwah et al., 2014). With regard to the relationship
between health insurance and health care use by the elderly, the studies are limited,
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and of the few that are available, the results are also mixed (Duku et al., 2015; Van
Der Wielen et al., 2018). Whereas Duku et al. (2015) finds significant effects of health
insurance on healthcare utilisation by the elderly, Van Der Wielen et al. (2018) finds
no significant impact on healthcare utilisation among older people in rural areas.
Most studies of the effects of health insurance on healthcare outcomes in Ghana
concentrate on specific geographical areas. In the Brong-Ahafo and the Upper
East regions, health insurance utilisation reduces birth complications, infant and
maternal deaths (Mensah et al., 2010). In the Northern region, the NHIS leads to
a decline in the number of days of illness and better self-reported health outcomes
(Asuming, 2013). In the Greater Accra region, Ansah et al. (2009) finds that the
NHIS increases healthcare utilisation, but insignificant effect on healthcare outcome
of children. Overall, most studies find that the introduction of health insurance
has improved health care utilisation and health among the populace (Mensah et al.,
2010; Dixon et al., 2014; Abrokwah et al., 2014; Dixon et al., 2014; Abrokwah et al.,
2014). The condition of ones’s health has been shown to influence one’s ability to
work, but studies of how health insurance affects labour market outcomes and labour
productivity the sub-Saharan Africa context are limited. Therefore, understanding
the relationship between insurance and labour market outcomes is important for
policy evaluation within the sub-Saharan Africa context. The study also examines
how improvement in healthcare access through health insurance affects abortion in
Ghana.
Institutional context of the Ghana NHIS
Ghana introduced the NHIS in 2003 on a pilot basis in four regions and it became fully
operationalised in all the regions in 2005. To improve healthcare access, the scheme
provides free health insurance to indigents and vulnerable people by exempting them
from the NHIS premium payment. The elderly aged 70 and over were among the
people captured as vulnerable in the NHIS and are therefore provided with free
healthcare. People with a mental disorder, children under 18 years and pregnant
women are also exempted from the NHIS premium payment. Exempting these
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groups of people from premium payment eliminates financial barriers affecting their
healthcare access (Ghana Health Service, 2009; Mensah et al., 2010).
The scheme covers both outpatient and inpatient services for 95% of disease
conditions that affect Ghanaians.3 The scheme excludes heart and brain surgery,
HIV, cancer treatments other than cervical and breast cancer.4 In Ghana NHIS, there
are no co-insurance or co-payment, and no deductibles when register or participate
in the NHIS.
Before the introduction of the NHIS, healthcare services in Ghana were financed
by user fees, where individuals pay for healthcare services before receiving treatment.
This policy, known as the cash and carry scheme, was part of the Structural
Adjustment Programme introduced in the 1980s to address Ghana’s budget deficits.
It discouraged unnecessary utilisation of healthcare services and encouraged private
sector participation to expand the healthcare system. This policy created disparities
in access to healthcare services and resulted in a huge decline in the utilisation of
healthcare services (Asenso-Okyere et al., 1998; World Bank, 2007; Ghana Health
Service, 2009). It also made vulnerable people more susceptible to financial
impoverishment in the event of catastrophic illness (World Bank, 2007).
The decline in healthcare utilisation, especially in the 1990s and the early 2000s,
prompted the government of Ghana to establish the NHIS in 2003 (Arhin-Tenkorang,
2001; Ghana Health Service, 2009). It was established under the National Insurance
Act 2003 (Act 650) to eliminate out-of-pocket payments and to ensure equity in access
to healthcare services. The scheme protects the indigents and vulnerable people from
catastrophic healthcare expenditures. A new Act (Act 852) replaced Act 650 in 2012
to consolidate the NHIS activities, eliminate administrative challenges, corruption
and improve transparency of the scheme.
Contribution to the NHIS is mandatory for formal sector employees, and their
contributions are made through payroll deduction of 2.5% of their Social Security and
3It covers most of the outpatient services such as, malaria treatment, acute respiratory diseases
and eye infections, hypertension, diabetes, skin diseases and ulcers. Inpatient services also covered
by the scheme are cervical and breast cancers treatment. Other general and specialist inpatient care
includes oral health, eye care services, maternal care and emergencies such as road accidents.
4Other disease conditions excluded are organ transplantation, dialysis, antiretroviral medicines,
cosmetic surgeries and angiography, and other medicines not on the NHIS list.
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National Trust Fund into the National Health Insurance Fund. However, employees
need to be registered before becoming a member in the NHIS. The membership of
informal sector workers is voluntary, and they contribute to the scheme through
annual premium payments. Premiums are based on a person’s ability to pay and
are not determined based on health needs. The amount is usually determined by
the authorities of the scheme at the district level, therefore, there are variations in
premiums across different districts in Ghana. Premiums for individuals working in
the informal sector ranges from GH7.2 - GH48¢(US$2− $12)5 for individuals in the
lowest and highest-income groups respectively (Mensah et al., 2010). In addition
to contributions by formal and informal sector workers, there are other sources of
finance contributing to the NHIS. These include a National Health Insurance levy
on goods and service, which is 2.5% of value added tax (VAT), 5% Road Fund, 20%
Communication Service Tax and a levy on tobacco and alcoholic drinks. Ghana
NHIS is regulated by the National Health Insurance Authority, which also manages
the National Health Insurance Fund.
There are three types of health insurance operating in Ghana: the Private
Commercial Health Insurance Scheme, the Private Mutual Health Insurance Scheme
and the District Mutual Health Insurance Scheme (DMHIS). The DMHIS is the
dominant one and is operated in all districts in Ghana. More than 99% of individuals
participating in the insurance schemes are within the DMHIS; therefore, our analysis
of the NHIS is based on the DMHIS. The DMHIS is responsible for the day-to-day
administration of the scheme, eligibility, enrolment, collecting contributions and
paying claims.
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This study examines the effects of health insurance coverage on healthcare
utilisation and labour market outcomes and consumption expenditure of the elderly
in Ghana. Using household-level data from the Ghana Living Standard Survey
and adopting a difference-in-difference framework, the study investigates whether
exempting the elderly from health insurance premium payments affects healthcare
utilisation, earnings, hours worked and consumption. The study finds that having
health insurance increases the number of visits the elderly make to a health facility
and the probability of being treated by health professionals. For labour market
outcomes specifically, hours worked and earnings in the agriculture sector, the
results indicate that health insurance increases both the number of hours worked
and earnings of the elderly, with the increase being larger for males than females.
With regard to consumption, the study finds that free insurance increases food
consumption expenditure of the elderly, and the size of the increase is slightly larger
for the elderly in the high-wealth group than those in the low-wealth group.
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2.1 Introduction
Poor health and its implications for the economic well-being of individuals and
households have been an issue of concern in many developing countries (Reddy,
2002; Boutayeb, 2009). Poor health limits the ability of individuals to engage in
income-generating activities, and this affects household income, hours of work and
labour force participation (Currie and Madrian, 1999; Cai and Kalb, 2007; Cai,
2010). This issue is of particular importance among the elderly, especially those in
sub-Saharan Africa, because the elderly are the key source of labour in the agricultural
sector (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2014).1 Overall, ill-health affects the size
of the effective workforce, which could affect the nation’s production. It could also
potentially reduce government revenue and increase government spending on other
health-related transfers (Hadley, 2003).
One major factor that contributes to poor health in developing countries is
the high cost of health treatment, specifically out-of-pocket health expenditure.
High medical costs reduce access to health care and this in turns affects health
outcomes (Xu et al., 2003; Russell, 2004; Xu et al., 2006). Most of the elderly
in developing countries work in the informal sector, which is characterised by low
income, and therefore, they struggle to generate adequate resources to pay for their
healthcare expenses. Individuals who cannot afford medical costs sometimes defer
their medical treatment (Leive and Xu, 2008; Kruk et al., 2009). The postponement
of treatment can have serious consequences for the individual’s health, and this has
wider implications for individuals and households in terms of household earnings,
consumption and hours of work (Gertler and Gruber, 2002; Asfaw and Braun, 2004;
Sparrow et al., 2014; Mohanty et al., 2014; Cheng et al., 2019).
Health expenditure increases with age and according to Alemayehu and Warner
(2004), major expenditure on illness is often experienced after 65 years. This suggests
that medical expenses are a challenge for most of the elderly in low-income groups
in developing countries. To reduce high medical costs and improve health care,
1According to Food and Agriculture Organization (2014), the average age of the labour force in
the agriculture sector (farmers) in Africa is 60 years. This indicates that the majority of people in
the agriculture sector in Africa are the elderly.
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the World Health Organization (WHO) advocated for universal health insurance
coverage in 2005 (World Health Organization, 2010). Studies have shown how the
subsidisation of health expenditure through health insurance has improved healthcare
access and health outcomes of the elderly in both developed and developing countries
(Lichtenberg, 2002; Wang et al., 2009; Card et al., 2008, 2009; Finkelstein et al.,
2012; Cheng et al., 2015; Duku et al., 2015). The elderly are more disposed to illness
and need regular health care, but owing to financial challenges, they are less likely to
receive proper health care.
The provision of free medical care for the elderly through a health insurance
system in most advanced countries is quite similar to that in developing countries.
However, one major difference between them is age eligibility for free health care
through the insurance program. In most developed countries, the majority of people
are in the formal sector and the eligible age for free health care corresponds to
their retirement age. Therefore, the elderly from these countries enrol in the health
insurance program immediately after their retirement. This system improves elderly
health and productivity even after retirement, thereby contributing immensely to the
economic development of their respective countries.2 However, in most developing
countries, the majority of people work in the informal sector, and are relatively few
work in the formal sector, therefore, retirement and age eligibility for free health
care is completely different. In most cases, the elderly have to wait a number of
years before meeting the age criterion. In Ghana, for instance, although the eligible
age for free health care through health insurance program is 70 years, the majority
of the elderly work in the informal sector, and the few that work in the formal
sector retire at 60 years. This indicates that the majority of the elderly, especially
those in the informal sector, have to wait a number of years before being eligible for
free health care.3 Whether or not the number of years the elderly in a developing
country such as Ghana have to wait before being eligible for free healthcare affects
2In advanced countries such as the US and Australia, for instance, the retirement and age
eligibility for free medical care are not very different.
3This arrangement is similar to other developing countries such as Vietnam and Chile, where
the eligible age for free health care is 85 and 80 years respectively, while the retirement age in these
countries is 60 and 65 years.
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their health and labour market outcomes is unknown. If having health insurance
is positively associated with health, and health influences an individual’s ability to
work, an important question, then, is whether or not providing the elderly with free
health insurance affects the health care and labour market outcomes of the elderly
in Ghana.
This study, therefore, investigates whether or not health insurance affects
healthcare use, labour market outcomes and consumption expenditure of the elderly
in Ghana. The study concentrates on the elderly who are above 55 years of age
and are active in the informal sector of the economy, which constitutes the majority
of the labour force in the agricultural sector in Africa. These people contribute
immensely to Africa’s economy, which depends largely on agricultural outputs, but
they are less likely to receive proper healthcare. Besides, most of the elderly also
engage in subsistence agriculture, which covers most food production in sub-Saharan
Africa. Most of this food production serves as food/nutrition security in the respective
countries. Their activities also provide job opportunities for younger ones, which
helps to reduce rural-urban migration and also encourages youth interest in the
agriculture sector (Aboderin and Beard, 2015; World Health Organization, 2014).
Ill-health in the elderly can affect the size of the effective workforce and the nation’s
production. Therefore, understanding the relationships between health insurance and
healthcare use, together with labour market outcomes from a developing country
such as Ghana, will help to improve policy decisions. The study also adds to a
shred of small evidence in the literature about the impacts of health insurance on
labour market outcome and consumption of the elderly in the informal sector in the
sub-Saharan Africa context.
This analysis focuses on Ghana, because issues on health and healthcare access
of the elderly are similar across Africa (World Health Organization, 2014; Aboderin
and Beard, 2015). Affordable access to health care was a challenge for the elderly
in Ghana until the introduction of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS)
in 2003, where the elderly aged 70 and over were exempted from paying premiums.
The study, therefore, employs a difference-in-difference (DID) strategy to examine the
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effects of the NHIS on the elderly (i.e. those exempt from the NHIS premium payment
and those aged 55-69 whor are not exempt from the premium payments) in terms
of healthcare utilisation, labour market outcomes and consumption expenditure.
The study uses nationally representative household-level data from Ghana Living
Standard Survey (GLSS) for this analysis. The findings show that health insurance
has significant effects on measures of healthcare utilisation and labour market
outcomes of the elderly. Specifically, having health insurance increases the number of
visits to a health facility and the probability of being treated by health professionals.
With regard to labour market outcomes, the results show that having health insurance
increases the number of hours worked and earnings, with the increase being larger
for males than for females. The study also finds that exempting the elderly from the
health insurance premium payment increases food consumption expenditure of the
elderly, and the size of the increase is larger for those in high-wealth groups compared
with those in low-wealth groups.
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, the study
focuses on the elderly in the informal sector, who constitutes the majority of
the labour force in the agriculture sector in developing countries. While many
of the previous studies in the relevant literature focus on formal sector workers,
understanding the effect health insurance has on elderly people who work in the
informal sector is important as this sector plays a significant role in the growth and
development of many developing countries. Finally, most of the existing studies,
specifically those on health insurance and labour market outcomes, are in developed
countries context. There are limited number of studies conducted in the sub-Saharan
Africa context. Therefore, examining the effects of the NHIS on labour market
outcomes in Ghana is vital for policy evaluation within the sub-Saharan Africa
context. The findings provide background information that will help to improve
health insurance policies in Ghana and other developing countries.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the background
of the study. Section 3 discusses the data used in the analyses. Section 4 presents the
econometrics framework underlying the study. The results are presented in Section
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5. Section 6 discusses the results and Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Health insurance and healthcare use
As already mention, the impact of health insurance on elderly health care has
been examined in the developed and in some developing countries and most of
the findings are similar. The arguments are that health insurance reduces financial
risk: specifically, out-of-pocket expenditure associated with health treatment. The
reduction in out-of-pocket medical expenses allows individuals to afford the needed
care and therefore increases their healthcare access. Card et al. (2008) investigate the
impact of nearly universal insurance coverage on the utilisation of health care by the
elderly. They find that the onset of Medicare eligibility increases the utilisation of
healthcare services in the US. The results obtained by Card et al. (2008) are similar to
those of other studies in the advanced countries context such as (Lichtenberg, 2002;
Card et al., 2009; Finkelstein et al., 2012). From the developing countries perspective,
Cheng et al. (2015) study how having health insurance affects health outcomes and
healthcare expenditure by the elderly in China and find that the elderly enrolled in
health insurance receive adequate medical service when ill. Similarly, Wang et al.
(2009), who study the effects of rural community-based health insurance on healthcare
outcomes in China, find that having such insurance improves the health status of the
elderly.
In Ghana, there are a number of studies on the effects of the NHIS on healthcare
utilisation in general, and most of the results suggest that health insurance increases
health care use (Mensah et al., 2010; Dzakpasu et al., 2012; Brugiavini and Pace,
2016). In terms of maternal healthcare utilisation, studies have revealed that health
insurance increases maternal health care use (Mensah et al., 2010; Dixon et al., 2014;
Abrokwah et al., 2014). However, there are few studies on the relationship between
health insurance and health care use of the elderly, and the few that are available
provide the mixed results (Duku et al., 2015; Van Der Wielen et al., 2018). Duku
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et al. (2015) investigate whether Ghana’s health insurance system improves healthcare
access for older people, and they find that health insurance improves the utilisation
of elderly healthcare services. Van Der Wielen et al. (2018) conduct a similar study
in Ghana but obtain a different result. They find that enrolling in health insurance
has no significant impact on the utilisation of healthcare services among older people
in rural areas. The mixed results make the Ghana studies inconclusive. Most of the
existing studies in Ghana are also limited to district-level analysis, therefore, from the
policy-making perspective it is important to examine this relationship with nationally
representative data.
2.2.2 Health insurance and labour market outcomes.
There are studies on the effects of health insurance on labour market outcomes, but
already mentioned, the focus has been on formal sector employment and the results
are mixed. The rationale for the positive effect of health insurance on labour market
outcomes is that insurance reduces healthcare expenses, which improves healthcare
access. Regular healthcare access, together with the use of preventive care services,
improves labour participation, hours of work and earnings (Currie and Madrian,
1999; Hadley, 2003; Dizioli and Pinheiro, 2016). Gruber and Hanratty (1995), who
investigate the effects of health insurance on labour market outcomes in Canada,
find that access to health insurance has increased employment and wages. Currie
and Madrian (1999) conduct a similar study in the US and find that health insurance
improves labour market outcomes such as labour force participation. Strumpf (2011),
who studies the impacts of Medicaid on women’s labour force participation, finds that
having health insurance increases female labour supply in the US.
Conversely, some studies find health insurance to be a disincentive to labour
market outcomes. One argument is that providing free health insurance for the elderly
increases the likelihood of retirement, and early retirement could also affect labour
force participation and hours of work (Gruber and Madrian, 2002). Others argue that
the provision of free health insurance makes informal sector jobs (self-employment)
more attractive because fringe benefit contributions (premium payments) are not
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required. This reduces labour supply in the formal sector, because workers move from
the formal sector to the informal sector. Subsidising the cost of medical treatment
also reduces the financial burden of the elderly. Therefore, most of the elderly with
free health care increase their leisure by reducing some of the labour market outcomes,
particularly labour force participation and hours of work, in order to preserve energy
for the rest of their life span (Aterido et al., 2011). Boyle and Lahey (2010) study the
impact of public health insurance on the labour market outcome of the veterans in
the US, and find that access to health insurance reduces labour supply of the elderly
workers. A study by Dague et al. (2017) finds similarly that enrolment in public
insurance (Medicaid) reduces adult employment and earnings in the US. Baicker
et al. (2014), who study the effects of Medicaid on the employment of individual
recipients in the Oregon health insurance experiment, also find that enrolling in
Medicaid reduces labour force participation and earnings. In Taiwan, Kan and Lin
(2009) investigate the effect of insurance on labour market outcomes and find that
the introduction of health insurance reduces both the hours of work and the wage
rate. The mixed results on the relationship between health insurance expansion and
labour market outcomes make the studies’ findings inconclusive.
On a slightly different note, there is evidence that suggests how an increase
in government health expenditure affects the total consumption expenditure of the
elderly (Mohanty et al., 2014). In China, Bai and Wu (2014) investigate the impact of
health insurance on consumption expenditure and find that health insurance increases
non-medical related consumption.
As there is a limited number of studies conducted in sub-Saharan Africa on
the impact of health insurance on the elderly labour market outcomes, this study
investigates the effects of health insurance on healthcare utilisation and labour market
outcomes, particularly hours of work, earnings and consumption expenditure from the
sub-Saharan Africa perspective, specifically Ghana, which is vital for policy analysis.
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2.3 Data
The data used in this study are drawn from three cross-sections of the GLSS
conducted by the Ghana Statistical Service. The GLSS is a nationally representative
multipurpose household survey of living standard in Ghana. These three
cross-sections are the fourth (1998/99), fifth (2005/06) and sixth (2012/13) rounds.
The fourth round has a sample of more than 5,998 households with over 25,000
individuals; the fifth round has 8,687 households with 37,128 individuals; and the
sixth round has a significantly larger number of interviewees compared with previous
years, with 16,772 households and 72,168 individuals.4
The analysis is limited to individuals aged 55-85 years given that the focus of the
study is on the elderly engaging in informal sector work. In Ghana, formal sector
workers can opt to voluntarily retire from age 55-59 years, with compulsory retirement
at age 60. There is no a stipulated retirement age for informal sector workers, however
individuals may choose to continue to work in the informal sector after retiring from
their formal sector jobs. Figure 2.1, which presents employment status by age group
in the 2005/06 survey, shows that the share of formal sector workers decreases from
25% for individuals aged 55-59 years to 10% for those aged 60-64 years. By contrast,
the share of informal sector workers remains steady from age 50 onwards, and falls
slightly for the age groups 70-79 years. The upper limit of 85 years serves to capture
individuals who are physically able to engage in agricultural work.
The number of individuals aged 55-85 years in each survey round was 2,231
(1998/99), 3,072 (2005/06) and 6,715 (2012/13), with a combined sample of 12,018.
This sample includes elderly who reported illness and those who were not ill two weeks
before the survey. The study focuses on the elderly who reported illness and sought
for medical treatment before the survey. After excluding observations of the elderly
with no health conditions prior to the survey (9,906) and missing responses (58),
the resultant sample size for the elderly reduced to 2,054 for health care utilisation
4The significant increase in observations in the succeeding years is due, firstly, to an increase
in the number of households included in the survey so as to capture more individuals. Secondly,
additional sections were introduced in successive surveys, which increases the number of observations
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Figure 2.1: Employment status of the elderly by age group
analysis. In terms of labour market outcomes, the study focused on the elderly who
had been utilising healthcare services two weeks before the survey. In this sample,
some elderly reported hours of work, earnings and consumption expenditure, whereas
others did not. This analysis focused on the individuals who reported their hours of
work, earnings and consumption expenditure. After excluding missing responses for
hours of work, earnings and consumption expenditure, the sample reduced to 768
observations.
This study is concerned with the impacts having health insurance has on
healthcare utilisation and labour market outcomes. In each year, the survey collects a
number of health care utilisation measures. The first, measure is a facility respondents
visit when they are ill. With this outcome, we assigned 1 to facilities such as hospital,
clinics and pharmacies that are covered by health insurance, and 0 for facilities such
patient homes, chemical stores, consultants homes and other homes not covered by
the NHIS. The second measure is whether or not respondents are treated by health
professionals when they are ill. For this outcome, the study assigned 1 to treatment
by trained health professional such as doctors, dentist, nurse, medical assistant
midwife and pharmacist, and 0 to non-health professionals such as traditional healers,
spiritualist and other healers. The third measure is whether or not they had been
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admitted to hospital two weeks prior to the survey.
Measures of labour market outcomes that are collected in the survey include hours
worked per week, employment status, annual total earnings, and annual earnings for
agricultural work. In the survey, the observed hours of work per week range from
0 to 120 hours. The study restricts the number of hours of work of individuals
working in the informal sector to 60, which corresponds to the 90th percentile of
the distribution of observed work hours in the informal sector as shown in Table A1
in Appendix A.5 The study converts annualised variables such as annual earnings
and consumption expenditure into weeks by dividing by 52 to commensurate with
other variables captured in weeks. A logarithm transformation is applied to all hours
worked and income variables. The study converted the income variables from Ghana
Cedis to US Dollars.6
The control variables that are used in this study can be classified into the following
categories: individual and household demographic characteristics (age, marital status,
gender, household size, ethnicity), socioeconomic characteristics (highest education
level, employment status, household wealth, and time and cost of transport to
travel to health facility), health status measure (illness) and geographical information
(region/state, rural and urban)
Panel A in Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics of healthcare utilisation by the
elderly aged 55-69 years and those 70 years and over by survey year. The estimates
show that, on average, health insurance increased health care use much more for
the elderly age 70 years and over compared to those aged 55-69 years. Healthcare
utilisation is also higher in 2005/06 compared to 1998/99, but the significant point
is that the utilisation increased for those aged 70 years and over compared with
those below 70 years. The differences in health care use between the elderly aged
70 years and over and those below 70 years in 2012/13 are similar to the 2005/06
5The study limits the number of hours worked in the informal sector to 60 hours per week
because the hours of work in the 75th percentile in the distribution of observed hours is 45 hours,
which is equivalent to the maximum hour worked by formal sector workers. Workers in the informal
sector work more than those in the formal sector, and the next highest category hours is 60 hours,
which corresponds to the 90th percentile in the distribution of observed hours. The study therefore
considered 60 hours per week the number of hours worked by the workers in the informal sector.
6The study used average Ghana Cedis to US Dollar rate within the study period (2016-2019) at
the rate of GH¢4.3 = US$1
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sample. These differences in healthcare utilisation in the survey years contributed to
the application of the DID estimation technique. On average, the elderly respondents
aged 55-69 years and those aged 70 years and over visited a health facility in the two
weeks prior to the survey in 2012/13 (93.1% vs 93.6%), with the proportion being
larger than those in the 2005/06 (88.8% vs 90.3%) and 1998/99 (77% vs 69.2%)
samples. The proportion of the elderly below 70 years and those 70 years and over
treated by a health professional when ill were 81.7% vs 76.1% in the 1998/99 sample,
93% vs 94.4% in the 2005/06 sample and 96.1% vs 96.3% in the 2012/13 sample. In
terms of receiving hospital care, the means percentages for the elderly below 70 years
and those 70 years and over are 4.3% vs 5.1% in 1998/99, 4.2% vs 7.4% in 2005/06
and 5.1% vs 6.2% in 2012/13.
Panel B in Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics of the labour market outcomes
and consumption sample by survey year. The average hours worked per week by the
elderly below 70 years and those aged 70 years and over were 22.8 vs 21.5 hours in
the 1998/99 sample, 31.6 vs 24.1 hours in the 2005/06 sample and 32.1 vs 29.4 hours
2012/13 sample. The mean weekly earnings of the elderly below 70 years and those
aged 70 years plus were $0.50 vs $0.30 in the 1998/99 sample, $2.70 vs $1.90 in the
2005/06 and 0$10.20 vs $12.90 in the 2012/13 sample. The mean weekly consumption
expenditures were $0.90 vs $0.70 in the 1998/99, $3.30 vs $3.00 in the 2005/06 and
$11.60 vs $ 14.00 in the 2012/13 sample.
The estimates show that on average there has been a successive increase in
healthcare utilisation and some labour market outcomes since the introduction of
the NHIS in 2003. The extent to which these increases are due to the introduction
of the NHIS is the question this study seeks to address.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics: Healthcare outcomes, weekly hours of work,
earnings and consumption expenditure
1999 2006 2012
55-69 70 + 55-69 70 + 55-69 70 +
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Healthcare outcomes
Health facility 0.770 0.692 0.888 0.903 0.931 0.936
Standard deviation [0.422] [0.464] [0.316] [0.297] [0.253] [0.244]
Health professional 0.817 0.761 0.930 0.944 0.961 0.963
Standard deviation [0.387] [0.429] [0.256] [0.230] [0.194] [0.188]
Hospital care 0.043 0.051 0.042 0.074 0.051 0.062
Standard deviation [0.204] [0.222] [0.201] [0.262] [0.220] [0.421]
Observations 230 117 356 216 707 436
Panel B: Labour market outcomes
Hours of work 22.79 21.50 31.55 24.05 32.12 29.37
Standard deviation [12.53] [14.27] [13.81] [14.79] [15.67] [15.80]
Earnings 0.538 0.324 2.69 1.88 10.24 12.94
Standard deviation [0.746] [0.565] [3.91] [2.54] [27.57] [23.28]
Consumption expenditure 0.88 0.66 3.34 3.04 11.55 13.99
Standard deviation [0.70] [0.32] [3.11] [3.21] [9.83] [11.54]
Observations 100 34 187 86 210 143
Note: Hour of work, earnings and consumption expenditure are in a week. Earnings and
consumption expenditure are in the US dollars. “Health facility” measures a facility respondents
visit when they are ill. “Health professional” measures whether or not respondents are treated by
health professionals when they are ill. “Hospital care” measures whether or not respondents had
been admitted to the hospital two weeks prior to the survey.
2.4 Econometrics framework
The study employs a DID approach to quantify the effects of health insurance on
healthcare use and labour market outcomes. To improve healthcare access for the
elderly in Ghana, health insurance is provided free to elderly individuals aged 70
and over. The study therefore assigns individuals aged 70 years and over to the
treatment group, and those below 70 years to the control group.7 Given that our
sample comprises individuals 55-85 years of age, individuals in the control group are
7The study chose the elderly below 70 years not entitled to the NHIS as a control group because
free elderly healthcare is a national policy implemented across the country at the same period
(time). Both groups (elderly above and below 70 years) are within the retirement age and are likely
to have a similar characteristic in terms of medical needs, healthcare expenditure and labour force




In the model specification, suppose the study defines W = 1 to denote the elderly
who received free health insurance (treatment group) and W = 0 for those who did
not receive free health insurance (control group). Furthermore, the study observes
two time periods, where pre and post are defined as time periods prior to, and after,
the introduction of the NHIS respectively. Following Ravallion (2001), the average
treatment effect of the treated (ATET) under the potential outcome framework is
expressed as:
ATET = E[Yi,post − Yi,pre|Xi, Zi,Wi = 1]− E[Yi,post − Yi,pre|Xi, Zi,Wi = 0] (2.1)
where Yi represents healthcare use and labour outcomes of individuals. Xi represents
the observed covariates that consist of individuals and household characteristics; and
Zi denotes individual-specific unobserved characteristics.
Individuals in the sample may have different characteristics (observed and
unobserved), which might explain the differences in the outcome (rather than the
program being the cause). If unobserved characteristic Zi is time-invariant or
time-variant but has the same time trend between the treated and control groups, we
can eliminate these individual-specific characteristics with a DID approach. Based
on the above argument, the ATET in equation (2.1) can be expressed as:
ATET = E[Yi,post − Yi,pre|Xi,Wi = 1]− E[Yi,post − Yi,pre|Xi,Wi = 0] (2.2)
Equation (2.2) can be expressed in a regression approach in the form of:
Yi = α + δINSURANCEi + θPOST + β(INSURANCEi × POST ) + γXi + εi
(2.3)
where INSURANCEi is the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the elderly
receive free health insurance and 0 for those who did not receive free health insurance.
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The indicator POST is equal to 1 for the time periods after the NHIS has been
introduced and 0 otherwise. Xi is a vector of control variables. β is the key parameter
of interest and is equivalent to the ATET in equation (2.2). εi is the idiosyncratic
error term.
2.4.1 Pre-treatment test
Prior to the introduction of the NHIS, there may have been unobserved factors that
could have evolved differently between treated and control groups, which may also
affect the outcomes the study are interested in studying. The existence of these
unobserved factors may lead to a violation of the parallel trend assumption, which
could potentially lead to a bias in the estimation of our treatment effect β. To assess
the presence of these factors, the paper conducts a balancing test on the covariates of
our sample before the introduction of the NHIS to determine if there are significant
differences in the observable characteristics between the treated and control groups.
Table 2.2 describes the differences in the outcomes and the remaining covariates
in the treatment and control group before the NHIS was introduced. As observed
in the Table 2.2, there are no significant differences between the treated and control
group in most of the covariates prior to the NHIS intervention. A test of parallel
trend assumptions requires at least two years of data prior to the introduction of the
policy in question. In our application, the study has data from one year of the GLSS.
For most of the outcome variables, there are no significant differences in the mean of
the variables by treatment and control status.
Figure A1 to Figure A5 illustrate the impact of health insurance on labour
market outcomes, consumption expenditure and healthcare utilisation before and
after the introduction of the NHIS policy. The figures reveal a noticeable increase in
earnings, consumption expenditure, hours worked and healthcare utilisation after the
implementation of the NHIS. Thus, on average, there has been a successive increase
in labour market outcomes, consumption expenditure and healthcare utilisation since
the introduction of the NHIS in 2003. Figure A1 and Figure A2 illustrate earnings and
consumption expenditure (in US dollars) before and after the NHIS implementation,
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Table 2.2: Pre-treatment balancing test
Variables Treatment Control Difference P-value
Outcomes
Health facility 0.692 0.770 0.077 0.120
Health professional 0.761 0.817 0.057 0.215
Hospitalised care 0.051 0.043 -0.008 0.744
Hours worked 21.50 22.97 1.467 0.830
Earnings 0.327 0.538 0.211 0.592
Consumption expenditure 0.657 0.884 0.227 0.532
Covariates
Poorest 0.174 0.110 -0.064 0.211
Poor 0.101 0.150 0.048 0.345
Medium 0.130 0.189 0.059 0.298
Rich 0.232 0.189 -0.043 0.479
Richest 0.362 0.362 -0.001 0.997
Employment 0.043 0.078 0.035 0.217
Male 0.470 0.378 -0.092 0.101
Health status 0.863 0.852 -0.011 0.782
Household size 3.493 3.843 0.350 0.420
Western region 0.061 0.080 0.019 0.537
Central region 0.105 0.138 0.033 0.397
Greater Accra region 0.105 0.080 -0.025 0.441
Volta region 0.192 0.147 -0.046 0.276
Eastern region 0.175 0.169 -0.007 0.880
Ashanti region 0.175 0.191 0.016 0.727
Brong-Ahafo region 0.070 0.053 -0.017 0.536
Northern region 0.035 0.062 0.027 0.294
Upper East region 0.044 0.036 -0.008 0.708
Upper west region 0.035 0.044 0.009 0.689
Time taken to Health facility 3.398 3.480 0.082 0.855
Akans 0.487 0.513 0.025 0.650
Ga Dangbe 0.104 0.087 -0.050 0.151
Ewe 0.162 0.157 -0.006 0.888
Guans 0.051 0.061 0.010 0.718
Northern 0.094 0.143 0.049 0.192
No Tribe 0.068 0.039 -0.029 0.234
Note: The table reflects averages in the pre-treatment period, a year before the introduction of the
NHIS in 2003; earnings and consumption expenditure are given in the US dollars.
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and we observe a significant increase in average earnings and household consumption
after the NHIS introduction. Figure A3 shows hours of work and that relatively
younger people have the ability to work more hours than older people. The estimate
reveals a significant increase in hours worked by the elderly after the provision of
free health care. In terms of healthcare utilisation, as illustrated in Figure A4
and Figure A5, the figures show an increase in healthcare utilisation by the elderly
after the introduction of the NHIS. Overall, the average earnings, hours worked,
consumption expenditure and healthcare utilisation of the elderly was higher after
the NHIS implementation than before, as illustrated in Figure A1 to Figure A5
In addition to the balancing test, the study further assesses the robustness of our
results by performing a number of falsification tests. The results of these tests are
discussed after presenting the key findings of the study. The next section presents
the key results of the paper.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Health insurance and healthcare utilisation
Table 2.3 reports the parameter estimates of β, the DID estimates showing the effects
of the NHIS policy on healthcare utilisation by the elderly. In all specifications,
the study estimates clustered standard errors by region to allow for within-group
correlation and report them in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Here,
the study uses three waves, 1998/99, 2005/06 and 2012/13, where 1998/99 is the
pre-NHIS period, and 2005/06 and 2012/13 are the post-NHIS periods. The results
show that having health insurance increases the probability of visiting a health
facility and being treated by a health professional. Specifically, having health
insurance increases the probability that elderly individuals visit a health facility by 9.3
percentage points (10.4% of the mean), and increases the probability of being treated
by a health professional by 6.9 percentage points (7.4% of the mean). In terms of
hospital care as shown in column (3), the elderly with free NHIS are less likely to be
hospitalised, although the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant.
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Table 2.3: DID estimates of the effect of health insurance on healthcare utilisation
Outcome variables Health Health Hospital
facility professional care
(1) (2) (3)
Insurance×Post 0.093** 0.069** -0.005
(0.039) (0.035) (0.028)
R-squared 0.076 0.083 0.053
Mean of outcome variable 0.891 0.927 0.053
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,054 2,054 2,054
Note: Standard errors, clustered by region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Weekly hours worked is the dependent variable and is given in logarithm form.
The covariates include demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, ethnicity);
socioeconomic characteristics (employment status and educational status); health status measure
(illness); region; and year fixed effect.
2.5.2 Heterogeneous effect of health insurance on healthcare
utilisation
To assess the presence of a heterogeneous effect, the study estimates the impact of
the NHIS policy by gender and whether the elderly respondent lives in an urban
or rural area.8 The results presented in Table 2.4 show that there is a significant
difference in health facility visits between elderly men and women. Elderly men with
free health care are 12.6 percentage points (14.3% of the mean) more likely to visit a
health facility compared with those without free health care. Thus, the probability of
elderly men visiting a health facility for a proper treatment when ill is higher for those
with free NHIS compared with those without it. For women, the study finds that
insurance does not have a significant effect on health facility visits. With regard to
treatment by health professionals and hospital care, the study did not find significant
differences between elderly men and women.
In terms of rurality, the study did not find a significant difference in healthcare
utilisation between the elderly residing in rural areas and those in urban areas. Most
of the estimates for those in rural areas show a positive effect and those in urban areas
8The provision of health facilities in Ghana is not uniform across the country. People may have
free health insurance but may not have access, to health facilities. The study therefore investigates
how the elderly’s place of residence affects healthcare utilisation. In terms of gender, the study seeks
to investigate whether there is a significant difference in healthcare utilisation between elderly men
and women in Ghana.
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Table 2.4: DID estimates of heterogenous effect of health insurance on healthcare
utilisation




Insurance×Post 0.126* 0.068 -0.019
(0.060) (0.075) (0.033)
R-squared 0.125 0.142 0.047
Mean of outcome variable 0.879 0.911 0.061
Observations 848 848 848
Females
Insurance×Post 0.039 0.041 -0.018
(0.044) (0.043) (0.046)
R-squared 0.059 0.051 0.058
Mean of outcome variable 0.899 0.939 0.048
Observations 1,206 1,206 1,206
Living in rural area
Insurance×Post 0.125 0.103 -0.064
(0.087) (0.076) (0.044)
R-squared 0.133 0.130 0.034
Mean of outcome variable 0.862 0.909 0.184
Observations 875 875 875
Living in urban area
Insurance×Post -0.0002 -0.0674 0.0269
(0.107) (0.0823) (0.0265)
R-squared 0.121 0.077 0.057
Mean of outcome variable 0.938 0.955 0.185
Observations 536 536 536
Note: Standard errors, clustered by regions, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *
p<0.1. All the estimates in Table 2.4 are subgroup analysis. The covariates include demographic
characteristics (age, gender, marital status, ethnicity); socioeconomic characteristics (employment
status, educational status and time taken to travel to the hospital); health status measure (illness),
region and year fixed effect.
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show a negative effect, but neither is statistically significant. That is, there is no
significant difference between the elderly with free health care and those without free
health care residing in both rural and urban centres in terms of healthcare utilisation.
Overall, the results suggest that the elderly’s place of residence does not influence
their healthcare use.
2.5.3 Health insurance and labour market outcomes
The study also examined the effect of health insurance on the elderly’s hours of
work and earnings. In this analysis, the study focuses on the working hours and
earnings of elderly individuals in the informal sector, specifically those who work in
the agricultural sector, given that a large proportion of the elderly are engaged in
work as farmers.
Table 2.5: DID estimates of the effect of health insurance on weekly hours of work
Variables Combined Males Females
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Informal sector
Insurance×Post 0.404** 0.620** 0.285*
(0.115) (0.186) (0.131)
R-squared 0.061 0.062 0.098
Mean hour of work 31.12 31.52 28.37
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 768 426 342
Panel B: Agricultural sector
Insurance×Post 0.407** 0.390** 0.544**
(0.126) (0.147) (0.222)
R-squared 0.067 0.046 0.104
Mean hour of work 28.88 30.64 26.12
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 511 312 199
Note: Standard errors, clustered by region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Weekly hours worked is the dependent variable and are given in the logarithm
form. The covariates include demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, ethnicity);
socioeconomic characteristics (employment status and educational status); health status measure
(illness); region; and year fixed effect.
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Compared with other sectors, the majority of the elderly in the informal sector
work in agriculture. As shown in Table A2 in Appendix A, about 70% of the elderly
in the sample work in the agricultural sector. The study, therefore, focuses on hours
of work and earnings in the informal sector as a whole and those in the agricultural
sector. We also consider the elderly’s hours of work and earnings in terms of gender.9
Table 2.5 describes the effects of the NHIS on hours of work of the elderly in
the informal sector in general (Panel A) and the agricultural sector (Panel B). The
estimates in both panels show positive and statistically significant effects of insurance
on hours of work. In Panel A, the result in column (1) shows that having insurance
increases the weekly number of hours of work in the informal sector by 40.4%. In
terms of gender, the effect is slightly larger for males (62%) than females (29%).10
In the agricultural sector as shown in Panel B, we observe that, providing the
elderly free insurance have increases their weekly number of hours of work in the
agricultural sector by 41%. However, a slightly larger effect of insurance is observed
for females (54.4%) compared with males (39%).11 The result suggests that elderly
women in Ghana work more hours than men in the agricultural sector, but in informal
sector as a whole, men work more hours than women.
In terms of earnings, the estimates in Table 2.6 show a positive and statistically
significant effect of NHIS on weekly earnings across the panels. The estimates in
Panel A are earnings in the informal sector as a whole. The findings show that
having free health insurance increases earnings by 66%, with the estimated effect
larger for females (73.4%) compared with males (59.4%).12 In the agricultural sector,
the estimates are similar to those in the informal sector as a whole in terms of signs
9In this subsection, the study did not consider the heterogeneous effect in terms of the elderly
place of residence (rural or urban) because most of the agricultural in activities (farming) in Ghana
occur in rural areas rather than urban centres.
10Since the labour market outcomes have been log-transformed, we estimate increases in
hours of work in the informal sector by computing (exp(coefficient)-1)*100=[exp(0.404)-1]*100=
49.78%. In terms of gender, hours of work increase by 85.89%=[exp(0.620)-1]*100 for males and
32.98%=[exp(0.285)-1]*100 for females when insurance status changes from 0 to 1.
11With regard to the agriculture sector, hours of work increase by 50.23%=[exp(0.407)-1]*100 and
is higher for females 72.23%=[exp(0.544)-1]*100 than males 47.70%=[exp(0.388)-1]*100 for females
when insurance status changes from 0 to 1
12Thus, earnings in the informal sector increases by 92.71%=[exp(0.656)-1]*100 and are higher for
females 108.34%=[exp(0.734)-1]*100 than males 81.12%=[exp(0.594)-1]*100 when insurance status
changes from 0 to 1.
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Table 2.6: DID estimates of the effect of health insurance on weekly earnings
Variables Combined Males Females
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Informal sector
Insurance×Post 0.656*** 0.594** 0.734**
(0.134) (0.190) (0.194)
R-squared 0.396 0.395 0.306
Mean earnings ($) 7.58 10.08 4.46
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 768 426 342
Panel B. Agricultural sector
Insurance×Post 0.682*** 0.905** 0.388**
(0.237) (0.283) (0.204)
R-squared 0.370 0.383 0.336
Mean earnings ($) 9.85 12.01 6.45
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 511 312 199
Note: Standard errors, clustered by region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Weekly earnings is the dependent variable and are given in the logarithm form.
The covariates include demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, ethnicity);
socioeconomic characteristics (employment status and educational status); health status measure
(illness); region; and year fixed effect.
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and statistical significance. The findings show that providing free NHIS through
the exemption of health insurance premium payments increases earnings in the
agricultural sector by 68.2%, with the earnings being increased by 91% for males
and 39% for females.13
The estimates in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 indicate that irrespective of gender,
having health insurance increases the number of hours worked and earnings of the
elderly. In the informal sector, the results reveal that men work more hours than
women, but women earn more than men in this sector. These differences in earnings
may be due to the activities both men and women engage in. Most women in this
sector engage in petty trading and these contributes to regular or daily earnings,
compared with the artisan activities men engage in, in this sector. However, in the
agricultural sector the situation is completely different. Whereas women work more
hours, they earn less compared with men. These differences in earnings may also
be due to agricultural activities both engage in: most women engage in subsistence
farming, while men engage in cash crops and plantation farming (Fortmann, 2009).
This may account for the differences in earnings between the elderly men and women
in the agricultural sector.
2.5.4 Health insurance and consumption
There is evidence internationally that ill-health affects the consumption of individuals
and households in developing countries, and the effects are larger among the poor
relative to the rich. The mechanism through which this occurs is that illness reduces
the ability of individuals to participate in the labour force, and this negatively
affects earnings. This reduction in earnings in turn affects consumption (Asfaw and
Braun, 2004; Sparrow et al., 2014). Since having health insurance reduces health
expenditure, as already stressed, the study examines the impact of the NHIS on
households’ food consumption expenditure. In this analysis, household consumption
13With regard to earnings in the agricultural sector increases by 97.78%=[exp(0.682)-1]*100 when
insurance changes from 0 to 1. In terms of gender, earnings increase by 147.19%=[exp(0.905)-1]*100
for males and 47.40%=[exp(0.388)-1]*100 for females when insurance status changes from 0 to 1.
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is also considered in terms of wealth-quintiles.14
Table 2.7: DID estimates of the effect of health insurance on weekly food
consumption expenditure
Outcome variables Combined Low-wealth High-wealth
group group
(1) (2) (3)
Insurance×Post 0.319** 0.153** 0.390*
(0.126) (0.072) (0.101)
R-squared 0.617 0.642 0.739
Mean consumption expenditure ($) 9.12 6.83 11.37
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 768 381 387
Note: Standard errors, clustered by region, are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Weekly consumption expenditure is the dependent variable and are given in the logarithm
form. The covariates include demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, ethnicity);
socioeconomic characteristics (employment status and educational status); health status measure
(illness); region; and year fixed effect.
The results shown in Table 2.7 indicate that exempting the elderly from
health insurance premium payments increases household weekly food consumption
expenditure by 32%, with the increase being slightly larger for the elderly in the
high-wealth group (39%) compared with those in the low-wealth group (15.3%).15 As
the majority of the elderly in Ghana are in the low-wealth group, the results suggest
that subsidising healthcare expenditure of the elderly improves food consumption of
the elderly in both low and high-income groups in Ghana.
2.5.5 Falsification (placebo) test
The validity of the DID estimates hinges on the parallel trend assumption being
satisfied. Thus, the trends in the outcome variables between the elderly with free
health care and those without free health care would have remained similar in the
14The GLSS wealth index categorises households into 5 wealth quintiles: poorest (1st quintile),
poor (2nd quintile), middle (3rd quintile), richer (4th quintile), richest (5th quintile). This helps
in distinguishing between poor and wealthy households. In the estimation, the study categorised
the 1st and 2nd wealth quintiles as a low-wealth group and 4th and 5th quintiles as a high-wealth
group.
15In other words, food consumption expenditure increases by 37.58%=[exp(0.319)-1]*100. In
terms of wealth quintile, consumption increases by 47.70%=[exp(0.390)-1]*100 for the elderly in
high-wealth group and 16.53%=[exp(0.153)-1]*100 for those in high-wealth group.
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absence of the NHIS, but this identifying assumption is not directly tested.16 The
study therefore conducted a pre-treatment balancing test analysis on variables of
interest before the policy intervention. As shown in Table 2.2, the pre-treatment
balancing test suggests that there are no significant differences between the elderly
with free NHIS and those without it on most of the covariates before the policy
implementation. This section examines other falsification (placebo) tests to check
the validity of our results.
In the baseline model, the elderly aged 70 years and over were the treated group,
but to conduct falsification analysis, the study assigned elderly individuals aged 55-69
years who are not affected by the policy as the treated group and those aged 40-55
years as a control group. The results from the falsification tests are reported in
Table 2.8 to Table 2.10. In all specifications, the estimates are either insignificant or
have the wrong signs for most of the outcome variables. Column (1) to column (3) in
Table 2.8 reports the estimates of the effect of NHIS on healthcare use, and the results
as shown in column (1) to column (3) in Panel A are imprecisely estimated. Thus,
the estimates are different in terms of signs and statistically significant compared
with the baseline DID results presented in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4, specifically the
health facility visits and treatment by the health professional.
16A test of parallel trend assumptions requires at least two years of data prior to the introduction
of the policy in question. In this analysis, the study has access to only one year of data from the
GLSS, therefore, it was not possible to perform a regression analysis before the policy intervention.
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Table 2.8: Placebo checks on healthcare utilisation
Health facility Health professional Hospital care
Panel A: Full sample
Insurance×Post -0.001 0.006 0.009
(0.039) (0.031) (0.022)
Mean of outcome variable 0.898 0.932 0.056
Observations 3,496 3,496 3,496
Panel B: Subgroup
Males
Insurance×Post 0.057 0.097 0.006
(0.065) (0.061) (0.026)
Mean of outcome variable 0.895 0.925 0.061
Observations 1,362 1,362 1,362
Females
Insurance×Post -0.031 0.045 0.006
(0.059) (0.049) (0.027)
Mean of outcome variable 0.901 0.937 0.053
Observations 2,134 2,134 2,134
Living in rural areas
Insurance×Post 0.050 0.029 0.025
(0.060) (0.060) (0.023)
Mean of outcome variable 0.870 0.916 0.046
Observations 1,290 1,290 1,290
Living in urban areas
Insurance×Post 0.091 0.095 0.026
(0.061) (0.081) (0.043)
Mean of outcome variable 0.953 0.967 0.049
Observations 896 896 896
Note: Standard errors, clustered by region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *
p<0.1. The covariates include demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, ethnicity);
socioeconomic characteristics (employment status, educational status and time taken to travel to the
hospital); health status measure (illness); region; and year fixed effect.
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Table 2.9: Placebo checks on weekly hours of work and earnings
Hours Earnings
Combined Males Females Combined Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Informal sector
Insurance×Post 0.009 0.071 0.210 0.301 0.240 0.404
(0.099) (0.089) (0.151) (0.225) (0.232) (0.362)
R-squared 0.037 0.045 0.040 0.379 0.412 0.241
Mean of outcome variable 32.55 33.91 30.48 $7.44 $9.99 $3.59
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,408 849 559 1,408 849 559
Panel B: Agricultural sector
Insurance×Post 0.060 0.254 -0.185 -0.015 -0.201 0.006
(0.126) (0.129) (0.053) (0.219) (0.291) (0.268)
R-squared 0.030 0.015 0.056 0.389 0.407 0.325
Mean of outcome variable 31.60 33.47 27.94 $10.23 $12.73 $5.22
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 785 520 265 785 520 265
Note: Standard errors, clustered by region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Weekly hours worked is the dependent variable and
are given in the logarithm form. Weekly hours worked and earnings are the dependent variable and are given in the logarithm form. The covariates include
demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, ethnicity); socioeconomic characteristics (employment status, educational status and time taken to
travel to the hospital); health status measure (illness); region; and year fixed effect.
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The results indicate that health insurance has no statistically significant effect
on most of the healthcare outcomes. The study applied the falsification test to the
weekly hours worked and earnings of the elderly. The results presented in columns
(1) to (6) of Table 2.9 also show insignificant effects of the NHIS on weekly hours
worked and earnings of the elderly. As shown in columns (1) to (3) of Table 2.10,
the findings for food consumption are different from the baseline results, which also
suggest insignificant effects of the NHIS on consumption expenditure. The overall
results are either insignificant or have the wrong signs for most of the outcome
variables examined. These are in direct opposition to our baseline model. The
pre-treatment balancing test and falsification tests described above suggest that the
differences in most of the outcome variables between the elderly with free health care
and those without free health care could be attributed largely to the introduction of
the NHIS policy.
Table 2.10: Placebo checks on weekly food consumption expenditure
Outcome variables Combined Low-wealth High-wealth
group group
(1) (2) (3)
Insurance×Post -0.105 0.075 -0.263*
(0.084) (0.046) (0.062)
R-squared 0.663 0.697 0.759
Mean consumption expenditure ($) 10.01 6.26 9.55
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,408 744 664
Note: Standard errors, clustered by region, are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Weekly Consumption expenditure is the dependent variable and are given in the logarithm
form. Demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, ethnicity); Socioeconomic
characteristics (employment status, educational status, wealth quintiles and hours worked); Health
status measure (illness); region; and year fixed effect.
2.5.6 Robustness check: propensity score matching with
DID
The study assesses the robustness of the results using a combined propensity
score matching and difference-in-difference (PSMDID) estimation technique as an
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alternative empirical model to check the robustness of the baseline results. The
PSMDID can accommodate unobserved factors of the control group that are constant
over time and more likely to affect program participation. It also helps to eliminate
the observed and unobserved characteristics that are constant over time and are
more likely to affect the treatment effect of the outcome variables (Heckman et al.,
1998, 1999; Imbens, 2004; Blundell et al., 2004; Wagstaff et al., 2009; Wang et al.,
2009; Gertler et al., 2016; Cheng et al., 2015). The specification of PSMDID is
little different from the treatment effect specification in equation (2.2). According to
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), if potential outcomes are independent of participation
conditional on the observable factors, then they are also independent of participation
status conditional on the propensity score, p(Xi) ≡ P (Wi = 1|Xi) = E(Wi|Xi)
= P (Wi = 1|Xi). Thus, the probability of receiving treatment given the observed
covariate is based on the propensity score of treated and control groups. The study,
therefore, substitutes the propensity score into equation (2.2), and the model is
expressed as:
ATET = E[Yi,post − Yi,pre|p(Xi),Wi = 1]− E[Yi,post − Yi,pre|p(Xi),Wi = 0] (2.4)
Estimating equation (2.4) should fall strictly within the unit interval (range), 0 <
P (Wi = 1|p(Xi)) < 1, known as common support. According to Blundell and Dias
(2009), the common support in PSMDID ensures that all the observations in a treated
group have a counterpart in the control group before and after the intervention. To
implement the PSMDID, the study estimates the propensity score of individuals
given their observed covariates with the logit model at the first stage. The study
then matches the elderly who receive treatment with those in the control group
by their propensity score. The study uses the average weight obtained from the
propensity score from the first stage to run the treatment effect regression. Several
propensity score matching (PSM) techniques have been proposed for the identification
of a control group in the first stage estimation of the propensity score. A kernel
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matching approach is applied,17 and all the estimates are based on bandwidth 0.06.
In all specifications, the study imposed common supports in the estimation.
A. Balancing tests of PSMDID covariates
The validity of the PSMDID estimation requires satisfaction of most of the
post-estimation conditions, such as minimum mean and median biases, and most
of the post-estimation conditions required for consistent estimates were satisfied.
The covariates of treated and control groups should balance, therefore, the study
performed a series of iterations, and the balancing properties were also satisfied in all
specifications. The estimation of ATET is defined in the region, therefore, the study
checks the region of common supports of treated and control groups using their
propensity density function. The results as shown in Figure A12 to Figure A17 in
Appendix A indicate that the common supports assumption is not violated, because
most of the estimated density masses are within the range of the region of common
supports. The tests showing the matching qualities are also presented in Table A5
in Appendix A. Table A5 describes the overall covariates balancing test of each
specification. The first column of data shows a significant reduction of pseudo-R2
after matching. The next two columns (3) and (4) show the likelihood test ratio of
joint significance and the p-value, and it is expected to be statistically significant
before matching, indicating the differences between treated and control groups, and
insignificant after matching, suggesting otherwise. The results shown in Table A5
indicate that the treated and control groups are not different (similar) after matching.
The mean and median biases between treated and control groups after matching
are reduced substantially and are less than 3% as required. The absolute standard
difference of mean (B) is also less than 25% as required after matching, and the ratio
(R) of treated to control is within the range (0.5 - 2) as recommended by Rubin
(2001).
The graphical presentations as shown in Figure A6 to Figure A11 in Appendix A
are similar to the estimates in Table A5, which confirms the reduction of standard
17The kernel matching estimator used a weighted average of all individuals in the control group
to construct the counterfactual outcomes.
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biases after matching. All the balancing (diagnostic) results suggest a successful
covariate balance between treated and control groups. The diagnostics test results
reported in Appendix A indicate that the differences between the treated and control
group are minimal, therefore our analyses between them are reliable.
B. PSMDID results
Table A6 in Appendix A describes the results of healthcare utilisation in the PSMDID.
The estimates as shown in column (1) to column (3) of Panel A in Table A6 are similar
to the DID results in Table 2.3 in terms of signs and statistical significance. Table A7
also describes the estimates of the elderly’s hours of work and earnings, and most of
the results similar to the DID results in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 in terms of signs and
statistical significance. The results of food consumption expenditure by the elderly
(reported in columns (1) to (3) in Table A8) are also not different from the DID
results in Table 2.7 in terms of signs and statistical significance. The major differences
between the DID and PSMDID in most of the model specifications is the magnitude
of the estimated coefficients. This variation may be a result of observations used
in the estimation. In the PSMDID as already elaborated, the estimations are made
within the region of common support, and observations outside common supports
are usually dropped from the estimation. This drop in observations could account
for the differences in magnitude between the DID and PSMDID coefficients. The
results suggest that the effects of health insurance on healthcare utilisation and labour
market outcomes are robust to alternative estimation techniques.
2.6 Discussions
This study employs a DID approach to examine the effects of health insurance on
healthcare utilisation and labour market outcomes of the elderly in Ghana. The study
also applies the PSMDID and falsification (placebo) tests to check the robustness of
the baseline results. In all specifications, the study clustered the standard errors by
age to allow within-group correlation at the individual level. The study performed
trend analysis for the period before the policy intervention, but we did not see a trend
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for the elderly with free health care and those without free health care in terms of
the covariates before the NHIS. After the implementation of the policy in 2003, the
utilisation of healthcare services remained the same for the control group. Thus, the
elderly in the control group continue to pay for health care through premium payment
while the treated group were exempt from premium payments, and this affected the
extent to which they utilised health care.
The study categorised this analysis into three parts: The first part examines
the effects of the NHIS on healthcare utilisation of the elderly, and the second part
focuses on labour market outcomes in the informal sector (weekly hours worked and
earnings in the agricultural sector). The third part concentrates on food consumption
expenditure.
In the first part, the findings indicate that exempting the elderly from health
insurance premium payments increases the frequency of their visits to a health facility
and the probability of being treated by health professionals. A falsification test is
performed by assigning the elderly who receive no treatment as the treatment group,
and the study found no significant effects across each specification. The falsification
and pre-treatment balancing test suggests that the differences in outcome between the
elderly with free health care and those without free health care could be attributed
largely to NHIS intervention.
As the availability and distribution of health facilities in Ghana is not uniform
across the country, people may have free health insurance but may not have access
to a health facility. To investigate this, the study examines how the elderly’s place
of residence affects healthcare utilisation, and the findings reveal that there is no
significant difference in healthcare use between those residing in rural areas and those
in urban areas. The results suggest that the elderly’s place of residence does not
influence their healthcare use. Thus, irrespective of their place of residence, having
the NHIS does not affects healthcare utilisation by the elderly.
In the second part of the analysis, the study focuses on hours of work and earnings
in the informal sector of the economy, specifically the agricultural sector. The
study concentrates in the agriculture sector relative to other sectors because Ghana’s
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economy depends largely on agriculture production, and the labour force in this
sector is predominantly the elderly. The findings show a significant effect of health
insurance on weekly hours worked. Thus, giving the elderly free health care increases
the elderly’s weekly hours of work. This affects the country’s production, because
an increase in hours worked also increases output, which in turn, improves the total
output of the nation. On average, elderly males work more hours than elderly females
in the informal sector as a whole, whereas females work more hours than males in
the agricultural sector. Most females engaged in subsistence agriculture, but their
activities contribute immensely to Ghana’s economic growth and development.
Because hours of work are closely related to earnings, the study investigates the
effect of the NHIS on earnings in the agricultural sector and finds a positive and
statistically significant effect. The increase in earnings among the elderly is more
likely to improve their purchasing power and welfare, and this will help to reduce
income inequality among the elderly population in Ghana. The existing literature on
the impact of health insurance on labour market outcomes presents mixed results as
already discussed. The results are similar to the studies by Boyle and Lahey (2010)
on old veteran in the US, in which the authors find that having public insurance has
a positive effect on the income of those who are less educated. The results are also
accord with the findings of Gruber and Hanratty (1995), that the introduction of
health insurance increases wages in Canada. Their analyses were based on earnings
in the formal sector of the economy relative to the informal sector, but the results
are similar to this study.
Finally, the study examines the effects of the NHIS on the consumption
expenditures of the elderly. In this analysis, the study focuses on the elderly in low
and high-wealth groups. The findings suggest a significant effect of health insurance
on food consumption expenditure among the elderly, but the increase is larger for
those in the high-wealth group than in the low-wealth group. Healthcare is a major
area of expense for the elderly, especially those in the low-income groups in most
developing countries, therefore, subsidising health expenditure relieves the elderly in
this group from catastrophic healthcare spending. The money that would have been
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spent on health care can be channelled to other household expenditure, such as food
consumption. The estimates suggest that improving the health of the elderly through
the NHIS, especially those in the low-wealth group, also improves their consumption,
which in turn improves their welfare. The result is similar to those found in the study
by Bai and Wu (2014) in China, that find that having health insurance increases
non-medical related consumption. The overall results indicate that giving elderly
free health care improves their utilisation of health care, hours of work, earnings and
food consumption expenditure.
Despite the benefits associated with the provision of free health care for the elderly,
there are other issues that need to be addressed in order for the scheme to achieve
its intended purpose, especially the elderly health care access. There is a section of
the elderly population, specifically those aged 60-69 years, that are equally in need
of healthcare assistance in the form of free health care in order to remain healthy
and contribute to Ghana’s economic development. As elaborated, these people are
no different from the elderly aged 70 and over in terms of their medical needs, health
expenditure and labour force participation. The majority of people in this age group
are usually engaged in cocoa and other cash crop production, which make a major
contribution to Ghana’s economy, and they constitute a large labour force in the
agriculture sector. Excluding them from the free health care policy could affect
Ghana’s economy in the long run because people in these age groups are also prone
to illness.
Figure A18 in Appendix A uses United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs (DESA 2015) data from its study of adult mortality from 1995 to 2015.
The DESA, UN (2015) data reveal the high mortality rate in Ghana among the elderly
aged 60-70 years. This indicates that, periodically, Ghana loses most people within its
labour force in the agriculture sector, and this can affect Ghana’s agriculture output
if appropriate policies are not put in place. The study, therefore, recommends three
approaches. First, it is necessary for government to lower the age eligibility for free
health care to at least 60 years in order to assist more people, who may postpone
treatment for financial reasons. This will aid diagnosis and enable the resolution of
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illness-related complications that have been accumulated in individuals over time due
to financial constraints. Secondly, to help in early diagnosis and proper treatment,
it is necessary to ensure the elderly given free health care adhere to a strict periodic
health check-up, and this will also help in early diagnosis and proper treatment.
Lastly, to improve health care access, it is necessary to expand the Community-based
Health Planning and Services (CHPS) and clinics in communities where they are not
available, specifically in emerging communities, urban slums and rural (particularly
hinterland communities). The end results will be improved output and the economic
well-being of individuals, households and the nation.
There are some limitations to our estimated results. First, a test for the parallel
trends assumption requires at least two periods, as we have only one year of data
that predates the NHIS, we cannot formally test for the parallel trends assumption.
Instead, we conducted a balancing test on the covariates of the treated and control
subjects to determine if subjects differ in their observable characteristics. While the
results from a balancing test cannot, in principle, be used to rule out the presence of
unobserved factors, a sample that is balanced on observed covariates can be indicative
that the sample may also be balanced on unobserved characteristics. Second, in the
PSMDID, the study acknowledged that the combination between the PSM and DID
would control for observed and unobserved factors, but there may be confounding
factors that may influence the unobserved time-varying factors. Though the study
tested for the validity of our DID and PSMDID results, there might be a bias that
could affect the estimates. Finally, the investigation of the effect of health insurance
on labour market outcomes of the elderly in developing countries, particularly in
sub-Saharan Africa, is very limited, even though the elderly in these countries are
the source of the labour force in the agriculture sector. A major reason for this
limitation is data availability. This study may have some data challenges in terms
of the sample size and time intervals of the survey, but understanding the impact
of the Ghana NHIS and its implications is very important in developing countries’
growth and development. Despite these limitations, the study makes some important
contributions to the literature on health insurance and labour market outcomes in
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the informal sector in a developing country.
2.7 Conclusion
The elderly are more susceptible to illness and need regular medical care access, but
healthcare access for the elderly in Ghana was a challenge until the introduction of the
NHIS, under which the elderly were given free health care by exempting them from
the health insurance premium payment. The study, therefore, examines the effects
on healthcare utilisation and labour market outcomes of extending exemption from
health insurance premiums to the group of elderly aged 70 years and above. Using the
DID strategy, the study finds that subsidising health insurance premium payments
eliminates financial barriers that often confront the majority of the elderly in Ghana,
and this increases healthcare utilisation, hours worked, earnings and consumption.
The improvement in the earnings and consumption of the elderly also improves the
welfare of the entire household, because in most families in developing countries
(in sub-Saharan Africa), the elderly are the breadwinners and household heads.
Therefore, an issue that affects their labour market outcomes has implications for
the entire household. Overall, the improvement in earnings and food consumption
expenditure is expected to reduce poverty and the inequality gap that characterises
the elderly population in Ghana. To better understand how health insurance affects
mortality and savings of the elderly, further research is needed on the effects of
health insurance on elderly mortality and household savings, comparing those with
free healthcare and those without it.
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Table A1: Observed hours of work per week









observed hours Mean 33.36
75% 45 105 Std.Dev 20.03
90% 60 105 Variance 401.3
95% 70 114 Skewness 0.720
99% 90 119 Kurtosis 3.695
Note: Source: Estimation is based on GLSS data.
Table A2: Proportion of agricultural workers in the informal sector
Outcome variables Non agricultural Agricultural Total
workers workers
(1) (2) (3)
Formal sector workers 75 0 75
Informal sector workers 182 511 693
Total 257 511 768
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Table A3: Healthcare utilisation sample by survey years
All 1999 2006 2013
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OUTCOME VARIABLES
Health facility 0.891 0.312 0.744 0.437 0.893 0.309 0.934 0.248
Health professional 0.927 0.260 0.798 0.402 0.935 0.246 0.962 0.190
Hospital care 0.053 0.225 0.046 0.210 0.054 0.227 0.055 0.228
CONTROL VARIABLES
Age 66.36 8.136 65.71 7.633 66.06 8.090 66.70 8.295
Education 0.437 0.496 0.334 0.439 0.392 0.489 0.492 0.500
Male 0.413 0.492 0.409 0.492 0.432 0.496 0.404 0.491
Female 0.587 0.492 0.591 0.492 0.568 0.496 0.596 0.491
Health status 0.848 0.359 0.856 0.352 0.855 0.353 0.842 0.364
Time taken to health facility 1.283 2.522 3.452 3.967 0.815 2.184 0.859 1.614
Employed 0.532 0.499 0.066 0.249 0.656 0.476 0.611 0.488
Ethnicity
Akans 0.469 0.499 0.504 0.502 0.540 0.499 0.423 0.494
Ga Dangbe 0.066 0.248 0.104 0.305 0.061 0.255 0.056 0.231
Ewe 0.136 0.343 0.159 0.366 0.112 0.316 0.142 0.349
Guans 0.037 0.188 0.058 0.233 0.035 0.184 0.031 0.173
Northern 0.276 0.447 0.127 0.333 0.231 0.422 0.344 0.475
No tribe 0.016 0.126 0.049 0.216 0.021 0.143 0.004 0.059
Marital status
Married 0.554 0.497 0.530 0.500 0.533 0.499 0.572 0.495
Separated 0.022 0.148 0.029 0.168 0.031 0.175 0.016 0.125
Divorce 0.130 0.336 0.144 0.352 0.154 0.361 0.114 0.318
Widowed 0.290 0.454 0.297 0.458 0.278 0.448 0.294 0.456
Never married 0.003 0.058 0.002 0.048 0.003 0.059 0.004 0.066
Regions
Western 0.092 0.290 0.074 0.262 0.108 0.311 0.090 0.286
Central 0.076 0.266 0.127 0.333 0.068 0.252 0.066 0.248
Greater Accra 0.075 0.263 0.088 0.284 0.077 0.267 0.070 0.255
Volta 0.128 0.334 0.162 0.369 0.110 0.313 0.127 0.333
Eastern 0.135 0.342 0.171 0.377 0.121 0.326 0.131 0.337
Ashanti 0.159 0.365 0.186 0.390 0.198 0.339 0.131 0.338
Brong Ahafo 0.090 0.286 0.059 0.236 0.121 0.326 0.084 0.277
Northern 0.077 0.267 0.053 0.225 0.100 0.300 0.073 0.260
Upper East 0.111 0.314 0.038 0.192 0.045 0.208 0.165 0.372
Upper West 0.056 0.231 0.041 0.199 0.052 0.223 0.063 0.243
Religion
Christians 0.060 0.238 0.066 0.249 0.068 0.252 0.054 0.227
Muslims 0.697 0.460 0.720 0.449 0.696 0.460 0.691 0.462
Traditionalist 0.136 0.344 0.104 0.305 0.135 0.342 0.147 0.354
No religion 0.106 0.308 0.110 0.313 0.101 0.302 0.108 0.310
Note: Calculation is based on GLSS 1998/99, 2005/06, 2012/13.
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Table A4: Labour market outcomes sample by survey years
All 1999 2006 2013
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OUTCOME V ARIABLES
Weekly hours of work 30.12 15.29 22.79 12.52 29.19 14.53 31.21 15.75
Weekly Earnings 7.581 20.94 0.513 0.723 2.438 3.551 11.13 26.28
Weekly Consumption expenditure 9.115 10.11 0.857 0.668 3.247 3.139 13.18 11.06
CONTROL V ARIABLES
Informal sector employment 0.907 0.290 0.938 0.243 0.919 0.273 0.890 0.313
Agriculture sector employment 0.634 0.482 0.636 0.482 0.651 0.477 0.623 0.485
Age 66.33 8.151 65.69 7.694 66.06 8.104 66.66 8.296
Education 0.437 0.496 0.336 0.473 0.386 0.487 0.491 0.500
Male 0.411 0.492 0.404 0.492 0.431 0.496 0.405 0.491
Female 0.588 0.492 0.595 0.492 0.569 0.496 0.595 0.491
Health status 0.895 0.307 0.858 0.493 0.900 0.300 0.880 0.325
Employed 0.532 0.499 0.066 0.248 0.656 0.475 0.609 0.488
Household Size 4.021 3.108 3.719 2.890 3.879 3.067 4.168 3.174
Ethnicity
Akans 0.467 0.499 0.501 0.501 0.540 0.499 0.421 0.495
Ga Dangbe 0.065 0.247 0.103 0.304 0.061 0.240 0.056 0.230
Ewe 0.137 0.344 0.165 0.372 0.112 0.316 0.140 0.347
Guans 0.038 0.190 0.057 0.232 0.035 0.184 0.033 0.179
Northern 0.277 0.448 0.125 0.332 0.231 0.422 0.346 0.476
No Tribe 0.016 0.125 0.048 0.215 0.021 0.143 0.003 0.059
Marital status
Married 0.556 0.497 0.530 0.500 0.533 0.500 0.575 0.495
Separated 0.022 0.146 0.028 0.167 0.031 0.173 0.015 0.123
Divorce 0.129 0.336 0.145 0.353 0.154 0.361 0.112 0.316
Widowed 0.289 0.454 0.300 0.457 0.279 0.449 0.293 0.455
Never married 0.003 0.058 0.002 0.048 0.003 0.058 0.004 0.065
Regions
Western 0.074 0.261 0.073 0.260 0.079 0.270 0.071 0.257
Central 0.091 0.288 0.125 0.332 0.084 0.278 0.085 0.279
Greater Accra 0.043 0.203 0.087 0.283 0.034 0.183 0.034 0.182
Volta 0.139 0.346 0.160 0.367 0.138 0.345 0.134 0.340
Eastern 0.148 0.356 0.178 0.383 0.133 0.340 0.147 0.355
Ashanti 0.161 0.368 0.184 0.388 0.212 0.409 0.129 0.336
Brong Ahafo 0.079 0.270 0.061 0.240 0.100 0.300 0.074 0.261
Northern 0.087 0.282 0.052 0.223 0.100 0.300 0.091 0.287
Upper East 0.115 0.319 0.038 0.191 0.059 0.235 0.166 0.372
Upper West 0.061 0.241 0.041 0.198 0.060 0.238 0.069 0.253
Wealth quintiles
Lowest 0.146 0.353 0.133 0.340 0.128 0.334 0.159 0.366
Low 0.160 0.367 0.133 0.340 0.125 0.331 0.184 0.388
Middle 0.167 0.373 0.168 0.375 0.186 0.389 0.156 0.363
High 0.223 0.416 0.204 0.404 0.208 0.407 0.234 0.424
Highest 0.305 0.461 0.362 0.482 0.353 0.478 0.266 0.442
Residence
Urban 0.385 0.487 0.321 0.468 0.392 0.489 0.396 0.489
Rural 0.615 0.487 0.678 0.468 0.608 0.489 0.604 0.489
Note: Calculation is based on GLSS 1998/99, 2005/06, 2012/13.
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Figure A5: Health facility visits before and after the NHIS
Table A5: Overall covariates balancing tests
Samples Pseudo-R2 LRχ2 P>χ2 Mean Median B R
Bias Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Health facility visit Unmatched 0.155 123.6 0.000 14.2 11.2 99.1 0.82
Matched 0.005 2.84 1.000 2.4 1.8 17.0 1.52
Health professionals Unmatched 0.155 123.6 0.000 14.2 11.2 99.1 0.82
matched 0.005 2.84 1.000 2.4 1.8 17.0 1.52
Hospitalised care Unmatched 0.158 123.4 0.000 13.9 10.7 100 0.75
Matched 0.006 3.25 1.000 2.7 2.5 18.5 1.45
Hours worked Unmatched 0.115 98.4 0.000 12.9 9.6 85.8 0.82
Matched 0.002 1.09 1.000 1.9 1.7 10.2 1.29
Earnings Un matched 0.012 64.5 0.000 15.3 14.5 86.3 1.13
Matched 0.005 1.52 1.000 3.5 3.9 15.8 1.41
Consumption Unmatched 0.114 143.3 0.000 14.5 10.9 85.2 0.63
Matched 0.003 2.97 1.000 1.9 1.0 13.4 1.42
Note: The Pseudo-R2 shows the extend covariate explain the probability of participation. Likelihood ratio
test shows a joint significant before and after matching and is expected to be statistically significant before
matching indicating differences between treated and control groups, and insignificant after matching. Mean
and the median biases in the model are expected to be reduced considerably after matching and sufficient
bias reduction should not exceed 5%. B is the absolute standard difference of mean propensity score index
in treated and control group and is expected to be less than 25%. R is the ratio of treated to control group
of the propensity score index and also expect to fall within the range between 0.5 and 2 for the sample to
be considered balanced.
67
Table A6: PSMDID estimates of the effects of health insurance on healthcare
utilisation
Health
Health facility Health professional Hospital care
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Full sample
Insurance×Post 0.062** 0.057* -0.017
(0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
Mean of outcome variable 0.888 0.927 0.189
Observations 2,034 2,034 2,034
Panel B: Subgroup
Males
Insurance×Post 0.068 0.031 -0.006
(0.066) (0.070) (0.033)
Mean of outcome variable 0.867 0.913 0.176
Observations 842 842 842
Females
Insurance×Post 0.029 0.041 -0.023
(0.038) (0.029) (0.048)
Mean of outcome variable 0.902 0.936 0.187
Observations 1,192 1,192 1,192
Living in rural areas
Insurance×Post 0.100 0.090 -0.066
(0.083) (0.079) (0.042)
Mean of outcome variable 0.872 0.917 0.185
Observations 872 872 8 872
Living in urban areas
Insurance×Post 0.004 -0.065 -0.009
(0.095) (0.086) (0.031)
Mean of outcome variable 0.910 0.940 0.185
Observations 531 531 531
Note: Standard errors, clustered by region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *
p<0.1. The covariates include demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, ethnicity);
socioeconomic characteristics (employment status, educational status and time taken to travel to
the hospital); health status measure (illness); region; and year fixed effect.
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Table A7: PSMDID estimates of the effects of health insurance on weekly hours of work and earnings
Hours Earnings
Combined Males Females Combined Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Informal sector
Insurance×Post 0.314*** 0.350*** 0.260*** 0.537*** 1.012*** 0.696***
(0.167) (0.124) (0.161) (0.163) (0.160) (0.256)
Mean of outcome variable 31.12 31.52 28.37 7.58 10.08 4.46
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 766 426 339 766 426 339
Panel B: Agricultural sector
Insurance×Post 0.404*** 0.330*** 0.460*** 0.935*** 1.012*** 0.696***
(0.166) (0.124) (0.161) (0.163) (0.160) (0.256)
Mean of outcome variable 28.88 30.64 26.12 9.85 12.01 6.45
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 509 311 194 509 311 194
Note: Standard errors, clustered by region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Weekly hours worked and earnings are the
dependent variable and are given in the logarithm form. The covariates include demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, ethnicity);
socioeconomic characteristics (employment status and educational status); health status measure (illness); region; and year fixed effect.
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Table A8: PSMDID estimates of the effect of health insurance on weekly food
consumption expenditure
Outcome variables Combined Low-wealth High-wealth
group group
(1) (2) (3)
Insurance×Post 0.414* 0.069 0.580**
(0.213) (0.070) (0.134)
Mean consumption expenditure ($) 9.12 6.83 11.37
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 756 376 380
Note: Standard errors, clustered by region, are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Weekly Consumption expenditure is the dependent variable and are given in the logarithm
form. Demographic characteristics (includes age, gender, marital status, ethnicity); Socioeconomic
characteristics (employment status, educational status, wealth quintiles and hours worked); Health status
measure (illness); region; and year fixed effect.
Covariate balancing tests
Figure A6: Standard bias before and after
matching for health facility visits
Figure A7: Standard bias before and after
matching for treatment by health
professionals
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Figure A8: Standard bias before and after
matching for hospital care
Figure A9: Standard bias before and after
matching for hours of work
Figure A10: Standard bias before and
after matching for earnings in agriculture
Figure A11: Standard bias before and
after matching for consumption
expenditure
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Figure A12: Health facility visits in the
region of common supports
Figure A13: Treatment by health
professional in the region of common
supports
Figure A14: Hospital care in the region of
common supports
Figure A15: Hours of work in the region
of common supports
Figure A16: Earnings in the region of
common supports
Figure A17: Consumption expenditure in
the region of common supports
72




Does Health Insurance Affects
Labour Productivity through
Illness-Related Absenteeism at the
Workplace in Ghana?
Frank Darkwah




The paper investigates whether health insurance expansion affects labour
productivity through illness-related absenteeism at the workplace among workers in
Ghana. The paper employs household-level data from the Ghana Living Standard
Survey and applies count data estimation techniques to investigate how health
insurance affects labour productivity through the expected time workers spend out
of work due to illness. The results show that health insurance has a positive effect
on labour productivity by reducing the extent of illness-related absenteeism in the
workplace, after accounting for a potential endogeneity in health insurance. The
reduction is statistically significant for male workers but insignificant for female
workers. The decline in the extent of illness-related absenteeism at the workplace
is observed for insured workers in both the formal and informal sectors, but the
reduction is lower in the informal sector than in the formal sector.
Keywords: health insurance, health, labour productivity.
JEL Classification: I10,I13 I18, J46
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3.1 Introduction
Understanding the effects of health insurance on workdays missed by workers is
important for economic growth and development. This is because absenteeism at
the workplace has implications for a country’s production through output loss. A
study by Davis et al. (2005) revealed that in 2003 about 69 million employees in
the United State (US) missed about 407 million days of work due to illness. The
monetary value of the missed workdays is estimated to be $48 billion, when missed
work time is valued at workers’ actual wages. This suggests that worker absenteeism
could greatly affect a country’s output.
Ill-health is the main cause of workplace absenteeism (Davis et al., 2005; Holden
et al., 2011; Xu and Jensen, 2012). Health influences an individual’s ability to
work, and there is a body of literature that has shown how health conditions affect
labour productivity at the workplace (Smith, 1999; Hadley, 2003; Bloom et al., 2004;
Cai and Kalb, 2006; Mitchell and Bates, 2011; Holden et al., 2011; Cheng et al.,
2019). Davis et al. (2005) examine the economic impact of health problems on
workers productivity and find that ill-health (poor physical condition) negatively
affects workers’ productivity in the US. Mitchell and Bates (2011) study the effects on
health-related productivity loss among workers in the US. They also find that workers
with a health condition or health risk contribute immensely to firms’ productivity loss.
Holden et al. (2011) also examine health conditions associated with productivity loss
among Australian workers, and they find that mental health conditions contribute
considerably to productivity loss among Australian workers. These studies suggest
that ill-health affects labour productivity and firms’ output. Labour productivity in
this analysis refers to the amount of goods and services that a worker produces in a
given time. This means that the number of workdays missed due to illness affects
worker productivity through output loss.
If illness contributes significantly to output loss at the workplace, then the impact
is likely to be higher in developing countries than developed countries. This is
because people in developing countries are more disposed to illness than those in the
developed countries (Deaton and Tortora, 2015; Boutayeb, 2006). Besides, the impact
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in developing countries will also have a spillover effect on the entire household. This is
because most workers in developing countries, specifically Africa, are breadwinners of
their families or households, therefore any issue (illness) that affects their day-to-day
activities directly or indirectly affects other dependants within the household or
community (Aboderin and Beard, 2015)
One factor affecting poor health conditions among people in developing countries
is healthcare access and the cost of medical treatment. The cost of medical care
is a major financial burden on households, having a greater effect on those in the
low-income group than on those in the high-income group (Xu et al., 2003). It
largely affects households in the low-income group because most of these people work
in the informal sector, which is characterised by low income, and therefore they find it
difficult to finance their healthcare expenses when they are ill. This issue is also more
prevalent in developing countries than advanced countries. Several interventions have
been initiated in many countries. Health insurance has been shown to mitigate the
financial impact of large medical expenses and improves healthcare access and health
(Lichtenberg, 2002; Wang et al., 2009; Card et al., 2008; Finkelstein et al., 2012;
Cheng, 2014; Cheng et al., 2015; Duku et al., 2015). As a result, several developing
countries have introduced health insurance policies to reduce the healthcare expenses
that usually confront their citizenry, thereby improving healthcare access and health.
However, studies on the relationship between health insurance and labour
productivity through illness-related absenteeism at the workplace in developing
countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa context, are limited. Most of the studies
are in the developed country context, and the evidence is that having health insurance
reduces the number of workdays missed due to illness because the likelihood of falling
ill is reduced. The reduction in workdays missed due to illness improves workers’
productivity because it reduces output loss. Reducing output loss through a reduction
in absenteeism at the workplaces increases the amount of goods and services that
a worker produces in a given time, which in turns increases workers’ productivity
(Vistnes, 1997; Lofland and Frick, 2006; Xu and Jensen, 2012; Dizioli and Pinheiro,
2016). The available studies are in the developed country context. Understanding
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this relationship is important because if it is found that health insurance reduces
illness-related absenteeism at the workplace, it may strengthen the incentive for
employers to sponsor workers with health insurance, and this will increase the
country’s production. Since the healthcare system and labour market structure in
Ghana is similar to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the findings will provide
background information that will help to improve health insurance policies in these
countries, where most people are vulnerable to illness.
This study therefore seeks to investigate whether health insurance affects labour
productivity through illness-related absenteeism at the workplace in Ghana. The
issues that affect health and healthcare access in Ghana are not much different
from those in other sub-Saharan Africa countries (World Health Organization, 2014;
Aboderin and Beard, 2015). Africa is the continent with the highest morbidity and
mortality rate, and Ghana, one of the African countries, is no exception. Infectious
disease alone accounts for at least 69% of deaths in the continent (Boutayeb,
2006; World Health Organization, 2011b; Young et al., 2009). The prevalence of
chronic non-communicable diseases and their risk factors has increased and this
contributes significantly to Ghana’s disease burden (de Graft Aikins et al., 2012). The
non-communicable diseases in 2010 accounted for 39% of all deaths in Ghana (World
Health Organization, 2011a). This suggests that Ghana and other sub-Saharan
African countries are more likely to experience illness-related absenteeism in the
workplace which, in turn, negatively affects output. Despite the importance of health
insurance, no research has focused on the productivity of workers, especially those in
sub-Saharan Africa, where the majority of people are more susceptible to illness.
This study uses nationally representative household survey data of Ghana to
investigate whether having health insurance affects the probability that workers
will miss a workday and the number of workdays missed due to illness. There is
evidence that people with health condition (risk) are more likely to participate in
the health insurance program and therefore consume more health care. This makes
health insurance endogenous to outcome variables of interest, which in turn, affect the
results (Cameron et al., 1988; Cheng, 2014). In terms of absenteeism at the workplace,
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people with poor health conditions or health risk are more likely to miss workdays,
while individuals with good health or healthy people naturally miss fewer workdays.
This issue also suggests a potential endogeneity problem in the analysis and ignoring
it would rendered the estimated parameters biased and inconsistent. It would be
unclear in the final analyses whether having health insurance affects illness-related
absenteeism at the workplace or not. The study addresses this potential endogeneity
problem in the health insurance program by employing regional-level average health
insurance coverage as an instrumental variable (IV).
The findings indicate that health insurance has a positive effect on labour
productivity by reducing the extent of illness-related absenteeism at the workplace.
Thus, having health insurance reduces the probability of missing a workday and the
number of workdays missed due to illness compared to not having health insurance.
In terms of the employment sector, the study observed a reduction in the days of
illness-related absenteeism for insured workers relative to uninsured workers in both
the informal and formal sectors. The study also observed that there is no significant
difference between insured workers aged 18-49 years (younger workers) and those
aged 50-60 years (older workers) in the probability of missing workdays due to illness.
Overall, the estimates indicate that workers with health insurance are absent from
work less often and therefore are more productive in terms of output losses compared
with workers without health insurance.
There is a body of literature on how health insurance affects labour market
outcomes. Most studies have focused on labour force participation, hours worked and
earnings (Gruber and Hanratty, 1995; Gruber and Madrian, 2002; Kan and Lin, 2009;
Strumpf, 2011; Baicker et al., 2014; Dague et al., 2017). There are few studies on the
effects of health insurance on labour productivity through illness-related absenteeism
in the workplace (Vistnes, 1997; Lofland and Frick, 2006; Xu and Jensen, 2012;
Dizioli and Pinheiro, 2016). The empirical results are also mixed; some studies find a
significant effect of health insurance on illness-related absenteeism at the workplace,
whereas others find no effect. Xu and Jensen (2012) investigate how health insurance
affects illness-related absenteeism among older workers in the US. They find no
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difference between the number of workdays missed due to illness in older workers
without health insurance and older workers with health insurance. Thus, health
insurance does not have a significant effect on illness-related absenteeism among older
workers in the US. Lofland and Frick (2006) examine the effects of health insurance
on workplace absenteeism in the US workforce but find different results. They find
that health insurance is significantly related to a reduced likelihood of the number
of missed workdays. A study by Dizioli and Pinheiro (2016) also investigates how
health insurance affects labour productivity through a reduction in the expected time
workers spend out of work on sick days. They find that workers with health insurance
miss fewer workdays than those without health insurance. However, Vistnes (1997),
who examines how insurance affects gender differences in days lost from work due to
illness in the US, finds that insurance actually increases illness-related absenteeism in
the workplace. Such results make the findings inconclusive, therefore, from developing
country perspective, investigating the effect of health insurance on illness-related
absenteeism at the workplace is important for health insurance policy analyses.
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways: Firstly, few studies
have been conducted and those that do exist were conducted in a developed country
context. No study has been undertaken in a developing country, specifically in
sub-Saharan Africa. According to Currie and Madrian (1999), the relationship
between individual’s health and their work is more observable in societies where
the majority of the people are vulnerable to illness. The evidence indicates that
individuals from sub-Saharan Africa are more susceptible to illness compared with
individuals in other regions (Deaton and Tortora, 2015). Therefore, investigating
the relationship between health insurance and illness-related absenteeism in the
workplaces in Ghana is vital for policy-making in a developing country context.
Secondly, whereas most of the previous studies focus on formal sector workers, this
study quantifies the effect of health insurance on productivity for workers in the
informal sector. This evidence is particularly important for a developing country
like Ghana, where the majority of the labour force population is in the informal
sector. This study adds to the literature about the impacts of health insurance
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on illness-related absenteeism at the workplace for workers in the informal sector.
Besides the informal sector analysis, the study also examines the effects in the
formal sector to understand if there is a significant difference between the workers
in both sectors, and also to check whether or not the effect in a developing country
context differs from those in developed countries. Thirdly, the study considers the
heterogeneous impact of health insurance on illness-related absenteeism in terms of
age group (younger and older worker) and gender to understand how these factors
could influence workers absenteeism. As older workers are more prone to illnesses
than younger workers, understanding the effect of health insurance on workers age
category and gender would assist policy making in Ghana.
Health insurance for individuals in some countries, particularly the US, is offered
predominantly through the employers,1 who therefore finance the greater portion of
employees’ health expenditure. However, in developing countries many healthcare
programs, including health insurance, are financed by the government. In Ghana, for
instance, about 75% of health insurance expenditure is financed by the government.
The informal sector constitutes about 70% of the labour force, but their personal
contribution to health insurance revenue in Ghana is 3.8% compared to that of the
formal sector, which is 15.6% (Schieber et al., 2012). The expenditure on healthcare
through the health insurance system in Ghana is similar to most developing countries.
Thus, most of the health insurance expenditure in developing countries is funded by
the government. Health spending has also been found to improve health outcomes
(Gupta et al., 2003; Gottret and Schieber, 2006; Anyanwu and Erhijakpor, 2009;
Baldacci et al., 2003). Whether or not government expenditure in the healthcare
system through the National Health Insurance Scheme is commensurate with gains
in worker productivity (by reducing the days of illness-related absenteeism at
workplaces) is unknown in most developing countries, specifically sub-Saharan Africa.
It is therefore important to understand how health insurance affects illness-related
absenteeism in the workplace from a developing country perspective.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the
1In the US, for example, about 88% of private individuals who acquired health insurance in 2005
did so through their workplace Gruber (2010).
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institutional background of Ghana’s health insurance scheme. Section 3 describes
the data obtained for the analysis. Section 4 presents the econometrics framework
underlying the study. The results are presented in section 5. Section 6 discusses the
results and Section 7 concludes the paper.
3.2 Data
The study uses two waves of data from the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS),
conducted by the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS). The GLSS is a nationally
representative household survey in Ghana. These two cross-sections of data collected
by the GSS are the fifth and sixth rounds of surveys. The fifth round was conducted
in 2005/06 and comprises 8,687 households with 37,128 individuals. The sixth round,
conducted in 2012/13, has a significantly greater number of respondents compared
with previous years, with 16,772 households and 72,168 individuals. The study
considers these two waves because they are the cross-sections that capture the health
insurance status of workers and some other variables of interest, particularly the
number of workdays missed due to illness.
The study focuses on respondents who are in the active labour force, therefore, it
restricts the analysis to the sample of individuals aged 15-60 years. This is because
the minimum age for employment in Ghana is 15 years and the retirement age for
formal sector workers is 60 years.2 Limiting the sample to this age range will help
to capture working individuals in the survey. Individuals outside the 15-60 years
age range in the sample were dropped.3 In this sample, some workers reported
the number of workdays missed due to illness, while others did not. This analysis
focused on the individuals who reported the number of workdays missed due to illness.
2There are two forms of retirement in Ghana: voluntary retirement, which usually occurs from
age 55, and compulsory retirement at 60 years. The study limits the upper age of the sample to
compulsory retirement age in order to capture the majority of people in the labour force. In terms
of the minimum employment aged, people age 13 years can be employed to do light work, but the
definition of light work is difficult to determine.
3After excluding individuals outside 15-60 years, the number of observations declined to 9,524 in
2005/06 sample and 18,625 in the 2012/13 sample. Taking into consideration variables of interest
such as the total number of workdays missed due to illness, the sample dropped to 3,091 observations.
This significant drop in the majority of the observations is due to the differences in observations of
the two surveys.
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After considering some variables of interest, particularly the outcome variables and
excluding missing responses, the sample size of employed workers across two surveys is
reduced to 3,091 observations, consisting of 2,607 insured and 484 uninsured workers.
The survey collected a wide range of healthcare outcomes, such as: whether
respondents suffered from illness and the number of days respondents had suffered
from this illness; and whether respondents had stopped usual activities (work) as a
result of the illness and the number of days respondents had to stop these activities.
The data also contain information on socioeconomic characteristics such as the
highest education level, age, marital status, gender, type of residence, household
size, region and ethnicity. In this study, we are interested primarily in two outcome
variables. The first variable is a binary outcome showing whether the respondent
missed a day from work due to illness. The second variable captures the total number
of days the respondent missed work.
The definition of both outcome and explanatory variables have been presented in
Table 3.1. In the analyses, the study uses the full sample along with the subgroup,
stratified by respondents’ age (young and old), the sector of employment (formal
and informal) and gender (male and female). Overall, more than half of the workers
(57.8%) in our sample missed some days from work due to illness prior to the survey
periods. The workers who missed work due to illness missed 5.9 days on average (See
Table B1). The statistics reported in Table 3.1 suggest that without adjusting for any
covariates, on average, workers without health insurance are less likely to miss days
from work than workers with health insurance (55.3% vs 58.3%). The mean of workers
reporting having experienced an illness or injury are lower for individuals without
health insurance compared to those with health insurance, although, the differences
are statistically insignificant. In the informal sector, the number of workers without
health insurance exceeds those with health insurance (82.5% vs 76.6%). Thus, on
average, the number of workers without health insurance in the informal sector is
relatively higher than those workers with insurance. As contributions to the NHIS
are mandatory for formal sector workers and optional for informal sector workers, it
follows that the majority of formal sector workers participate in the NHIS program.
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The study observed that differences in workers’ age, gender and employment sector
contribute to illness-related absenteeism at the workplace. Differences in marital
and health status of a worker also contribute to illness-related absenteeism at the
workplace. The estimates further reveal the significant differences in mean in most of
workers’ region of residence and this could also influence illness-related absenteeism.
Workers with NHIS tend to have a higher education level compared with those
without NHIS (75.4% vs 69.9%). Fewer workers without health insurance are single
(53.8%) compared to compared to those with NHIS (60%). More workers with health
insurance reside in the rural areas (55.1%) than in urban centres (44.9%). The average
household size of workers with NHIS (4.1) is greater than that of workers without
health insurance (3.9). In terms of the ethnic groups, more workers in the Northern
tribe have NHIS than workers in other tribes. The Northern tribe are composed of
Mole-Dagbani, Grusi, Gurma and Mande. As for religious affiliation, the majority of
workers with health insurance are Muslims, even though the majority of Ghanaians
are Christians. This is not surprising because the majority of workers in the Northern
tribe, which dominates participation in the NHIS, are Muslims. The differences in
individuals’ place of residence (rural/urban), household size, ethnicity and religious
affiliations are statistically insignificant to contribute to illness-related absenteeism
at the workplace. The statistics show that the average age of workers with NHIS and
those without NHIS is 38 and 36 years respectively.
85
Table 3.1: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics
Insured Uninsured Mean test
Description Mean Std dev N Mean Std dev N Diff p-value
OUTCOMES
Missing workday due to illness 1 if worker miss workday due to illness, or 0 otherwise 0.583 0.493 2,607 0.553 0.498 484 -0.030 0.214
Number of workdays missed Number of workdays missed due to illness 5.774 3.976 2,607 5.768 3.938 484 -0.006 0.977
CONTROL
Age Workers age 37.93 12.36 2,607 36.26 11.69 484 -1.668 0.006
Education status 1 if worker had education, or 0 otherwise 0.754 0.431 2,607 0.699 0.459 484 -0.055 0.011
Male 1 if worker is male, or 0 otherwise 0.351 0.478 2,607 0.394 0.489 484 0.040 0.087
Female 1 if worker is female, or 0 otherwise 0.646 0.478 2,607 0.606 0.489 484 -0.040 0.087
Informal sector employees 1 if employed in the informal sector, or 0 otherwise 0.766 0.423 2,607 0.825 0.380 484 0.059 0.004
ETHNICITY
Akans 1 if Akan, or 0 otherwise 0.412 0.492 2,607 0.432 0.496 484 0.011 0.423
Ga Dangbe 1 if Ga Dangbe, or 0 otherwise 0.044 0.204 2,607 0.050 0.217 484 0.006 0.563
Ewe 1 if Ewe, or 0 otherwise 0.130 0.337 2,607 0.116 0.320 484 -0.015 0.379
Guans 1 if Guan, or 0 otherwise 0.048 0.214 2,607 0.037 0.189 484 -0.011 0.288
Northern 1 if Northern, or 0 otherwise 0.356 0.479 2,607 0.357 0.480 484 0.001 0.963
No tribe 1 if other tribe, or 0 otherwise 0.009 0.095 2,607 0.009 0.091 484 -0.001 0.843
MARITAL STATUS
Married 1 if currently married, or 0 otherwise 0.599 0.490 2,607 0.538 0.499 484 -0.060 0.012
Separated 1 if separated, or 0 otherwise 0.084 0.278 2,607 0.109 0.313 484 0.026 0.065
Divorce 1 if divorce, or 0 otherwise 0.079 0.270 2,607 0.077 0.267 484 -0.002 0.902
Widowed 1 if widowed, or 0 otherwise 0.059 0.234 2,607 0.047 0.211 484 -0.012 0.300
Never married 1 if never married, or 0 otherwise 0.179 0.384 2,607 0.228 0.420 484 0.048 0.012
RELIGION
Christians 1 if Christians, or 0 otherwise 0.035 0.185 2,607 0.053 0.224 484 0.018 0.062
Muslims 1 if Muslims, or 0 otherwise 0.723 0.448 2,607 0.720 0.450 484 -0.003 0.879
Traditionalist 1 if Traditionalist, or 0 otherwise 0.197 0.400 2,607 0.173 0.378 484 -0.024 0.209
No religion 1 if not in any religion, or 0 otherwise 0.044 0.205 2,607 0.055 0.228 484 0.011 0.286
REGION
Western 1 if from Western region, or 0 otherwise 0.070 0.254 2,607 0.110 0.313 484 0.040 0.002
Central 1 if from Central region, or 0 otherwise 0.055 0.228 2,607 0.091 0.288 484 0.036 0.002
Greater Accra 1 if from Greater Accra region, or 0 otherwise 0.046 0.210 2,607 0.035 0.184 484 0.011 0.275
Volta 1 if from Volta region, or 0 otherwise 0.119 0.324 2,607 0.147 0.354 484 0.028 0.090
Eastern 1 if from Eastern region, or 0 otherwise 0.129 0.335 2,607 0.110 0.313 484 -0.019 0.245
Ashanti 1 if from Ashanti region, or 0 otherwise 0.162 0.368 2,607 0.172 0.378 484 0.010 0.573
Brong Ahafo 1 if from Brong Ahafo, or 0 otherwise 0.103 0.304 2,607 0.052 0.222 484 -0.051 0.000
Northern 1 if from Northern region, or 0 otherwise 0.108 0.310 2,607 0.184 0.388 484 0.077 0.000
Upper East 1 if from Upper East region, or 0 otherwise 0.115 0.319 2,607 0.033 0.179 484 -0.082 0.000
Upper West 1 if from Upper West region, or 0 otherwise 0.094 0.292 2,607 0.066 0.249 484 -0.028 0.048
RESIDENCE
Rural 1 if reside in urban area, or 0 otherwise 0.551 0.489 2,607 0.541 0.499 484 -0.010 0.786
Urban 1 if reside in rural area, or 0 otherwise 0.449 0.498 2,607 0.459 0.499 484 0.010 0.786
Household size Size of the household, 4.053 2.767 2,607 3.934 3.202 484 -0.118 0.562




This section describes the econometric model employed to investigate the effects
of health insurance on illness-related absenteeism at the workplace. The outcome
variables of interest in this analysis are the probability of missing a workday and the
total number of workdays missed due to illness. The latter reflect a non-negative
integer or a count. The non-negative integer of the outcome variable, which is a
focus of this analysis, motivates the application of a model of count regression, and
the model is specified as follows. Let yi be the observed number of workdays missed
due to illness for a worker i. Suppose that, conditional on the exogenous covariates
Xi, the endogenous variable Xei, and random unobserved heterogeneity terms εi, yi
follow a Poisson distribution, with probability density function:
yi ∼ Poisson(µi) (3.1)
which can be expressed as:
f(yi|Xei, Xi, εi) = Pr(Y = yi) =
e−µiµyii
yi!
, yi = 0, 1, 2, 3, ...
with the conditional mean parameters µi
µ = E(yi|Xei, Xi, εi; β) = exp(β1Xei + β2X ′i1 + εi1) (3.2)
where ε1 is assumed to follow a standard normal distribution, thus ε1 ∼ N(0, 1). The
decision to participate in the health insurance program is represented by the latent








ei > 0] (3.4)
where Xi2 is a vector of exogenous covariate variables that affect Xei but does not
affect directly yi, and hence is an independent source of variation in yi. Assume that
the error terms ε1 and ε2 are related through:
εi1 = ρεi2 + ηi (3.5)
where ηi ∼ [0, σ2η] is independent of εi2 ∼ [0, σ2ε ]. If ρ = 0, then Xei can be treated
as exogenous. Otherwise, it is endogenous, since it is correlated with εi1 in equation
(3.2) because both Xei and εi1 depends on εi. Because of the count nature of our
outcome variable, the study adopted the Poisson estimation technique. The Poisson
estimation is based on the equidispersion property of the Poisson distribution, where
mean and variance are equal, thus E(Y ) = V ar(Y ) = µ.
If the equidispersion property is violated because of overdispersion [V ar(Y ) >
E(Y )], then the negative binomial approach becomes an appropriate estimation
strategy, and it can be expressed as:










where µi=tiµ and α = 1ν . The parameter µi is the mean incidence rate of y per unit
of exposure. ti represents the exposure for a particular observation and ν is a scale
parameter. The negative binomial regression model for an observation i can also be
written as:












The study applies probit estimation technique to examine the probability of missing
a workday due to illness.
3.3.2 Estimation procedure
Participation in the health insurance program has been associated with the issue of
self-selection and the argument that individuals with health conditions are more likely
to participate in a health insurance program and therefore consume more healthcare.
This would make health insurance potentially endogenous to outcome variables and
may affect the estimates. The study employs a control function approach specifically
the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) method proposed by Terza et al. (2008),
to address this problem. The outcome variables are nonlinear,4 and ignoring the
nonlinearity in the outcomes can affect the estimation results. The study, therefore,
applies the 2SRI method relative to the two-stage least squares (2SLS) to handle the
nonlinear nature of our outcome variables. Following Terza et al. (2008), the study
specifies the outcome model in the nonlinear least squares (NLS) method form as:
E(Y |Xe, Xo, Xu; β) = M(Xeβ1 +Xoβ2 +Xuβ3) (3.7)
where M(Xe, Xo, Xu; β) represents the conditional mean of Y , given Xe, Xo and
Xu. β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Y denotes the outcome
variable. Xe represents a health insurance dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 when the participant holds health insurance and 0 otherwise. Xo denotes the
observable demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of a worker andXu denotes
unobservable characteristics. The regression model corresponding to equation (3.7)
can be expressed as:
Y = M(Xeβ1 +Xoβ2 +Xuβ3) + ε (3.8)
4Most of the outcome variables are dichotomous (binary), count and ordinal in nature. According
to Basu et al. (2018), nonlinear estimators produced the least bias estimates of average treatment
effects.
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where ε is the regression error term. The demand for health care and the probability
of missed workday(s) may depend on the health status of a worker, and those with
poor health conditions are more likely to miss workdays and also to participate
in an insurance program. This unobserved health status of workers may bias the
estimates. Conversely, individuals with good health naturally miss fewer workdays.
Therefore, ignoring the endogeneity issue in health insurance would greatly affect
the estimates. This is because it would lead to the conclusion that would suggest a
reduction/increase in the number of missed workday(s), even if there is no effect.
Thus, it will lead to an underestimation/overestimation of any effect the health
insurance may have on the reduction/increase in illness-related absenteeism in the
workplace. The analysis accounts for this possible endogeneity issue in the health
insurance program.
To address this potential endogeneity issue, the study instruments the health
insurance variable Xe, and expresses the model in nonlinear auxiliary regression
(reduced form equation) as:
Xe = r(Tδ) +Xu (3.9)
where r(Tδ) represents the conditional mean of Xe given T , and T = [Xo, Z].
The variable Z is a vector of IVs and δ is the parameter to be estimated. Z also
contains variables that affect the NHIS while affecting only the days of illness-related
absenteeism at the workplace through Xe. The study assumes that there is an
unobserved factor, Xu, which affects both Xe and Y , and which is the only source of
dependence between them, after controlling for the influence of the observed variables
Xo and Z. If the residual term Xu were observable, the study could add it as
an additional regressor in the model. Estimating this would address the potential
self-selection issue associated with health insurance participation.
To implement the model outlined in equations (3.8) and (3.9), the study employs
regional-level average health insurance coverage as an IV in our estimation. The
area-based IV measure creates variations in the endogenous variable Xe. According
to Wooldridge (2010), the regional variable used as the instrument is appropriate
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provided other regional variables that affect the dependent variable are controlled
for. Area-based IV measures have been used in other studies (Sloan et al., 2001;
Grabowski and Hirth, 2003; Sasso and Buchmueller, 2004; Morris, 2007; Jay et al.,
2013; Denny and Oppedisano, 2013). The study focuses on regional-level average
health insurance coverage as an instrument because the implementation of the NHIS
in Ghana differs across regions, and these differences in the NHIS implementation
should affect people’s enrolment in the NHIS program. The communities with earlier
implementation of the NHIS are likely to have higher average health insurance
coverage compared with communities with late implementation. This IV should be
correlated with the endogenous health insurance variable Xe and therefore is likely to
reflect the exogenous variation in the individuals’ participation in the NHIS. The IV
reflects collective behaviour and is unlikely to be affected by individual unobserved
characteristics. The instrument is likely to be correlated with health insurance but
uncorrelated with the probability of missing workdays and the number of workdays
missed due to illness and the error term. Thus, the instrument is expected to affect
the outcome variables only through its effects on the health insurance uptake.5 There
may be regional-level factors that may correlate with the instrument employed, which
in turn affect outcomes. The study therefore takes this into account by controlling
for other regional factors in the regression model.
Implementation of the 2SRI method involves replacing the unobserved covariate
Xu with a consistent estimate. The first step is to estimate equation (3.9) using NLS
and thereafter calculate the residual X̂u.6 The estimated residual can be expressed
5There may be a positive externality or spillover effect of NHIS participation and this is an
indirect effect. The study, therefore, does not consider this spillover effects in this analysis. Health
facilities in Ghana are not uniformly distributed at the district level and this may affect participation
in the NHIS. Areas where health facilities are not available would discourage participation in the
NHIS. The issue is different at the regional level and this motivated the use of regional-level NHIS
averages as the instrument relative to the district level averages.
6Residuals in the control function analysis can be constructed in four ways: response, Anscombe,
Pearson, and deviance. The estimates in this analysis are based on the response residual, a residual
used mostly in control function analysis. However, the other residuals are also used as robustness
checks. Generally, the response residual is the differences between the observed treatment and the
predicted probability of treatment.
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as:
X̂u = Xe − r(T α̂) (3.10)
The estimated residual X̂u as shown in equation (3.10) is then substituted into
equation (3.8) as an additional regressor. The estimation equation can be expressed
as:
Y = M(β1Xe + β2Xo,+β3X̂u) + ε
2sri (3.11)
To estimate equation (3.11), the study uses probit, negative binomial and Poisson,
depending on the outcome variables analysed. As with the 2SLS estimation, the 2SRI
requires that the IV satisfy the exclusion condition, which has been explained above,
and also the relevance condition. To test the strength of the IV, the study applies
the standard IV diagnostic tests. The results of the IV diagnostic tests are reported
in Appendix B, Table B2 and Table B3.
3.4 Results
This section presents the estimates of the effect of health insurance on the probability
of missing a workday due to illness and the total number of missed workdays. The
study applies an IV approach to address a potential endogeneity issue associated
with voluntary participation in the health insurance program. Although the study
uses a 2SRI approach, it also uses 2SLS to obtain the conventional diagnostic tests
for instrument strength. The first stage regression results of the IV reported in
Table B2 and Table B3. The coefficients of the IV in most of the regressions are
positive and statistically significant, indicating that regional-level average health
insurance coverage correlated with individuals’ NHIS enrolment. The study used
an F-test to assess the strength (weakness) of the instruments employed. The
instruments are considered valid if F-statistics are larger than the rule of thumb
value of 10 (Stock et al., 2002). The IV results as reported in Table B2 and Table B3
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indicates that the instrument is not weak and therefore, it is relevant for the model
specifications. Thus, the IV is strong enough to identify the NHIS effect. This is
because, in all specifications, the F-statistics in the first stage regression, which
ranges from 24 to 110, exceeds the rule of thumb value of 10. The F-statistics also
greatly exceed Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values, therefore rejecting the null
hypothesis of a weak instrument is justified. There is no evidence to suggest that the
instrument is weak. Table B2 and Table B3 also report the 2SLS estimates which
do not differ from the 2SRI results reported in the main text in terms of signs and
the statistical significance. The sensitivity analysis of the instruments employed is
discussed in sub-section 3.5.2.
Table 3.2: Estimates of the effects of health insurance on illness-related absenteeism
at the workplaces
Probit Negative binomial Poisson
Outcome variables Probability of missing Number of days Number of days
a workday missed missed
(1) (2) (3)
Health insurance -0.223* -3.056** -3.151**
(0.123) (1.015) (1.016)
Mean of outcome variable 0.578 5.774 5.774
Observations 3,091 3,091 3,091
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the level of the region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01,
**p<0.05, * p<0.1. The covariates include age, gender, educational status, marital status,
ethnicity, health status, employment status, region, year fixed effect, household size and religion.
These estimates are obtained from the 2SRI model. Results in column (1) are for probit regression,
and columns (2) and (3) are for negative binomial and Poisson regressions respectively. Coefficients
are marginal effects measured at the mean.
Table 3.2 reports the second-stage estimation results of the effect of NHIS on the
extents of illness-related absenteeism at the workplace. All the standard errors in
the parentheses below the estimates are robust. Column (1) reports the probability
of missing a workday due to illness. The estimates show that there is a significant
difference between workers with health insurance and those without insurance in
terms of the probability of missing a workday due to illness. Specifically, holding
other factors constant, having health insurance reduces the probability of missing
a workday due to illness by 22.3 percentage points. Column (2) presents the
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estimates of the total number of workdays missed due to illness. There is an issue
of overdispersion in the data because the estimated variance exceeds the mean in
the outcome variables; the study therefore applies the negative binomial technique to
account for the overdispersion. The result shows that having health insurance reduces
the number of workdays missed due to illness. Thus, workers with health insurance
missed fewer workdays than workers without health insurance. More specifically,
having health insurance reduces the number of workdays missed due to illness by
3.1 days on average, holding other factors constant. In terms of signs and statistical
significance, the column (2) estimate is similar to the column (3) estimate obtained
from an alternative estimation approach (Poisson).7 Overall, the estimates indicate
that health insurance reduces illness-related absenteeism at the workplace through
the reduction in the number of sick days a worker takes. This increases labour
productivity through a reduction in output loss.
The study also applies the OLS model in this analysis and the results are reported
in Table 3.3. The results in column (1) in both panels (A and B) are similar to those
in Table 3.2 in terms of signs and statistical significance. The difference between
them is the magnitude of the estimates, and it is relatively higher in the 2SRI than
the OLS estimates. Our outcome variables are nonlinear, and given the advantage
on the efficiency, the estimates obtained by the 2SRI approach is preferred. The rest
of the analyses covered in the next sub-sections use the 2SRI estimation approach.
7When assuming no difference between the mean and variance mean, and applying the Poisson
estimation technique, the results are again similar to the negative binomial estimates in terms of
signs and statistical significance.
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Table 3.3: OLS estimates of the effects of health insurance on number of workdays missed and the probability of missing a workday due to
illness
Age Sector Gender
Full sample 15-49 50-60 Formal Informal Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Number of workdays missed
Health insurance -2.308** -1.823* 4.791* -2.707 -2.119** -3.310** -1.521
(0.949) (1.018) (2.669) (2.371) (1.034) (1.499) (1.241 )
Mean of outcome variable 0.578 0.570 0.611 0.476 0.608 0.569 0.584
Observations 3,091 2,439 652 687 2,403 1,112 1,979
Panel B: Probability of missing a workday
Health insurance -0.219* 0.106 -0.219 0.166 -0.311 -0.169 -0.252
(0.123) (0.1366) (0.292) (0.308) (0.133) (0.197) (0.158)
Mean of outcome variable 5.774 5.559 6.582 5.686 5.800 5.702 5.815
Observations 3,091 2,439 652 687 2,403 1,112 1,979
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the level of the region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. The covariates include age, gender,
educational status, marital status, ethnicity, health status, employment status, region, year fixed effect, household size and religion. These estimates are
obtained from the OLS model. The estimates in Panel A are based on the total number of workdays missed due to illness and Panel B are based on the
probability of missing a workday due to illness.
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3.4.1 Heterogeneous effects
The study examines the heterogeneity of illness-related absenteeism at the workplace
by age groups in terms of both the employment sector in which a worker works
and gender. First, the study applies graphical analysis to the outcome variables.
The graph as shown in Figure 3.1 shows a significant difference in the number
of illness-related absenteeism at the workplace across workers in both the formal
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Figure 3.1: Employment sector, age and the number of workdays missed due to
illness
at the workplace on average are higher for workers in the formal sector than the
informal sector workers. In both employment sectors, illness-related absenteeism
at the workplace decline when workers are ageing. The reduction in the number
of illness-related absenteeism at the workplace is also observed for both male and
female workers and it is relatively higher for males than females, as illustrated in
Figure 3.2. The estimates further reveal a reduction of illness-related absenteeism
at the workplace before age 50, and after 50 years it increases for male workers but
decreases for female workers.
The estimates in Figure 3.1 are based on age groups, but a similar estimation
examined individual ages (age not grouped) and the results are illustrated in
Figure B1 in Appendix B. Both estimates are similar. The variations in illness-related
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Figure 3.2: Gender, age and the number of workdays missed due to illness
further analysis. The study, therefore, estimates the heterogeneous effects of health
insurance on illness-related absenteeism at the workplace in terms of age group,
employment sector and gender.
A. Age group
This section investigates whether there is a significant difference between younger
and older workers in terms of the probability of missing a workday and the number
of workdays missed due to illness. The results are reported in Table 3.4.8
The first two columns show a negative effect but the results are not statistically
significant, indicating that there is no significant difference between younger and older
workers with health insurance and those without health insurance in the probability
of missing workday due to illness. With regard to the total number of workdays
missed due to illness, the study observes a significant reduction in the number of
workdays missed due to illness for both younger and older workers with health
insurance compared to those without insurance, as shown in columns (3) and (4)
respectively. Holding other factors constant, the effects are larger in magnitude for
older workers compared with young individuals, as the study finds the number of
8Workers aged 15-49 years were classified as younger workers and 50-60 years as older workers.
The study considered workers aged 50-60 years to be older workers because the retirement age for
formal sector workers starts at 55 years (voluntary retirement age) and compulsory retirement is 60
years.
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Table 3.4: Estimates of the effects of health insurance on illness-related absenteeism
at the workplace by age
Probability of missing Number of days
a workday missed
Outcome variables 15-49 50-60 15-49 50-60
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Health insurance -0.223 -0.271 -2.619** -4.599*
(0.136) (0.293) (1.104) (2.494)
Mean of outcome variable 0.570 0.611 5.559 6.582
Observations 2,439 652 2,439 652
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the level of the region, are shown in parentheses: ***
p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. The covariates include age, gender, educational status, marital
status, ethnicity, health status, employment status, region, year fixed effect, household size and
religion. These estimates are obtained from the 2SRI model. Results in columns (1) and (2) are
for probit regression, and columns (3) and (4) are for negative binomial regressions. Coefficients
are marginal effects measured at the mean.
days workers with health insurance missed work due to illness is reduced by 2.6 days
for younger workers and 4.6 for older workers compared with individuals in similar
age groups without health insurance.
B. The sector of employment (formal and informal sector)
This section assesses the effects of health insurance on illness-related absenteeism at
workplaces by the sector in which a worker works (formal or informal). In Ghana,
the majority of the population in the labour force (70%) are in the informal sector
and their activities contribute immensely to Ghana’s economic development. The
focus of this analysis is on those who work in the informal sector, but the study
also examines those in the formal sector to find out if there is a significant difference
between workers in the two sectors. Understanding the relationship between health
insurance and absenteeism at the workplace for workers in both formal and informal
sectors is important for policy-making in Ghana.9
The results shown in Table 3.5 indicate a significant reduction of the number of
workdays missed due to illness for workers in both sectors who have health insurance.
Thus, holding other factors constant, having health insurance reduces the number of
9Even though the contribution to the NHIS is mandatory for formal sector employees through
payroll deduction of 2.5% of their Social Security and National Trust Fund, but the contributor
need to be registered before becoming a member of the NHIS. Those who failed to register with the
NHIS bear the full cost of their medical treatment.
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Table 3.5: Estimates of the effects of health insurance on illness-related absenteeism
at the workplace by sector
Negative binomial Poisson
Outcome variables Formal Informal Formal Informal
sector sector sector sector
workers workers workers workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Health insurance -4.109* -2.719** -4.415* -2.807**
(2.282) (1.128) (2.333) (1.126)
Mean of outcome variable 5.686 5.800 5.686 5.800
Observations 687 2,403 687 2,403
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the level of the region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01,
**p<0.05, * p<0.1. The covariates include age, gender, educational status, marital status,
ethnicity, health status, employment status, region, year fixed effect, household size and religion.
These estimates are obtained from the 2SRI model. Results in columns (1) and (2) are for
negative binomial regression, and columns (3) and (4) are for Poisson regressions. Coefficients are
marginal effects measured at the mean, and the estimates are based on the number of workdays
missed due to illness.
workdays missed by workers in the formal sector by 4.1 days on average and workers
in the informal sector by 2.7 days, compared with those without insurance. The
estimates suggest that, irrespective of the work sector, those with health insurance
missed fewer workdays than those without health insurance. The results of the
negative binomial are similar to the Poisson estimates shown in columns (3) and
(4) in terms of signs and statistical significance, but slightly different from the OLS
estimates reported in Table 3.3.
As for the probability of missing a workday due to illness, the results show
significant differences between workers in the formal and informal sector (see columns
(1) and (2) of Table 3.7). The study observes a significant reduction in workdays
missed due to illness for insured workers in the informal sector compared to those
without insurance. For workers in the formal sector, however, the study finds that,
holding other factors constant, having insurance has no significant effect on missing
a workday due to illness.
C. Gender
Table 3.6 and the last two columns of Table 3.7 describe the effect of health insurance
on the number of workdays missed and the likelihood of missing a workday due
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Table 3.6: Estimates of the effects of health insurance on illness-related absenteeism
at the workplace by gender
Negative binomial Poisson
Outcome variables Male Female Male Female
workers workers workers workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Health insurance -3.237** -0.627 -3.300** -0.636
(1.386) (0.962) (1.377) (0.979)
Mean of outcome variable 5.702 5.815 5.702 5.815
Observations 1,112 1,979 1,112 1,979
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the level of the region, are shown in parentheses: ***
p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. The covariates include age, gender, educational status, marital
status, ethnicity, health status, employment status, region, year fixed effect, household size and
religion. Results in columns (1) and (2) are for negative binomial regression, and columns (3)
and (4) are for Poisson regressions. Coefficients are marginal effects measured at the mean, and
the estimates are based on the number of workdays missed due to illness.
to illness by gender to determine whether workers’ gender influences illness-related
absenteeism at the workplace. The first two columns of Table 3.6 show significant
differences in the number of workdays missed due to illness for males and females
workers. Holding other factors constant, health insurance significantly reduces the
number of days male workers are absent from work due to illness by 3.2 days,
although no significant effect is found for female workers. The significant difference
could be accounted for by several factors, but one major factor is health condition.
In Ghana , men are more susceptible to ill-health than women. Life expectancy rate
is higher for females (64.4) than males (62.5), indicating that women are ill less often
and are therefore less likely to miss workdays due to illness. The results suggest that
there is no significant difference between insured and uninsured women in terms of
the probability of missing workdays and the total number of workdays missed due
to illness.
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Table 3.7: Estimates of the effects of health insurance on the probability of missing
a workday due to illness by sector and gender
Probability of Probability of
missing a workday missing a workday
Outcome variables Formal Informal Male Female
sector sector workers workers
workers workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Health insurance 0.177 -0.315** -0.171* -0.261
(0.306) (0.134) (0.184) (0.159)
Mean of outcome variable 0.476 0.608 0.569 0.584
Observations 687 2,401 1,112 1,977
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the level of the region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01,
**p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: The other covariates include age, gender, educational status, marital
status, ethnicity, health status, employment status, region, year fixed effect, household size and
religion. These estimates are obtained from the 2SRI model. Results in columns (1) and (4) are
for probit regression. Coefficients are marginal effects measured at the mean, and the estimates are
based on the probability of missing a workday due to illness.
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D. Employment sector and gender by age
Table 3.8 reports the estimates in terms of employment sector and gender, by
age (younger and older workers). The estimates show a significant reduction in
illness-related absenteeism at the workplace for insured younger workers in the
informal sector compared with those without insurance (see column (3) and column
(7) of Panel A). The study did not find a significant effect of health insurance on
illness-related absenteeism at the workplace for workers in the formal sector. The
results show that the reduction in illness-related absenteeism at the workplace in the
informal sector is driven by young workers rather than older workers. In terms of
gender, the study finds a significant reduction in the number of workdays missed
due to illness for insured male workers (younger and older) relative to those without
health insurance. For female workers, a statistically significant difference is observed
only on the probability of missing a workday as shown in column (3) in Panel B of
Table 3.8. In terms of older female workers, the study finds an insignificant effect
of the NHIS on illness-related absenteeism at the workplace. The results shown in
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 are not much different from the estimates reported in
Table 3.8. A decline in the workdays missed due to illness is observed for both formal
and informal sector workers and both genders.
The OLS results reported in columns (2) to (7) of Table 3.3 show the
heterogeneous effects. Most of the estimates in both anels (A and B) are similar
in terms of signs and statistical significance, while others are completely different
when compared with the baseline estimates. The results shown in Table 3.3 suggest
that applying an IV approach is appropriate for this analysis.
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Table 3.8: Estimates of the effect of health insurance on illness-related absenteeism
at the workplace by age group in terms of sector and gender
Outcome variables Formal Informal Formal Informal
sector sector sector sector
workers workers workers workers
Panel A 15-49 50-60 15-49 50-60 15-49 50-60 15-49 50-60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Health insurance 0.407 -0.510 -0.369** -0.148 -3.606 -1.521 -2.282** -4.085
(0.323) (1.001) (0.150) (0.306) (2.408) (5.855) (1.230) (2.753)
Mean of outcome variable 0.466 0.540 0.602 0.632 5.532 6.394 5.563 6.627
Observations 566 111 1,871 530 566 121 1,872 531
Male Female Male Female
workers workers workers workers
Panel B 15-49 50-60 15-49 50-60 15-49 50-60 15-49 50-60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Health Insurance -0.088 -0.213 -0.389** -0.221 -3.826** -1.581* -0.934 -1.209
(0.216) (0.346) (0.159) (0.302) (1.512) (3.397) (1.051) (2.341)
Mean of outcome variable 0.555 0.620 0.578 0.605 5.970 5.933 5.970 5.933
Observations 873 237 1,565 412 873 239 1,566 413
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the level of the region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01,
**p<0.05, * p<0.1. The covariates include age, gender, educational status, marital status, ethnicity,
health status, employment status, region, year fixed effect, household size and religion. Results in
columns (1) to (4) are for probit regression, and columns (5) to (8) are for negative binomial regressions.
Coefficients are marginal effects measured at the mean, and the estimates in columns (1) to (4) are
based on the probability of missing a workday due to illness and columns (5) to (8) are based on the
total number of workdays missed due to illness.
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E. Interaction effect analysis
Interaction effects between the NHIS, gender and employment sector on the number
of workdays missed due to illness are also examined. In most specifications, the study
observed interaction effects because the lines of observed variables are not parallel
as illustrated in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. The study also assesses the significant
difference in the sets of effects estimated using contrast estimation techniques in
margins. In these analyses, the study observed a significant effect in most categories
examined (see Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4). Figure 3.3 illustrate the interaction
effect between the NHIS and employment sector and the results suggest a significant
reduction in the number of workdays missed due to illness for insured workers in
both informal and formal sectors of the economy compared with those without health
insurance.
The study also observed a significant interaction effect between health insurance
and gender (see Figure 3.4). These estimates are not much different from the
baseline results. Overall, the results show heterogeneous effects of health insurance
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Figure 3.3: Interaction effects on the number of workdays missed due to illness by




20 40 60 20 40 60
Workers without NHIS Workers with NHIS































20 40 60 20 40 60






























Contrasts of Predictive Margins of NHIS@Age#Gender with 95% CIs
Figure 3.4: Interaction effects of health insurance on the number of workdays
missed due to illness by male and female workers
3.4.2 Robustness checks
A. Sensitivity analysis of instrumental variables
There are a number of criticisms of the instruments usually applied to model
identification and a major one is that few of these instruments would satisfy the
exclusion restriction assumption. Apart from this criticism, there are sometimes
issues such as spillover effects and reverse causality problems associated with the
studies that apply the IV approach. To address this issue, Conley et al. (2012)
proposed a plausibly exogenous estimator to check the potential violation of the
exclusion restriction. The study, therefore, applies the plausibly exogenous estimator
to check the sensitivity of the instrument employed on the baseline results. To do so,
the estimation model is rewritten as:
Yi = σXe + γZi + ϵi (3.12)
Xe = δZi + εi (3.13)
where Yi represents outcome variables, Xe is the endogenous variable (health
insurance), σ, δ, and γ are the parameters of interest, Zi is an IV, ϵi and εi are
the error terms. If the exclusion restriction assumption is satisfied, we expect γ = 0
and if the assumption is violated, then γ ̸= 0. According to Conley et al. (2012), the
instruments might not necessarily satisfy the exclusion restriction γ = 0, but rather,
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are close to the exclusion restriction assumption. Therefore, the sensitivity analysis
can be performed using prior knowledge of the magnitude of γ to check the extent to
which the coefficient of treatment variable σ is positive or negative within a certain
confidence interval (Conley et al., 2012). In other words, σ must fall within certain
confidence intervals known as union of confidence intervals (UCI), where γ provides
support for UCI. For instruments to be valid in the plausibly exogenous model, γ ≡ 0.
The UCI assumes that γ ∈ Γ where Γ is the bounded support of γ. Given a specific
value of γ from the support known as γ̂, we can subtract γ̂ Zi from both sides of
equation (3.12), expressed as:
Ŷi = Yi − γ̂Zi = σXe + ϵi (3.14)
The study then applies the 2SLS to obtain an estimate of σ with an IV Zi. Applying
the UCI approach, we assume a positive support interval γ ∈ [0, θ],10 and estimate the
union of confidence intervals for the instrument, given that γ is in the UCI support.
The magnitude of γ is based on prior information on first stage regression. The result
is shown in Figure 3.5. The dashed lines are the UCI and they are composed of the
upper and lower limit of confidence intervals respectively. The blue line (long dash)
represents the 2SLS estimates of the treatment variable known as a point estimate.
Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 represent the 95% UCI. The confidence interval containing
zero indicates that the IVs are less robust. For the number of workdays missed due
to illness results, the confidence intervals exclude zero, as illustrated in Figure 3.5.
This suggests that to invalidate the statistical significance of the baseline results
under the UCI, the specification requires γ ≤ 1.8. Figure 3.5 indicates that the
instrument employed to estimate the health insurance effects on the number of days
missed due to illness is robust, even if it violates or departs from a perfect IV. This
is because a large exclusion restriction violation is required to invalidate our baseline
results. Thus, the exclusion restriction violation is small and as long as that is the
case, our baseline result is still robust. The estimates indicate that the effect of
10The studies also employs a symmetric support centred at zero γ ∈ [−θ, θ] for different values of
θ, but the results remain the same.
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health insurance instrumented by regional-level average health insurance coverage is
plausibly exogenous. Figure 3.6 presents the results from the sensitivity analysis of
the IV for missing workdays due to illness. In contrast to Figure 3.5, 95% confidence
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Figure 3.5: The UCI test for instrument validity on the number of workdays missed
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Figure 3.6: The UCI test for instrument validity on the probability of missing a
workday due to illness
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B. Estimation with other residuals in the control function approach
The control function approach is a general method for addressing the endogeneity
issue associated with a regressor(s). A function of the residuals exists in the control
function approach, which helps to produce a correct adjustment for endogeneity
in the outcome equation (Newey et al., 1999; Garrido et al., 2012). According
to O’Malley et al. (2011), control functions are robust to the treatment equation
distribution of response residuals if the outcome equation distribution of response
residuals is symmetric. For a binary treatment, residuals can be constructed in four
ways: response, Anscombe, Pearson and deviance. These residuals are equivalent in
linear but not in nonlinear regression models (Gill and Torres, 2019; Garrido et al.,
2012). The functional form of the residuals in the control function approach should
correspond appropriately with nonlinear specifications, therefore, for this analysis we
employed two-stage residual inclusion, one of the estimation techniques commonly
used in control function approach (Garrido et al., 2012; Terza, 2018; Basu et al.,
2018). The computation of the residuals varies among themselves and the estimates
from these residuals are also slightly different from one another.11
The estimates in the baseline analysis are based on response residual, therefore,
the study checks the sensitivity of our baseline results by applying different estimated
residuals. The results from these residuals (Anscombe, Pearson and deviance) are
reported in Table B4 to Table B7 in Appendix B. Most of the estimates are similar
to the baseline results (response residual results) in terms of signs and statistically
significance. The results in most specifications indicate a negative and statistically
significant effect of health insurance on illness-related absenteeism at the workplaces.
The only difference across the estimates is the magnitudes of the estimates which is
slightly different across the estimated residuals. These differences in magnitude could
be attributed to the computational differences in the residuals as already stressed.
11The computation of the response residual is the difference between the observed treatment and
the predicted probability of treatment. Pearson residuals are constructed by dividing the response
residuals by the standard error of the predicted probability of treatment. Anscombe residuals are
computed using the observed treatment, the predicted treatment probability and the variance of
that prediction. Deviance residuals are estimated by taking the square root of the observations
that minimised the deviance to obtain the parameter estimates (Pierce and Schafer, 1986; Gill and
Torres, 2019; Garrido et al., 2012).
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In most specifications, the study observed a significant reduction in illness-related
absenteeism at the workplace for workers with health insurance relative to those
without health insurance. Most of the results in heterogeneous analyses are also
similar to the baseline results in terms of signs and statistical significance.
3.5 Discussion
The study applies a 2SRI approach to investigate the effect of health insurance on
labour productivity through illness-related absenteeism at the workplace in Ghana. In
the estimation, the study introduces IVs to address the potential endogeneity issue in
health insurance analysis. The findings indicate that workers with health insurance
miss fewer workdays than those without health insurance. In general, the results
correspond to the evidence in the literature that having health insurance improves
individual health, and improved health increases labour force participation. Better
health also improves labour productivity by reducing illness-related absenteeism at
the workplace. This reduces output loss and increases the country’s production.
These are some possible mechanisms through which health insurance influence
absenteeism and productivity.
Contributions to the NHIS in Ghana are mandatory for formal sector workers
and voluntary for informal sector workers, therefore, the majority of workers in the
formal sector are in the NHIS, but this is not the case in the informal sector. The
expectation was that the NHIS would have a more significant effect on formal sector
workers compared to informal sector workers, but the results reveal otherwise. The
paper finds a negative and statistically significant effect of health insurance on workers
in both sectors, indicating that the reduction in the number of days of illness-related
absenteeism at the workplace is driven by workers in both formal and informal sectors.
Several factors could account for this finding, including earnings and nature of
work in these sectors, particularly the informal sector. Most workers in the informal
sector are self-employed and their earnings depend on the activities they engage in.
They may be paid on a daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly or yearly basis. Since these
earnings are sometimes unstable and unreliable compared with earnings in the formal
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sector, absence from work has a large effect on their earnings. The majority of workers
in this sector, especially older workers, are also household heads and breadwinners
for their families, therefore, illness could affect the entire household earnings and
consumption. As a result, they are very conscious of their health and take proper care
to avoid catastrophic illness, which could incapacitate them in their daily activities.
Despite a significant reduction of illness-related absenteeism at the workplace
in both sectors, there are variations in the size of the effects between workers in the
formal and informal sectors, and this may be due to the distribution of health facilities
across the country. Most of the available hospitals are in urban centres rather than
in rural areas. The majority of people in the informal sector are in rural areas. They
may be insured, but they may have challenges in accessing health care compared
with those in urban centres, and this may have accounted for these differences. The
findings suggest that there is a need to expand the Community-based Health Planning
and Service (CHPS) and clinics to emerging communities such as slum areas, rural
areas and the hinterlands where they are not available, so as to improve healthcare
access and health, which in turn affect health and labour productivity.
The study also investigates the effects of the NHIS separately for young and
old workers in terms of the probability of missing a workday and the number of
workdays missed due to illness. The findings show no significant effect of the NHIS
on the probability of missing workdays due to illness, although a significant effect on
the number of days a worker misses work due to illness is observed for both younger
and older workers. The study undertakes a series of robustness checks with different
estimation techniques. In all specifications, the results suggest that health insurance
increases labour productivity by reducing the extent of illness-related absenteeism
at workplaces, indicating that the results are robust to the alternative estimation
techniques.
To reduce absenteeism and improve workers’ productivity in the workplace, the
study makes some recommendations. Firstly, CHPS and clinics should be extended
to communities where they are unavailable; and this would help to improve healthcare
access and health. Secondly, health insurance premiums should be subsidised
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for workers in the informal sector who cannot afford the premium payments.
These measures would increase participation in the NHIS and reduce illness-related
absenteeism at workplaces, and thereby improve labour productivity. With improved
labour productivity, the economy would grow and workers’ welfare would also be
enhanced.
There are some limitations to the study. First, the study controls for some regional
characteristics that may affect the estimates, but there are other factors that cannot
be controlled for, and this may affect the exogeneity of the instruments employed.
Secondly, in this sample, some workers reported the number of workdays missed due
to illness but others did not. Because the study focused on the individuals who
reported the number of workdays missed due to illness, the sample size dropped
significantly, and this can also affect the estimates. Finally, there may be other
health conditions individuals have which have not been accounted for in this study
and this can also affect the estimates. Despite these limitations, the study makes an
important contribution to the literature on health insurance and labour productivity
through illness-related absenteeism at the workplace in a developing country context.
3.6 Conclusion
This study examined the effects of health insurance on the labour productivity of
workers in Ghana. Holding other factors that affect labour productivity constant,
the number of workdays workers missed due to illness affects workers’ productivity
through output loss. Since health insurance is positively related to health, and
health influences an individual’s ability to work, the study examined whether health
insurance affects workers’ productivity through illness-related absenteeism at the
workplace in Ghana. The findings indicate that providing workers with health
insurance increases their labour productivity through a reduction in the extent of
illness-related absenteeism at the workplaces. Thus, workers with health insurance
miss fewer workdays than those without health insurance. This indicates that workers
with health insurance are absent from work less often and are more likely to reduce
output loss compared with workers without health insurance. Future research could
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focus on illness-related absenteeism in individual firms to investigate the actual cost
of this absenteeism at the workplaces.
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Appendix B:
Table B1: Descriptive statistics by year
All 2012 2006
Description Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Missing workday due to illness 0.578 0.493 0.586 0.493 0.535 0.499
Number of workdays missed 5.946 4.105 5.738 3.969 5.969 3.974
Informal sector employees 0.735 0.441 0.745 0.436 0.693 0.462
Hours of work 32.45 15.67 32.45 15.56 32.46 16.25
Age 35.71 14.14 35.50 13.16 36.91 13.01
Educational Status 0.763 0.425 0.748 0.434 0.847 0.360
Male 0.352 0.478 0.338 2,665 0.433 0.496
Female 0.648 0.478 0.662 0.473 0.567 0.496
Health status 0.941 0.235 0.939 0.239 0.952 0.214
Household size 3.965 1.822 3.954 2.827 4.018 2.703
ETHNICITY
Akans 0.419 0.494 0.379 0.485 0.644 0.479
Ga Dangbe 0.045 0.206 0.043 0.202 0.054 0.226
Ewe 0.126 0.332 0.134 0.341 0.080 0.271
Guans 0.045 0.208 0.047 0.219 0.035 0.185
Northern 0.356 0.479 0.389 0.487 0.175 0.380
No tribe 0.008 0.090 0.007 0.086 0.012 0.110
MARITALSTATUS
Married 0.532 0.499 0.527 0.499 0.556 0.497
Separated 0.081 0.273 0.078 0.268 0.100 0.301
Divorce 0.072 0.259 0.073 0.260 0.069 0.254
Widowed 0.053 0.223 0.055 0.227 0.039 0.194
Never married 0.262 0.440 0.267 0.442 0.235 0.425
REGION
Western 0.082 0.274 0.081 0.273 0.084 0.277
Central 0.064 0.244 0.011 0.240 0.076 0.266
Greater Accra 0.050 0.218 0.089 0.216 0.058 0.227
Volta 0.117 0.321 0.125 0.331 0.070 0.256
Eastern 0.119 0.324 0.113 0.316 0.154 0.361
Ashanti 0.155 0.362 0.139 0.346 0.244 0.230
Brong Ahafo 0.096 0.295 0.085 0.280 0.157 0.364
Northern 0.123 0.328 0.131 0.337 0.079 0.270
Upper East 0.106 0.308 0.118 0.323 0.038 0.192
Upper West 0.089 0.284 0.097 0.296 0.043 0.202
RELIGION
Christians 0.123 0.329 0.136 0.343 0.046 0.246
Moslems 0 .153 0.360 0.161 0.368 0.113 0.317
Traditionalist 0.156 0.363 0.165 0.372 0.116 0.321
No religion 0.217 0.412 0.209 0.407 0.251 0.434
Others 0.351 0.477 0.328 0.470 0.456 0.499
RESIDENCE
Urban 0.469 0.499 0.464 0.499 0.486 0.501
Rural 0.531 0.499 0.535 0.499 0.514 0.501
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Table B2: The IV estimates of the probability of missing a workday due to illness
Probability of missing a workday due to illness
Outcome variables Full Formal Informal Male Female
sample sector sector workers workers
workers workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Second Stage IV estimates
Health insurance -0.133 0.284 -0.241* -0.177 -0.108
(0.130) (0.319) (0.144) (0.235) (0.155)
Mean of outcome variable 0.585 0.476 0.606 0.569 0.584
Panel B: First Stage IV estimates
Regional-level average NHIS 1.725*** 1.705*** 1.714*** 1.661*** 1.771***
(0.165) (0.350) (0.186) (0.299) (0.197)
F-statistics 110.0 23.95 84.88 30.96 80.99
Stock&Yogo critical value(15%) 11.59 11.59 11.59 11.59 11.59
Under-identification test (χ2) 102.7 22.25 79.61 29.75 74.37
Observations 3,091 687 2,403 1,112 1,979
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the level of the region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01,
**p<0.05, * p<0.1. The covariates include age, gender, educational status, marital status, ethnicity,
health status, employment status, region, year fixed effect, household size and religion. The
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F-statistic is a weak IV test. The under-identification test is the
Kleibergen-Paap rank LM-statistic. The Stock and Yogo critical values correspond to the maximal
rejection rate one is willing to tolerate if the true rejection rate is 5%.
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Table B3: The IV estimates of the number of workdays missed due to illness
Number of workdays missed due to illness
Outcome variables Full Formal Informal Male Female
sample sector sector workers workers
workers workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Second Stage IV estimates
Health insurance -2.987** -4.361* -2.600** -5.830** -1.096
(1.450) (2.613) (1.115) (2.024) (1.194)
Mean of outcome variable 5.946 5.686 5.800 5.702 5.815
Panel B: First Stage IV estimates
Regional-level average NHIS 1.725*** 1.705*** 1.714*** 1.661*** 1.771***
(0.165) (0.350) (0.186) (0.299) (0.197)
F-statistics 110.04 23.95 84.88 30.96 80.99
Stock&Yogo critical value(15%) 11.59 11.59 11.59 11.59 11.59
Under-identification test(χ2) 102.74 22.25 79.68 29.75 74.35
Observations 3,091 687 2,403 1,112 1,979
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the level of the region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01,
**p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: The other covariates include age, gender, educational status, marital status,
ethnicity, health status, employment status, region, year fixed effect, household size and religion.
The Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F-statistic is a weak IV test. The under-identification test is the
Kleibergen-Paap rank LM-statistic. The Stock and Yogo critical values correspond to the maximal
rejection rate one is willing to tolerate if the true rejection rate is 5%.
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Table B4: Probit estimates of the effects of health insurance on probability of missing a workday using different residuals
Age Sector Gender
Full sample 15-49 50-60 Formal Informal Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Anscombe residuals
Health insurance -0.133 -0.149 -0.099 0.532 -0.296** -0.139 -0.308
(0.125) (0.140) (0.289) (0.320) (0.134) (0.154) (0.126)
Mean of outcome variable 0.578 0.570 0.611 0.476 0.608 0.569 0.584
Observations 3,089 2,438 651 687 2,403 1,112 1,979
Panel B: Pearson residuals
Health insurance -0.006 -0.002 -0.061 0.549** -0.112 0.002 -0.106
(0.070) (0.078) (0.172) (0.174) (0.076) (0.105) (0.083)
Mean of outcome variable 0.578 0.570 0.611 0.476 0.608 0.569 0.584
Observations 3,089 2,438 651 687 2,401 1,112 1,979
Panel C: Deviance residuals
Health insurance -0.176 -0.185 -0.165 0.432 -0.327** -0.173 -0.341**
(0.136) (0.152) (0.314) (0.345) (0.147) (0.160) (0.131)
Mean of outcome variable 0.578 0.570 0.611 0.476 0.608 0.569 0.584
Observations 3,089 2,438 651 687 2,401 1,112 1,979
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the level of the region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. The covariates include age, gender,
educational status, marital status, ethnicity, health status, employment status, region, year fixed effect, household size and religion. These estimates are
obtained from the 2SRI model. Results in columns (1) to (8) are for probit regression. Coefficients are marginal effects measured at the mean. .
121
Table B5: Negative binomial estimates of the effects of health insurance on number of workdays missed using different residuals
Age Sector Gender
Full sample 15-49 50-60 Formal Informal Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Anscombe residuals
Health insurance -3.809** -3.276** -5.348* -5.609** -3.258** -3.902** -0.785
(1.481) (1.602) (3.730) (3.292) (1.649) (2.022) (1.415)
Mean of outcome variable 5.774 5.559 6.582 5.686 5.800 5.702 5.815
Observations 3,091 2,439 652 687 2,403 1,112 1,979
Panel B: Pearson residuals
Health insurance -2.064** -1.720 -2.944 -3.054 -1.744 -2.008 -0.432
(0.986) (1.065) (3.730) (2.208) (1.096) (1.361) (0.956)
Mean of outcome variable 5.774 5.559 6.582 5.686 5.800 5.702 5.815
Observations 3,091 2,439 652 687 2,403 1,112 1,979
Panel C: Deviance residuals
Health insurance -4.006** -3.442** -5.624 -5.954* -3.412** -4.087** -0.832
(1.583) (1.711) (4.004) (3.523) (1.763) (2.162) (1.521)
Mean of outcome variable 5.774 5.559 6.582 5.686 5.800 5.702 5.815
Observations 3,091 2,439 652 687 2,403 1,112 1,979
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the level of the region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. The covariates include age, gender,
educational status, marital status, ethnicity, health status, employment status, region, year fixed effect, household size and religion. These estimates are
obtained from the 2SRI model. Results in columns (1) to (8) are for negative binomial regression. Coefficients are marginal effects measured at the mean.
122
Table B6: Negative binomial estimates of the effects of health insurance on the number of workdays missed by age using different residuals
Informal Formal Males Females
15-49 50-60 15-49 50-60 15-49 50-60 15-49 50-60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Anscombe residuals
Health insurance -4.569 -3.563 -2.831* -4.205 -4.907** -0.921 -1.230 -2.338
(3.462) (8.511) (1.789) (4.137) (2.204) (4.929) (1.539) (3.534)
Mean of outcome variable 5.532 6.394 5.563 6.627 5.970 5.933 5.970 5.933
Observations 566 121 1,872 531 873 239 1,566 413
Panel B: Pearson residuals
Health insurance -2.171 -2.248 -1.543 -2.042 -2.759** 0.332 -0.662 -1.515
(3.702) (9.144) (1.910) (4.439) (1.483) (3.308) (1.039) (2.408)
Mean of outcome variable 5.532 6.394 5.563 6.627 5.970 5.933 5.970 5.933
Observations 566 121 1,872 531 873 239 1,566 413
Panel C: Deviance residuals
Health insurance -4.797 -4.032 -2.973 -4.361 -5.163** 0.881 -1.312 -2.528
(3.702) (9.144) (1.910) (4.439) (2.355) (5.292) (1.653) (3.813)
Mean of outcome variable 5.532 6.394 5.563 6.627 5.970 5.933 5.970 5.933
Observations 566 121 1,872 531 873 239 1,566 413
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the level of the region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. The covariates include age, gender,
educational status, marital status, ethnicity, health status, employment status, region, year fixed effect, household size and religion. These estimates are
obtained from the 2SRI model. Results in columns (1) to (8) are for negative binomial regression. Coefficients are marginal effects measured at the mean.
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Table B7: Probit estimates of the effects of health insurance on the probability of missing a workday by age using different residuals
Informal Formal Informal Formal
15-49 50-60 15-49 50-60 15-49 50-60 15-49 50-60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Anscombe residuals
Health insurance 0.784 -0.321 -0.375** -0.023 -0.163 -0.176 -0.335** -0.101
(0.336) (1.118) (0.152) (0.299) (0.174) (0.357) (0.141) (0.288)
Mean of outcome variable 0.466 0.540 0.602 0.632 0.555 0.620 0.578 0.605
Observations 566 111 1,871 530 873 237 1,565 412
Panel B: Pearson residuals
Health insurance 0.656*** -0.287 -0.157** 0.066 0.016 -0.183 -0.135 -0.098
(0.366) (1.108) (0.166) (0.326) (0.117) (0.277) (0.093) (0.191)
Mean of outcome variable 0.466 0.520 0.602 0.632 0.555 0.620 0.578 0.605
Observations 566 111 1,871 530 873 237 1,565 412
Panel C: Deviance residuals
Health insurance 0.707*** -0.304 -0.406** 0.064** -0.207 -0.156 -0.362** -0.161
(0.366) (1.108) (0.166) (0.326) (0.181) (0.361) (0.146) (0.300)
Mean of outcome variable 0.466 0.520 0.602 0.632 0.555 0.620 0.578 0.605
Observations 566 111 1,871 530 873 237 1,565 412
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the level of the region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. The covariates include age, gender,
educational status, marital status, ethnicity, health status, employment status, region, year fixed effect, household size and religion. These estimates are
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Figure B1: Interaction effects of NHIS on the number of workdays missed due to
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Contrasts of Predictive Margins of NHIS@Age#Gender with 95% CIs
Figure B2: Contrasts on the number of workdays missed due to illness by
employment sector and gender
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Chapter 4








The study investigates the effect of health insurance on maternal healthcare
utilisation and abortion in Ghana. This study uses two waves of cross-sectional data
from the Demographic and Health Survey of Ghana and employs nonparametric and
parametric estimation strategies for the analysis. The study finds that on average,
health insurance causes a sizeable and significant increase in maternal healthcare
utilisation. In terms of abortion, no evidence is found that the abortion rate
responds to health insurance in general. However, in subgroup analysis, a significant
reduction in abortions is observed among young women aged 15-19 years compared
to those of the same age group without health insurance. The reduction in abortions
is also observed for unmarried women. This suggests there are heterogeneous effects
of health insurance on abortion for a category of women in Ghana.
Keywords: health insurance, healthcare, abortion, matching method
JEL Classification: C14, I10, I18
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4.1 Introduction
Women’s and children’s health are the bedrocks of economic development. Since a
country’s development depends on the health status of its citizens, the World Health
Organization (WHO) and its member nations committed themselves in the early part
of the 1990s to improve maternal and child health under the Millennium Development
Goals (MDG 4 and 5), with an emphasis on reducing the under-five mortality rate
and maternal mortality ratio (MMR) by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015 (World
Health Organization, 2015; Kassebaum et al., 2016). The high mortality ratio the
world experienced in the early 1990s shifted health issues, particularly maternal and
child health, from a national focus to a global challenge (Currie and Hyson, 1999;
Kremer et al., 2009). Since the 1990s, several policies have been initiated in the
concerned countries to improve the situation through healthcare access.
Despite global awareness and efforts countries and their development partners
have made to improve access to maternal and child health care, most developing
countries continue to experience a high number of maternal deaths.1 Most developing
countries in particular sub-Sahara African countries, failed to meet the MDGs target
of reducing the MMR by 75% (190 death per 100,000 live births) between 1990 and
2015. Although the maternal mortality ratio in sub-Saharan Africa declined about
50% between 1990 to 2015,2 it still remained the highest across all the regions in the
world (World Health Organization, 2015). This indicates that the maternal death
rate remains a challenge in most developing countries.
One of the most important factors influencing maternal deaths in sub-Saharan
Africa is poor access to health care, and this is as a result of the financial constraints
that confront most women in this region (Nanda, 2002; Sharma et al., 2005; World
Health Organization, 2015). In addition, there is evidence suggesting that unsafe
abortions contribute immensely to maternal deaths in developing countries. Unsafe
abortion is defined by the WHO as a procedure for terminating an unintended
1According to the World Health Organization (2015), about 303,000 maternal deaths were
recorded. This suggests that about 830 women died each day, and 550 and 180 of these maternal
deaths occurred in Africa and South Asia respectively.
2Thus, the MMR in sub-Sahara Africa reduced from 990 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births
in 1990 to 510 at the end of 2015 (World Health Organization, 2015).
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pregnancy carried out either by persons lacking the necessary skills or in an
environment that does not conform to minimum medical standards, or both (World
Health Organization, 2012b). According to the World Health Organization (2012a),
about 21.6 million unsafe abortion cases are reported annually. In terms of
abortion-related deaths, more than 99% of unsafe abortions occur in developing
countries particularly, sub-Saharan Africa, Central and Southeast Asia, Latin
America and the Caribbean (Okonofua, 2006; Sedgh et al., 2016). In 2008, 6.19
million unsafe abortions were reported, causing the deaths of 29,000 women in Africa
(World Health Organization, 2012b). This suggests that abortion-related deaths in
developing countries are a major issue of concern. Studies have also shown that
government interventions such as health insurance affect abortion and maternal
healthcare services (Nguyen et al., 2012; Giedion et al., 2007; Cheng, 2014; Whelan,
2010), but studies of the effect of health insurance on abortion in sub-Saharan Africa
are limited, despite its enormous contribution to maternal deaths. The important
question for this study then is, does health insurance affect abortion in sub-Saharan
Africa, particularly Ghana?
Ghana is among the countries in sub-Saharan Africa that failed to meet most of
the 2015 MDG targets, particularly the MMR. Ghana recorded about 319 maternal
deaths per 100,000 live births in 2015 which exceeded the MDG 5 target of 190 deaths
per 100,000 live births between 1990 and 2015, and Ghana’s MMR was ranked among
the highest in the region (World Health Organization, 2015). This indicates that
maternal mortality in Ghana is still a major concern and if the situation continues,
Ghana will find it difficult to achieve the new target set under the Sustainable
Development Goal (SDG 3.1) of reducing the global MMR to less than 70 deaths
per 100,000 live births by 2030 (Immurana and Arabi, 2016; Kassebaum et al., 2016).
Failure to achieve the SDG 3.1 target may affect Ghana’s quest of minimising its
MMR. In Ghana, abortion accounts for 15%-30% of maternal deaths and it is the
second largest cause of maternal mortality in the country (Asamoah et al., 2011;
Rominski and Lori, 2014). Abortion, particularly unsafe abortion, is common among
teenage girls, young women in their 20s and unmarried women in Ghana (Turpin
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et al., 2002; Sundaram et al., 2012). Therefore, investigating the effects of health
insurance on maternal healthcare utilisation and abortion in Ghana is vital, not only
for policymakers but also for researchers.
In Ghana, abortion is a criminal offence regulated by Act 29, Section 58 of the
Criminal Code of 1960, amended by PNDCL 102 of 1985. However, Section 2 of
the law states that abortion may be performed by a registered medical practitioner
when the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest, to protect the mental or physical
health of the woman, or when there is malformation of the fetus. This makes the
laws governing abortion in Ghana relatively liberal compared with those in other
countries (Morhee and Morhee, 2006; Taylor et al., 2011). Steps have been taken by
the policy makers (the Government of Ghana) to reduce the negative effects of unsafe
abortion by developing a comprehensive reproductive health strategy that specifically
addresses maternal morbidity and mortality associated with unsafe abortion (Mote
et al., 2010; Taylor et al., 2011). One of these policies is the subsidisation of maternal
healthcare services through health insurance. This reduces the financial burden that
often confronts pregnant women and increases maternal healthcare services. Despite
these policies, the incidence of unsafe abortion is still high in Ghana.
This study uses data from the Demographic and Health Surveys conducted
by the Ghana Statistical Service to investigate the effects of health insurance on
maternal healthcare utilisation and abortion in Ghana. This survey collects unique
reproductive health and maternal healthcare service data that are appropriate for
this study. The data employed are nonrandomised and lack of randomisation
in observational data may result in large differences between the observed and
unobserved characteristics of the treated (women with health insurance) and control
(women without health insurance) groups. These differences in covariates between
the treated and the control groups makes the observations in the data unbalanced
and can lead to bias estimates of the treatment effects (D’Agostino, 2007).
To tackle issue of the potential differences between the covariates (i.e. imbalance
covariates), the study employs an identification strategy that has a capacity to
control for confounding influences of pre-treatment covariates in the data. Controlling
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for these pre-treatment covariate differences between insured and uninsured women
reduces covariate differences in the data (Ho et al., 2007; Iacus et al., 2011; Jones
et al., 2016). This study, therefore, employs non-parametric coarsened exact
matching (CEM) for this analysis. In addition to the CEM approach, the study also
applies other matching estimation techniques such as nearest neighbour Mahalanobis
distance matching (NNMDM) and nearest neighbour propensity score matching with
replacement (NNPSM), and parametric techniques such as probit and instrumental
variable (IV) approaches to check the robustness of the baseline result. The study
employs CEM because it has the ability to trim observations in the data in such
a way that the covariates difference between insured and uninsured women reduces
significantly and the two groups become more similar. Achieving a balance of insured
and uninsured women on pre-treatment covariates rules out confounding variables in
the data. This makes exposure to treatment appear as random as possible, and it also
makes a treatment variable exogenous, conditional on the observable characteristics
(Ho et al., 2007).
Results obtained using CEM show that on average, having health insurance
significantly increases maternal healthcare utilisation in Ghana. Specifically, health
insurance increases the probability of receiving antenatal care by at least four times
before delivery. It also increases the probability of having the first antenatal check-up
within the first three months of pregnancy. The study further finds that having health
insurance increases the probability of delivering the baby at a health facility. As well,
it also increases the likelihood of the mother to receive postnatal check-ups from
health professionals after delivery compared with mothers without health insurance.
As for abortion, the results of the full sample analysis show that having health
insurance does not have a significant effect. However, the subgroup analysis shows a
significant reduction in the number of abortions among young women aged 15-19 years
and unmarried women. The study applied different estimation techniques, to check
the robustness of the baseline estimates and the results across different estimators
indicate that our results are robust.
The study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. Abortion issues
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are critical in developing countries because of its immense contribution to maternal
deaths and its associated health complications, but there has been little research on
the effects of having health insurance on abortion in sub-Saharan Africa. Most of the
related studies are in the developed countries context, particularly the US. Therefore,
for policy analysis in the sub-Saharan Africa context, where abortion-related deaths
are high, it is vital to examine this relationship from different environmental settings.
In addition, to understand whether health insurance effects differ across different
groups of women , the study investigates heterogeneous effects of health insurance on
abortion with respect to women’s characteristics: age groups, marital status, place
of residence and educational status. This analysis provides background information
for the formulation of policies that will strengthen the maternal healthcare policy in
Ghana and other developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the
background of the study. Section 3 presents the econometrics framework underlying
the study. Section 4 discusses the data used in the analysis. The results are reported
in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the results and Section 7 concludes.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Health insurance and abortion
In the literature, the impact of health insurance on abortion has been found to be
mixed in literature. In terms of positive effects of health insurance on abortion,
most studies (Sonfield et al., 2011; Jones and Finer, 2012; Jones et al., 2013) link
cost to the abortion procedure. Having health insurance reduces the monetary cost
of obtaining an abortion and increases the tendency for women to undertake such
procedures. Jones and Finer (2012) study on abortion care in the US reveals that
most women use health insurance to pay for their abortion procedures. The authors
find that insurance increases the abortion rate. A similar study by Jones et al. (2013)
finds that having health insurance reduces the financial constraints associated with
abortion care among women in the low-income group. Sonfield et al. (2011) find that
133
inadequate health insurance for women in the US increases out-of-pocket expenses,
and this leads to an increase in unintended pregnancies and abortions.
Some studies also find negative effects of health insurance on abortion. The
argument is that subsidising maternal healthcare services reduces expenditure
associated with antenatal and postnatal care. The reduction in these costs reduces the
financial burden that often confronts pregnant women, and this encourages pregnant
women to keep their babies instead of choosing to terminate their pregnancy. Whelan
(2010) finds a significant decline in the abortion rate in Massachusetts after expanded
health insurance coverage to all residents. Mulligan (2015) examines the effect of
insurance mandates on contraception use, abortion and birth, and finds that having
insurance decreases the abortion rate in the US. A recent study by Canestaro et al.
(2017) in the US also finds that providing women with health insurance reduces the
number of unintended pregnancies and abortions.
There is little research on the effects of health insurance on abortion in a
developing country context. Most related studies on abortion in developing countries
have concentrated on factors that affect abortion (Ahiadeke, 2001; Geelhoed et al.,
2002; Jewkes et al., 2005; Gebreselassie et al., 2010). Yogi et al. (2018) examine
the prevalence and factors associated with abortion and unsafe abortion in Nepal
and find that young, the poorest and uneducated women are more likely to abort
their pregnancy through unsafe methods. Meffen et al. (2018) conduct a similar
study in Haiti and find that married women and women within the lowest wealth
quintile are more likely to abort their pregnancy. In sub-Saharan-Africa context,
Dickson et al. (2018) investigates the socioeconomic determinant of abortion among
women in Mozambique and Ghana. They find abortion to be high among women
with primary education, employed women and married women.
In Ghana, Mote et al. (2010) investigate factors that influence induced abortion
among women in Ghana, and they find a high incidence of abortion among women
working in the formal sector and a low incidence among uneducated women. Geelhoed
et al. (2002) study the prevalence of contraceptive methods and induced abortion
in Ghana and find that urban residence and women with higher education were
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associated with more induced abortions and and higher use of contraceptive methods.
Atakro et al. (2019) also examine the contributing factors that affect abortion among
women in selected districts in Ghana. The findings reveal that poor socioeconomic
conditions, cultural and religious beliefs, and the desire to bear children only after
marriage contribute to unsafe abortion. This study, therefore, examines whether the
expansion of health insurance in Ghana affects abortion or not.
4.2.2 Health insurance and maternal healthcare utilisation
There is evidence that having health insurance increases healthcare access. The
mechanism is that health insurance reduces out-of-pocket medical expenses that
individuals often pay at the point of receiving treatment. The reduction in
out-of-pocket medical expenses enables individuals to afford the needed care and
therefore improves healthcare access and health (Chandra et al., 2007; Card et al.,
2009; Sommers et al., 2017; Escobar et al., 2011; Wagstaff, 2007; Finkelstein et al.,
2012; Cheng, 2014). Most of these studies have concentrated on general healthcare
access and health outcomes. In terms of maternal healthcare services, studies have
shown that the introduction of health insurance improves maternal health care
(Giedion et al., 2007; Mensah et al., 2010; Nguyen et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2016;
Abrokwah et al., 2014; Dixon et al., 2014). Wang et al. (2016) investigate the effect
of health insurance on maternal health services in three developing countries (Ghana,
Rwanda, and Indonesia). They find a positive effect of health insurance on at least
two of the four maternal healthcare outcomes employed in each of the three countries.
Giedion et al. (2007) examine a related study in Columbia and find that participation
in a health insurance program increases access to both maternal and child healthcare
services. Nguyen et al. (2012) investigate how the provision of financial intervention
for women in some districts in Bangladesh improves maternal healthcare use and find
that increased utilisation of healthcare services by women in intervention districts.
Mensah et al. (2010) study the impact of health insurance on maternal healthcare use
in Ghana and find a significant effect on maternal health services, but their study
is limited to only four districts in two regions. Similar studies in Ghana produce
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results similar to those of Mensah et al. (2010).3 Other studies find a significant
effect of the NHIS on the frequency of maternal health use but insignificant effect
on timing of the first three months of antenatal care visits (Dixon et al., 2014).
Singh et al. (2015) study also finds a positive effect of health insurance on facility
delivery but insignificant effect on antenatal care use. These results make the study
inconclusive, as most studies in Ghana concentrate on specific geographical areas.
The current study focuses maternal healthcare analysis on outcomes that correspond
to the WHO recommendation for maternal healthcare services for pregnant women
before delivery. It also considers the heterogeneous effects of health insurance on
utilisation, with respect to women’s characteristics.
Maternal healthcare access and abortion have been found to be large contributors
to maternal deaths in sub-Saharan Africa, but the focus of these studies has been only
on access with a little study on the abortion. Therefore, investigating the relationship
between health insurance and abortion in Ghana is vital as far as maternal mortality
in sub-Sahara Africa is concerned.
4.3 Data
The study employs two cross-sections of data from the Ghana Demographic and
Health Surveys (DHS). The DHS is a nationally representative reproductive survey
conducted in Ghana. These two cross-sections of data are the fifth and sixth in
a series of demographic and health surveys conducted since the 1980s. The study
considers these two waves because they are the cross-sections that capture the health
insurance status of women and healthcare outcomes of interest, particularly abortion.
The surveys were conducted by the Ghana Statistical Service and the Ghana Health
Service, supported by the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID). The fifth wave was conducted in 2008 and out of 5,096 women aged 15-49
years identified for interviewing, 4,916 were interviewed, yielding a 97% response
rate. In the sixth wave, conducted in 2014, 9,656 women in the same age range were
identified for interviewing and 9,396 were interviewed, yielding a 97% response rate.
3See Blanchet et al. (2012); Aboagye and Agyemang (2013); Abrokwah et al. (2014).
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After excluding observations with missing responses, the sample size was reduced
to 10,424 observations, comprising 6,392 (61.3%) women with health insurance and
4,032 (38.7%) women without health insurance.
The survey collected a wide range of maternal healthcare outcomes, such as
whether respondents visit an antenatal care (ANC), the timing of the first ANC visit
and the number of ANC visits before delivery; whether the respondent delivered at a
health facility or otherwise; and whether respondents received a postnatal check-up
from a health professional after delivery. The study analyses these outcomes to
capture the WHO recommendation on maternal healthcare services. In terms of
abortion, the respondents were asked whether they had ever terminated a pregnancy
before or not. The respondents who had terminated a pregnancy were assigned as
1 and for those who had never terminated a pregnancy were assigned 0. Other
information, such as reproductive history, respondent knowledge and use of family
planning methods, age at which the respondent first had sexual intercourse, the
ideal number of children, and other health issues were also investigated. The data
also contained information on women’s socioeconomic background and demographic
characteristics, such as educational history, age, marital status, place of residence,
household wealth, employment history (their own and their husband’s); women
exposure to mass media, birth history, religious affiliation, ethnicity and region of
residence.
Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics of women with health insurance and
those without health insurance. In terms of maternal healthcare outcomes, the
estimates indicate that women with health insurance (94.2%) are more likely than
those without it (87.0%) to visit an ANC at least four times. On average, insured
women are more likely to receive postnatal care from a health professional after
delivery (32.6%), compared with uninsured women (25.2%). On average, women
with health insurance have a higher chance of delivering safely at a health facility
(73.8%) compared with women without health insurance (53.4%). The probability of
women visiting an ANC for a check-up within the first three months of the pregnancy,
on average, is higher for women with insurance (32.9.4%) than for those without it
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(30.0%). As for abortion, the estimates reveal that women with NHIS are more likely
to terminate their pregnancy (20.7%) than those without NHIS (19.4%).
In terms of the covariates, the results reveal that more women with NHIS have
a high school education (6.2%), compared to those without insurance (2.6%). The
estimates show that the average age of sampled women in the 15-49 year age group
with health insurance is 29.8 and of those without health insurance is 29.3 years.
Women without insurance are more likely to have more children and are also more
likely to lose their virginity at an early age compared with those with health insurance.
Most women without health insurance reside in rural areas (58.7%). Unlike those
without the NHIS, the majority of women with NHIS have access to electricity, radios
and television. Women with health insurance tend to be married (62.8%) rather
than unmarried (29.3%). More women in the richest and richer wealth quintiles
participate in the NHIS than women in other wealth quintiles. In terms of ethnicity,
women with NHIS in Northern tribe (Mole-Dagbani, Grusi, Gurma and Mande) on
average dominate other ethnic groups in NHIS enrolment (40.5%). The majority of
women with insurance are Christians (74.8%), compared with women affiliated to
other religions.
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Table 4.1: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics
Insured Uninsured
Description Mean Std dev N Mean Std dev N
OUTCOMES
At least 4 ANC visits 1 if visits ANC at least 4 times, or 0 otherwise 0.942 0.234 6,392 0.870 0.336 4,032
First 3 ANC visits 1 if visits ANC within the first 3 months of pregnancy, or 0 otherwise 0.329 0.470 6,392 0.300 0.458 4,032
Postnatal check-ups 1 if receive postnatal check-ups by health professional, or 0 otherwise 0.326 0.469 6,392 0.252 0.434 4,032
Abortion 1 if had terminated pregnancy before, or 0 otherwise 0.207 0.405 6,392 0.194 0.396 4,032
Delivery at health facility 1 if delivered at health facility, or 0 otherwise 0.738 0.440 3,300 0.534 0.499 2,239
COV ARIATE
Age Women’s age 29.76 9.428 6,392 29.28 9.408 4,032
Age at first sex Age first had sexual intercourse 15.60 6.615 6,392 15.29 6.116 4,032
Expected children Ideal children women expected to have 4.203 1.277 6,392 4.292 1.288 4,032
Employed 1 if employed, or 0 otherwise 0.729 0.445 6,392 0.757 0.429 4,032
Electricity 1 if household has electricity, or 0 otherwise 0.695 0.460 6,272 0.565 0.496 3,954
EDUCATION
No education 1 if worker has education, or 0 otherwise 0.244 0.430 6,392 0.298 0.457 4,032
Primary education 1 if worker has education, or 0 otherwise 0.178 0.383 6,392 0.228 0.419 4,032
Secondary education 1 if worker has education, or 0 otherwise 0.516 0.500 6,392 0.449 0.497 4,032
Higher education 1 if worker has education, or 0 otherwise 0.062 0.241 6,392 0.026 0.158 4,032
ETHNICITY
Akans 1 if Akan, or 0 otherwise 0.375 0.484 6,392 0.441 0.497 4,032
Ga Dangbe 1 if Ga Dangbe, or 0 otherwise 0.051 0.221 6,392 0.057 0.232 4,032
Ewe 1 if Ewe, or 0 otherwise 0.121 0.326 6,392 0.122 0.327 4,032
Guans 1 if Guan, or 0 otherwise 0.029 0.167 6,392 0.027 0.163 4,032
Northern 1 if Northern, or 0 otherwise 0.405 0.491 6,392 0.331 0.471 4,032
No tribe 1 if other tribe, or 0 otherwise 0.019 0.135 6,392 0.022 0.145 4,032
RELIGION
Christians 1 if Christian , or 0 otherwise 0.748 0.434 6,392 0.790 0.408 4,032
Muslims 1 if Muslim , or 0 otherwise 0.203 0.402 6,392 0.153 0.360 4,032
Traditionalist 1 if Traditionalist , or 0 otherwise 0.023 0.150 6,392 0.059 0.236 4,032
No religion 1 if No Religion, or 0 otherwise 0.026 0.160 6,392 0.045 0.207 4,032
MARITAL STATUS
Never married 1 if never married, or 0 otherwise 0.293 0.455 6,392 0.299 0.458 4,032
Married 1 if currently married, or 0 otherwise 0.628 0.483 6,392 0.596 0.491 4,032
Divorce 1 if divorced, or 0 otherwise 0.080 0.270 6,392 0.105 0.307 4,032
REGION
Western 1 if from Western region, or 0 otherwise 0.104 0.305 6,392 0.113 0.314 4,032
Central 1 if from Central region, or 0 otherwise 0.072 0.259 6,392 0.133 0.339 4,032
Greater Accra 1 if from Greater Accra region, or 0 otherwise 0.090 0.286 6,392 0.114 0.318 4,032
Volta 1 if from Volta region, or 0 otherwise 0.088 0.283 6,392 0.086 0.280 4,032
Eastern 1 if from Eastern region, or 0 otherwise 0.101 0.301 6,392 0.084 0.278 4,032
Ashanti 1 if from Ashanti region, or 0 otherwise 0.092 0.289 6,392 0.147 0.354 4,032
Brong Ahafo 1 if from Brong Ahafo, or 0 otherwise 0.121 0.326 6,392 0.070 0.256 4,032
Northern 1 if from Northern region, or 0 otherwise 0.121 0.326 6,392 0.128 0.334 4,032
Upper East 1 if from Upper East region, or 0 otherwise 0.114 0.317 6,392 0.083 0.276 4,032
Upper West 1 if from Upper West region, or 0 otherwise 0.098 0.297 6,392 0.043 0.204 4,032
WEALTH
Poorest 1 if in poorest wealth quintile, or 0 otherwise 0.259 0.438 6,392 0.282 0.450 4,032
Poor 1 if in poor wealth quintile, or 0 otherwise 0.176 0.381 6,392 0.221 0.415 4,032
Middle 1 if in middle wealth quintile, or 0 otherwise 0.194 0.395 6,392 0.209 0.407 4,032
Richer 1 if in richer wealth quintile, or 0 otherwise 0.191 0.393 6,392 0.168 0.374 4,032
Richest 1 if in richest wealth quintile, or 0 otherwise 0.180 0.385 6,392 0.120 0.324 4,032
RESIDENTIAL TYPE
Urban 1 if live in urban area, or 0 otherwise 0.494 0.500 6,392 0.413 0.493 4,032
Rural 1 if live in rural area, or 0 otherwise 0.505 0.500 6,392 0.587 0.493 4,032
EMPLOYMENT
Employed 1 if employed, or 0 otherwise 0.722 0.448 6,130 0.739 0.439 3,535
Electricity 1 if household has electricity, or 0 otherwise 0.707 0.455 6,015 0.610 0.488 3,458
Radio 1 if household has radio, or 0 otherwise 0.689 0.463 6,015 0.621 0.485 3,458
Television 1 if household has electricity, or 0 otherwise 0.582 0.493 6,015 0.452 0.498 3,458




This section describes the econometric model employed to examine the effect of health
insurance on maternal healthcare utilisation and abortion in Ghana. The study uses
a treatment effect model for this analysis. In the model specification, the study
defines Ti as the treatment variable with value Ti = 1 to denote women with health
insurance and Ti = 0 for women without health insurance. The outcome variable is
denoted as Yi, where Yi(0) is the potential outcome for the observation i if the unit
does not receive treatment and Yi(1) is the potential outcome if the unit receives
treatment. The study considers n unit drawn from a population of N units where
n ≤ N . For this analysis, the study denotes Xi as covariates for observation i. The
treatment effect for unit i expressed as TEi = Yi(1)−Yi(0) is unobserved. Therefore,
to estimate the treatment effect, the study assumes that treatment assignment is
ignorable conditional on Xi (conditional independence assumption). Thus, after
controlling for the observable covariates the potential outcome and treatment status
is independence and the CIA is expressed as Y0i, Y1i ⊥ Ti|Xi, where Ti is the treatment
variable. This study focuses on the mean causal effect E[Yi(1)−Yi(0)] of the treatment













where Yi is the utilisation of maternal healthcare services and the probability of
having an abortion. Xi represents the observed covariates that consist of individuals
and household characteristics. µ1(Xi) ≡ E[Yi(1)|Xi] and µ0(Xi) ≡ E[Yi(0)|Xi], and
each quantity represents a mean causal effect for a unit whose characteristics are
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represented by Xi, averaged over all units.
To evaluate the impact health insurance has on maternal healthcare utilisation
and the probability of having abortion, the study estimates the average treatment












where Ti = 1 denotes health insurance and is the dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if women have health insurance and Ti = 0 denotes those who do not have health
insurance. µ1(Xi) ≡ E[Yi(1)|Ti = 1, Xi] describes the outcome of the probability of
women who receive treatment, given the covariate and µ0(Xi) ≡ E[Yi(0)|Ti = 0, Xi]
describes the outcome of the probability of women who did not receive treatment
given the covariate. ATET is the quantity of interest, but if causal effects are constant
over i, then the ATET and the ATE are identical.
This study uses observational data for this analysis. One criticism of the
use of observational data to investigate the treatment effect is that the data are
nonrandomised, and lack of randomisation in observational data may result in large
differences in the observed and unobserved characteristics between the treated and
control groups. These differences create imbalances that can bias the treatment
effects estimation (D’Agostino, 2007). These imbalances can be controlled through
estimation techniques, which have the capacity to control pre-treatment covariates
in the data. In observational data analysis where the treated and control groups are
not identical before treatment, matching estimators are often used to control for the
pre-treatment covariate (Iacus et al., 2012).
The study uses the CEM approach for this analysis. Coarsened exact matching
has the ability to trim observations in the data in such a way that the covariate
difference between treated and control is reduced significantly and the two groups
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become more similar. It also has a capacity to control for confounding influences of
pre-treatment covariates in the data (Ho et al., 2007; Iacus et al., 2011; Jones et al.,
2016). Controlling for these pre-treatment covariate differences (imbalances) between
women who have health insurance (treated) and those without health insurance
(control) reduces the imbalances in the data. The CEM approach also reduces the
imbalance in a chosen confounder without any detrimental effects on the balancing
of other variables. Thus, the imbalance bounding property is achieved by selecting
variables into meaningful groups and perform exact matching on the coarsened data
(Ho et al., 2007; Iacus et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2016).
Weights are applied to the covariates to estimate the ATET. The weights are
generated using the CEM approach shown in equation (4.3),
weighti =






, i ∈ Cs
(4.3)
where unmatched units receive weighti = 0. Women with health insurance receive a




, where mST and mSC are
the number of treated and control units in the stratum. mC and mT respectively
are the matched units for treated and control groups.
The weight generated for both treated and control groups makes exposure
to treatment appear as random as possible and this makes a treatment variable
exogenous, conditional on the observed characteristics.4 Thus, the generated weight
makes treated and control groups appear similar and the only difference between them
is the treatment exposure. The CEM technique eliminates all imbalances beyond
some chosen level defined by coarsening. The remaining differences or imbalances
4Where weighti is generated by denoting τ = (i : Ti = 1) be the set of indexes for the treated
unit and nT = τ be count of the elements of this set. Similarly, C = (i : Ti = 0), nC = C for control
units, with nT + nC = n, which define sample observation possibly drawn from the population of
size N . We denote mT ⊆ τ and mC ⊆ C as the set of indexes of the matched units in the two
groups. After coarsening, the CEM algorithm creates a set of strata, say s ∈ S, each with the same
coarsened values of X. Units in strata that contain at least one treated and one control unit are
retained, while units in the remaining strata are removed from the sample. The study denotes τs to
represent treated units in stratum s and expresses msT = τs to reflect the number of treated units
in the stratum. Similarly, the control units, that is, Cs, are also expressed as msC = Cs. It follows
that the number of matched units is mT = ∪s∈SmsT for the treated group and mC = ∪s∈SmsC for
the control group. To each matched unit i in stratum s, CEM assigns the above weights.
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within coarsened strata can be controlled through a statistical model.
In the econometric analysis, the probit model is used together with the weights
obtained from the CEM. The study also applies other matching techniques such as
NNMDM and PSM to check robustness of the baseline estimates.
The estimation of equation (4.2) is based on the conditional probability of
observed covariate, therefore, the study uses the other matching techniques such as
the PSM approach, where the estimation is based on the propensity score, to check
sensitivity of the baseline estimates. According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), if
potential outcomes are independent of participation conditional on the observable
factors, then they are also independent of participation status conditional on the
propensity score, p(Xi) ≡ P (Ti = 1|Xi) = E(Wi|Xi) = P (Ti = 1|Xi). Thus, the
probability of receiving treatment given observed covariate is based on the propensity
score of the treated and control groups. The study estimates the ATET in the PSM













where µ1p(Xi) ≡ E[Yi(1)|Ti = 1, p(Xi)] describes the outcome of the probability of
women receiving treatment given the propensity score and µ0p(Xi) ≡ E[Yi(0)|Ti =
0, p(Xi)] describes the outcome of the probability of women not receiving treatment
given the propensity score. The CIA in the propensity score is expressed as
Y0i, Y1i ⊥ Ti|p(Xi). The paper applies the common support condition, which rules
the occurrence of perfect predictability of treatment given the covariate and can be
written as 0 < P (Ti = 1|Xi) < 1 and 0 < P (Ti = 1|p(Xi)) < 1 in the propensity score
estimation. The common support equation implies that the probability of receiving
treatment or not should fall strictly within the unit interval (range).
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4.4.2 Implementation strategy
The identification strategy involves a combination of CEM and a parametric
regression analysis on the balanced data. Matching on the continuous variable
creates an imbalance, which leads to a biased estimate. The study, therefore,
applies CEM, which coarsened continuous, ordinal and nominal variables into a set
of strata to reduce the dimensionality of the matching process and increase more
matches. To begin the estimations, the study performs CEM on covariates such as
age, highest educational level, religious affiliation, the age of first sexual intercourse,
ethnicity, wealth quintiles, ideal number of children and employment status.5 The
first step coarsened the results using an automatic binning algorithm, which leads
to a stratification of the sample into strata. The study captures matched women
with health insurance and those without health insurance in 698 strata. The weights
generated by CEM are used to estimate the treatment effect. The imbalance in the
covariates are checked and the estimates reveal a substantial reduction in imbalance,
suggesting a good match. The study controls the remaining imbalance by including
covariates such as place of residence, marital status and region in the estimation.
The estimation results are reported in Table 4.2 to Table 4.4, which are discussed in
the next section.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Maternal healthcare utilisation
Table 4.2 reports the effect of health insurance on maternal healthcare utilisation.
The results show a positive and statistically significant effect of health insurance
on most of the maternal healthcare outcomes. Specifically, having health insurance
increases the probability of antenatal check-ups at least four times by 3.4 percentage
points. Health insurance increases the probability of having the first antenatal
5Andersen (1995) identified predisposing factors that influence healthcare utilisation in his
conceptual healthcare model as age, sex, education, religion, ethnicity, wealth quintiles, employment,
income, use of a health facility and insurance. The covariates included in the analysis are based on
Andersen’s identification.
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check-up within the first three months of pregnancy by 2.8 percentage points
compared with those without health insurance. The estimates further show
that participation in a health insurance program increases the probability of
delivery at a health facility by 11.6 percentage points. It also increases the
likelihood of receiving postnatal check-ups by health professionals by 4.7 percentage
points compared with women without health insurance. Overall, the results indicate
that having health insurance contributes to the use of maternal health care in Ghana.
Table 4.2: Marginal effect estimates of the effects of health insurance on maternal
healthcare utilisation
Dependent variables At least 4 First 3 Facility Postnatal
ANC visits ANC visits delivery check-ups
Full sample (1) (2) (3) (4)
Health insurance 0.034*** 0.028** 0.116*** 0.047**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
Observations 8,570 8,570 4,497 8,570
Standard errors, clustered by region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Results are for probit using CEM weights. Coefficients are marginal effects measured at the
mean.
4.5.2 Heterogeneous effects of health insurance on maternal
healthcare utilisation
A. Maternal healthcare use and women’s place of residence
This section assesses the rural-urban heterogeneity in maternal healthcare utilisation.
This analysis was considered because the provision of health facilities in Ghana is
not uniform across the country; women may have health insurance but may not have
access to a health facility. The study, therefore, investigates how women’s place
of residence affects maternal healthcare utilisation and the results are reported in
Panel A of Table 4.3. The estimates show a positive and statistically significant
effect of health insurance on most of the maternal healthcare outcomes for women
residing in rural and urban areas. With the exception of the number of antenatal
check-ups, the study did not find a significant difference between insured women
in rural and urban areas in their the utilisation of maternal healthcare services.
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Table 4.3: Marginal effect estimates of heterogeneous effects of health insurance on
maternal healthcare utilisation
Dependent variables At least 4 First 3 Facility Postnatal
ANC visits ANC visits delivery check-ups
Subgroup (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
Living in urban areas
Health insurance 0.007 0.026* 0.041** 0.036**
(0.006) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Observations 3,991 3,991 1,727 3,991
Living in rural areas
Health insurance 0.058** 0.038*** 0.161*** 0.066***
(0.009) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014)
Observations 4,579 4,579 2,759 4,579
Panel B
Married
Health insurance 0.045*** 0.046** 0.117*** 0.061***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Observations 5,353 5,353 3,943 5,353
Unmarried
Health insurance 0.008 -0.009 0.098** 0.012
(0.006) (0.010) (0.037) (0.010)
Observations 3,217 3,217 554 3,217
Panel C
Formal education
Health insurance 0.015** 0.015 0.053*** 0.028**
(0.005) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
Observations 5,251 5,251 2,244 5,251
No formal education
Health insurance 0.049*** 0.057*** 0.146*** 0.080***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016)
Observations 3,319 3,319 2,253 3,319
Standard errors, clustered by region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Results are for probit using CEM weights. Coefficients are marginal effects measured at
the mean.
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Thus, irrespective of women’s place of residence, having health insurance increases the
probability of women’s having their first antenatal check-up within the first trimester
of the pregnancy, increases the likelihood of delivery at a health facility and also
increases the chance of receiving a postnatal check-up by a health professional after
delivery. On the number of antenatal check-ups, it is observed that women with NHIS
residing in rural areas are more likely to visit the ANC before delivery at least four
times for check-ups, as recommended by the WHO. In particular, the probability of
an increase in the frequency with which insured women in rural areas visit an ANC
before delivery increases by 5.8 percentage points. For women in the urban area,
however, no significant effect was found. This suggests that there are heterogeneous
effects of health insurance on maternal healthcare services in terms of women’s place
of residence.
B. Maternal healthcare use and marital status
Panel B of Table 4.3 reports the heterogeneity in maternal healthcare utilisation
in terms of marital status, and the results show a significant difference between
married and unmarried women. The results indicate that married women with health
insurance are more likely to meet the WHO recommendation on maternal healthcare
services for a pregnant women prior to delivery compared to those without health
insurance. The estimates suggest that the use of maternal healthcare is higher among
married women than unmarried women in Ghana.
C. Maternal healthcare use and educational status
Panel C in Table 4.3 reports the heterogeneity in maternal healthcare utilisation in
terms of women educational status. The results show a significant effect of health
insurance on maternal healthcare utilisation for women with formal education and
those with no formal education, with the exception of the timing of the first ANC
visits, within the first 3 months of the pregnancy, where a significant difference,
is observed. Taken as a whole, these results indicate that irrespective of women’s
educational status, having health insurance increases maternal healthcare utilisation
in Ghana.
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Overall, the estimates indicate that insured women’s place of residence and
educational status does not greatly influence their maternal healthcare utilisation.
4.5.3 Abortion
Abortion, particularly unsafe abortion, contributes substantially to maternal
mortality in sub-Saharan Africa. As stressed in the introduction, the rise in unsafe
abortion in this region has been associated with financial constraints that often
confront women.6 The study, therefore, assesses the impact of health insurance on
abortion and the results are reported in Table 4.4. The estimate in column (1) uses
a combined sample and the result shows that insurance has no significant effect
on abortion. Thus, there is no significant difference between women with health
insurance and those without health insurance in terms of abortion in the full sample
analysis. This suggests that participation in the NHIS in general, does not influence
pregnant women’s decision to abort their pregnancies or not.
Table 4.4: Marginal effect estimates of the effects of health insurance on abortion
Outcome variables Abortion 15-19 20-29 30-39 40-49
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
Health insurance 0.011 -0.027** 0.004 0.040** 0.037
(0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.018) (0.023)
Observations 8,683 1,394 3,018 2,515 1,567
Standard errors, clustered by region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Results in columns (1) to (5) are for probit using CEM weights. Coefficients are marginal
effects measured at the mean.
4.5.4 Heterogeneous effects of health insurance on abortion
The study further investigates heterogeneity in abortion with respect to respondents’
characteristics to understand if health insurance effects differ across different groups
6In sub-Saharan Africa, most women resort to abortion for several reasons. In Ghana, for
instance, the inability of women to afford the needed maternal care during pregnancy is one major
constraint that often confronts women (Turpin et al., 2002). This often leads to an unsafe abortion
among young and unmarried women. Since the NHIS reduces the financial constraints associated
with maternal healthcare services, the study expects access to the NHIS to have a significant impact
on the abortion rate in Ghana.
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of women. First, the paper estimates the ATET separately in terms of age groups.
The study focuses on the age category because the decision to abort a pregnancy
differs across women, and it is more common among young and unmarried women
than married women in sub-Saharan Africa, specifically Ghana (Turpin et al., 2002).
Therefore, for policy-making purposes it is important to understand the NHIS effects
in terms of women’s characteristics. The results are reported in columns (2) to (5)
of Table 4.4.
A. Abortion and age group
Contrary to the full sample analysis as shown in column (1) of Table 4.4, the study
observes a significant effect of health insurance on abortion in the subgroup analysis.
In particular, the study finds that the probability of insured women aged 15-19 years
aborting a pregnancy is reduced by 2.7 percentage points compared with those of the
same age group without health insurance. In contrast, there is a positive effect of
abortion for women in other age groups, but the estimate is statistically significant for
women aged 30-39 years. The study does not find a significant effect of insurance for
women aged 20-29 years and 40-49 years. Most women aged 30-39 years are married
and a significant reduction in abortion among that age group was anticipated, but
the results suggest otherwise.
Graphical analyses are also performed on abortion for age groups in terms of
marital status, place of residence and educational status. Figure 4.1 to Figure 4.7
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Figure 4.1: Abortion and marital status
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for age groups in terms of marital status. Figure 4.1 shows a significant difference
in abortion among the married and unmarried women. The results show that those
who married at an early or tender age tend to have a higher incidence of abortion
relative to unmarried women in the same age group. The unmarried women catch
up to married women in the older age ranges and may even surpass married women
after age 30. The increases in abortion among women in this age group may be as
the result of the unmarried women’s desire to bear children only after marriage. The
results agree with those found by Atakro et al. (2019), that some women in Ghana
wish to bear children only after marriage and this contributes to unsafe abortion.
The study further examines abortion in terms of women’s place of residence. As
illustrated in Figure 4.2, there is a slight difference in abortion numbers between
women residing in rural and urban centres. The estimates suggest higher rates of
abortion among young women aged 15-24 residing in urban centres than in rural
areas. However, the situation changes after 25 years, where those in rural areas
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Figure 4.2: Abortion and place of residence
in Figure 4.3, analysis is performed in terms of educational status and abortion
numbers. A difference in abortion estimates is observed between women with formal
education and those with no formal education. Figure 4.3 shows that young women
with a formal education have higher numbers of abortions than those with no formal
education. The situation changes after age 24, where those with no formal education
tend to have more abortion than with those with formal education. Overall, the
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Figure 4.3: Abortion and educational status
After observing variations in abortion in terms of age, marital status, place of
residence and educational status, the study then investigates whether having health
insurance has effect on abortion numbers in terms of these same characteristics.
B. Abortion and marital status
Next, the study assesses the effect of health insurance on abortion in terms of women’s
marital status. The estimates in columns (1) and (2) in Table 4.5 show a statistically
significant effect of health insurance on abortions for both married and unmarried
women. Surprisingly, the effect is positive for married women and negative for
unmarried women. This suggests that married women are more likely to terminate
their pregnancy than unmarried women. Specifically, the probability of married
women terminating their pregnancy is higher by 3.5 percentage points. This suggests
that the abortion rate is still high among married women despite a reduction in the
antenatal and postnatal care expenses which are covered by the NHIS. For unmarried
women, there is a reduction in the number of abortions by 2.4 percentage points.
C. Abortion and women’s place of residence
The study additionally investigates whether or not place of residence influences
abortion in Ghana. Columns (3) and (4) in Table 4.5 show that having health
insurance has no significant effect on abortion among women residing in either rural
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Table 4.5: Marginal effect estimates of heterogeneous effects of health insurance on
abortions
Outcome variables Married Unmarried Urban Rural Formal No formal
education education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B
Health insurance 0.035** -0.024** 0.003 0.016 -0.010 0.043***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Observations 5,468 3,215 4,027 4,656 5,247 3,436
Standard errors, clustered by region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Results in columns (1) to (6) are for probit using CEM weights. Coefficients are marginal
effects measured at the mean.
or urban areas. Thus, irrespective of women place of residence, having insurance does
not influence women’s decision on whether to abort a pregnancy or not.
D. Abortion and educational status
Columns (5) and (6) in Table 4.5 show the effects of health insurance on abortion
in terms of educational status. The study considers women’s educational status
in this analysis because there is evidence that there is a significant difference in
abortion numbers between women with and without formal education in Ghana (Mote
et al., 2010). Therefore, it is important to understand how insurance affects abortion
in terms of women’s educational status. The study observes that having health
insurance or not leads to a significant difference in the number of abortions between
women with formal education and those with no formal education. The estimates
indicate that, despite maternal healthcare subsidisation through health insurance,
abortions among women with no formal education are higher by 5.4 percentage points.
Conversely, a reduction in abortions is observed for women with formal education,
but the estimate is not statistically significant.
E. Interaction effect analysis
In addition to subgroup analyses reported in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, the study
also uses graphs to examines the interaction effect between health insurance and a
number of characteristics (i.e. age, marital status, place of residence and educational
status). According to Norton et al. (2004), the effects of one regressor on the outcome
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variable sometimes depends on the magnitude of the other regressors. Therefore, the
study examines the interaction effects on some of the outcome variables analysed,
particularly abortion. The results (see Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5) suggest there are
increases in the number of abortions among married women and those residing in
rural areas, but a reduction in the number of abortions among women with a formal
education (see Figure 4.6). Increases in abortions across age groups are also seen, but
as shown in the z-statistic of Figure 4.7, most of the estimates are not statistically
significant. In terms of sign and statistical significance, these estimates are not much
different from the subgroup results shown in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. Overall, the
results show heterogeneous effects of health insurance on abortion for different groups
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Figure 4.7: Interaction effects of health insurance and age on abortion
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4.5.5 Robustness checks
The study applies alternative approaches such as NNMDM, NNPSM, parametric
estimation without balanced data (simple probit) and the IV approach as a robustness
check.
A. NNMDM and PSM
The study uses other matching estimation techniques, such as NNMDM and NNPSM,
to check the robustness of the results and to ensure the adequate balance of the
covariates. Using NNMDM, the study matches each treated unit to the nearest
control unit and only matched or balanced covariates are used in the estimation. The
NNMDM technique helps to achieve a tight balance, and also allow us to control and
maintain the balance in a specific variable of interest. It prunes the data and drops
the treatment observations that had a very bad match. The study first combines
NNMDM and CEM; the estimates are reported in column (1) of Table 4.6 and
Table 4.7. Column (2) of both tables reports only NNMDM estimates. In most
of the specifications, the results are similar to the baseline estimates in terms of signs
and statistical significance.
In addition to NNMDM, the study employs NNPSM specifically with replacement
for this analysis. Using NNPSM, the paper estimates the propensity score of women
given their observed covariates, with probit model at the first stage. Women with
health insurance are then matched by their propensity score. The average weight
obtained from the propensity score from the first stage was used to run the treatment
effect regression. Estimation results are reported in Table C1 to Table C4 and
summary statistics on the distribution of the estimated propensity score are presented
in Table C11 to Table C15 in Appendix C.
The post-estimation tests showing the matching qualities are reported in
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Table C13 and Table C14.7 For consistent estimates, the covariates of the treated
and control group should balance. A series of iterations is then performed and
the balancing property is satisfied in all specifications. Table C13 describes the
overall covariate balancing test of each specification and Table C14 describes the
individual covariate balancing test. In Table C13, column (2) shows a significant
reduction of Pseudo-R2 after matching. The next two columns (3) and (4), show
the likelihood test ratio of joint significance and p-value, which is expected to be
statistically significant before matching, indicating differences between treated and
control groups, and insignificant after matching, suggesting otherwise. The results
shown in Table C13 and Table C14 indicate that the treated and control groups are
similar after matching. The mean and median biases between treated and control
groups after matching are reduced substantially and are less than 3% as required.
The absolute standard difference of mean (B) is also less than 25% as required after
matching and the ratio (R) of treated and control groups are within the range 0.5-2
as recommended by Rubin (2001). All specifications show a successful matching.
Figure C1 through to Figure C5 assess the covariates balance before and after
matching and the results illustrate a successful matching. They show a reduction
of biases after matching, and this suggests a consistent estimate in Table C13. All
balancing (diagnostic) results indicate a successful covariate balance between treated
and control groups. Based on the results of the diagnostics tests performed, the
author is confident that the difference between the treated and control groups is
minimal, therefore, the analyses are reliable.
In combined CEM and NNPSM techniques, most of the results in column (3) of
7In the t-test we expect significant differences before matching and insignificant differences after
matching, indicating covariates balanced in both treated and non-treated groups (Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1985). The Pseudo-R2 shows the extent to which covariates explain the probability of
participation. Therefore, there should be no significant difference if covariates are well distributed
between the treated and control groups. Pseudo-R2 is expected to be low after matching. The mean
and the median biases in the model are expected to be reduced considerably after matching and
sufficient bias reduction should not exceed 3% in the overall balancing test and below 5% in the
individual test (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). Rubin (2001) also recommends that (B), which is the
absolute standard difference of mean propensity score index in treated and control groups, should
be less than 25% and (R), which is the ratio of treated to control group of the propensity score
index should fall within the range between 0.5 and 2 for the sample to be considered appropriately
balanced. Likelihood ratio test of joint significance is supposed to be significant before the matching
and insignificant after matching (Aggarwal, 2010; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008)
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Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 remain the same as the NNPSM results in column (4) of
Table 4.6 and Table 4.7. All specifications reported in Table 4.2 to Table 4.4 appear
robust to the different methods employed, because the estimates in those tables are
similar in terms of signs and statistical significance to most estimates obtained from
the NNMDM and NNPSM approaches.
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Table 4.6: Alternative estimates of the effects of health insurance on healthcare utilisation and abortion
Health insurance effects CEM & NNMDM NNMDM only CEM & NNPSM NNPSM only Simple probit IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
At least 4 ANC visits 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.047*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.027)
Observations 8,570 10,220 8,570 10,220 10,220 10,220
First 3 ANC visits 0.017 0.008 0.030 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.106**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.049)
Observations 8,570 10,220 8,570 10,220 10,220 10,220
Facility delivery 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.126*** 0.133 0.131*** 0.282**
(0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.155) (0.011) (0.072)
Observations 4,497 5,453 4,497 5,453 5,453 5,453
Postnatal check-ups 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.079** 0.056** 0.05** -0.207**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.049)
Observations 8,570 10,220 8,570 10,220 10,220 10,220
Note: Robust standard errors, are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Demographic characteristics (includes age, gender, marital status, ethnicity); Socioeconomic
characteristics (includes employment status, educational status, household size, religion, household wealth); Geographical information (region of residence and rural/urban
residence), Health status measure (illness), and year fixed effect. Coefficients of simple probit are marginal effects measured at the mean.
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Table 4.7: Alternative estimates of the effects of health insurance on abortion
Health insurance effects CEM & NNMDM NNMDM only CEM & NNPSM NNPSM only Simple probit IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Abortion 0.008 0.016 0.024* -0.001 0.011 -0.039
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.045)
Observations 8,683 10,220 8,683 10,220 10,220 10,220
15-19 years -0.016 -0.022*** -0.032** -0.033** -0.017** -0.132
(0.026) (0.013) (0013.) (0.014) (0.009) (0.057)
Observations 1,583 1,793 1,583 1,793 1,492 1,492
20-29 years -0.006 -0.012 0.0003 0.015 0.008 -0.211**
(0.026) (0.021) (0.0214) (0.030) (0.014) (0.092)
Observations 3,018 3,533 3,018 3,533 3,533 3,533
30-39 years 0.049** 0.057** 0.050** 0.013 0.033 0.057
(0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.088)
Observations 2,515 2,965 2,515 2,965 2,965 2,965
40-49 years 0.017 0.015 -0.015 0.049* 0.029 -0.065
(0.029) (0.028) (0.037) (0.029) (0.021) (0.097)
Observations 1,567 1,929 1,567 1,929 1,929 1,929
Urban -0.010 0.015 0.041 0.005 0.001 -0.141**
(0.010) (0.019) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.062)
Observations 4,027 4,735 4,027 4,735 4,735 4,735
Rural 0.023 0.013 0.032 0.007 0.016 0.079
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.010) (0.066)
Observations 4,656 5,485 4,656 5,485 5,485 5,485
Married 0.030** 0.034* 0.041** 0.015 0.038** -0.134**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.011) (0.067)
Observations 5,486 6,318 5,486 6,318 6,321 6,321
Unmarried -0.032 -0.025 -0.032* -0.004 -0.026* 0.066
(0.022) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.056)
Observations 3,215 3,899 3,215 3,899 3,899 3,899
Formal Education -0.013 -0.010 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.015
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.057)
Observations 5,257 5,996 5,257 5,996 5,999 5,999
No formal education 0.038** 0.044*** 0.022 0.032* 0.025** 0.111
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.073)
Observations 3,436 4,223 3,436 4,223 4,223 4,223
Note: Standard errors, are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients of simple probit are marginal effects
measured at the mean.
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B. Simple probit
This section employs parametric estimation techniques that are not based on CEM
weight to check the robustness of the estimates. The results are reported in column
(5) of Table 4.6 and Table 4.7. Most of the results shown in Table 4.6 are little
different from the baseline results in Table 4.2 in terms of signs and statistical
significance in most of the healthcare utilisation specifications, with the exception
of place of residence, particularly urban centres which are statistically significant
in simple probit estimates but insignificant in the baseline results. Table C5 also
describes heterogeneous effect of NHIS on maternal healthcare utilisation. Overall,
the results show that health insurance increases the probability of maternal health
care use in Ghana.
As for abortion, most of the estimates in Table 4.7 are similar to the baseline
results in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. The study finds a reduction in abortion for
insured women aged 15-19 years but an increase in abortion for women aged 30-39
years. With the exception of women’s educational status, where the signs are different
from the baseline estimates, both results are statistically insignificant. Most of the
estimates are different in terms of signs and statistical significance, as reported in
column (5) of Table 4.6 and Table 4.7. The results suggest the difference between
coarsened (baseline estimates) and not coarsened data analysis.
C. The IV approach
Although the CEM technique has the ability to prune imbalances in the observation in
such a way that the covariates difference between treated and control groups reduces
significantly and the two groups become more similar. There may be confounding
factors that influence the unobserved time-varying factors and these may affect the
estimates. To address a potential endogeneity issue in this analysis, the study employs
an IV approach. There are studies that applied matching estimation methods with
the IV approach as robustness checks on health insurance analysis (Trujillo et al.,
2005; Brugiavini and Pace, 2016).
In dealing with a potential endogeneity issue, the study instruments health
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insurance by regional-level average health insurance coverage. The area-based IV
measures create variations in the endogenous variable. Area-based IV measures have
been used in other studies (Sloan et al., 2001; Grabowski and Hirth, 2003; Sasso and
Buchmueller, 2004; Morris, 2007; Jay et al., 2013; Denny and Oppedisano, 2013). The
implementation of the NHIS in Ghana differs across regions, and these differences
in the NHIS implementation may affect people’s enrolment in the NHIS program.
Regional-level average health insurance coverage is likely to explain a variation in
women’s enrolment in the NHIS, therefore, the study uses regional-level average
health insurance coverage as an instrument. It is expected that the communities
with earlier NHIS implementation have higher average health insurance coverage
than communities with late implementation. It is expected that the instrument
affects the maternal healthcare outcomes and abortion only through its effects on
health insurance.
Diagnostic tests are used to test the strength (weakness) of the instrument. The
IV coefficients in the first stage regression results reported in Table C7 to Table C10
are positive and statistically significant indicating that regional-level average health
insurance coverage contributes to NHIS participation. The study used F-test to
assess the strength (weakness) of the instruments employed and the instruments
are considered valid if F-statistic is larger than the rule of thumb value of 10. The
results from the first stage regression indicate that the instruments are not weak in all
specifications because the F-statistics exceed the rule of thumb value of 10, indicating
that the instrument is strong enough to identify the NHIS effect. The F-statistics
also greatly exceed Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values, therefore, rejecting the null
hypothesis of a weak instrument is justified.
The estimates of most maternal healthcare outcomes and as reported in (6) of
Table 4.6 are similar to baseline results in terms of signs and statistical significance,
with the exception of the timing of the first ANC visit, where the estimate is not
statistically significant. Table C8 also describes heterogeneous effect of NHIS on
maternal healthcare utilisation. Column (6) of Table 4.7 report abortion estimates.
After taking endogeneity into account, some of the subgroup results for abortion are
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little different from our baseline results in terms of signs and statistical significance.
Overall, the results show that women with NHIS are more likely to meet the WHO
recommendation on maternal healthcare utilisation before delivery than women
without the NHIS.
4.6 Discussion
The paper employs both nonparametric and parametric estimation techniques to
examine the effect of health insurance on maternal healthcare utilisation and abortion
in Ghana. The estimates show that the introduction of health insurance increases
maternal healthcare use and reduces abortion among young and unmarried women
in Ghana.
In the literature on maternal healthcare utilisation, the timing of the antenatal
visits has been given little attention, most studies concentrate on the number of
antenatal check-ups (frequency of the antenatal visits) and place of delivery. But
the timing of the antenatal visit is quite critical for pregnant women’s survival. The
WHO recommends the first antenatal check-up to fall within the first three months
of the pregnancy. The argument is that early visits help to detect and resolve
pregnancy-related complications. Identifying pregnancy-related complications and
solving them in the early stage helps to reduce the maternal mortality rate. The
results show that providing women with health insurance does not only encourage
the frequency of antenatal check-ups, it also increases the likelihood of having an
antenatal check-up within the first three months of the pregnancy and the use of
other maternal healthcare services. These would help to reduce the incidence of
maternal mortality by easily detecting and rectifying complications that affect the
mother and the unborn child.
The study also reveals the existence of a rural-urban heterogeneity in maternal
healthcare utilisation specifically for the number of antenatal check-ups before
delivery. Thus, women with NHIS in rural areas are more likely to visit an ANC
at least four times for a check-up before delivery compared with those without health
insurance but the study find insignificant effects for insured women in urban centres.
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This suggests that there is a need to expand Community-based Health Planning
and Service (CHPS) and clinics to emerging communities in urban centres, especially
slums areas, and the hinterland in rural areas where they are not available, to improve
healthcare access. This will also reduce pressure on hospitals in urban areas.
The study observed that place of residence and educational status do not have
a large influence on maternal healthcare utilisation, although significant differences
in maternal healthcare utilisation are observed for married and unmarried women.
The encouragement and support (both physical and financial) married women receive
from their partners may account for this difference, because most women in developing
countries tend to work in the informal sector of the economy which is characterised by
low income and this affects their day-to-day activities. The study also recommends
the provision of mobile clinics to new communities and slum areas. This will help
to curb immediate healthcare challenges because most people residing in these areas
are indigent and sometimes cannot even afford the cost of transportation to a health
facility. Therefore, providing mobile clinics will reduce the financial barriers, which
in turn improves healthcare access. Education about the NHIS should be targeted at
female-dominated places such as market centres, churches, mosques and communities
with a low level education. Providing women in these areas with information about
the health benefits associated with NHIS participation would encourage enrolment,
which would in turn improve maternal healthcare use.
Examining the impact of health insurance on abortion, the results of the
full sample analysis show that abortion does not respond to health insurance
participation. This suggests that women’s participation in the NHIS does not
influence their decision to have an abortion in Ghana. The result is not surprising,
because the health insurance package excludes the abortion procedure and cost.
The exclusion of free abortions from the package and its illegality (although
common) has given women, particularly young and unmarried women, a limited
choice when pregnant. They either keep the baby and deliver it or terminate the
pregnancy through unlawful procedures. When terminating a pregnancy, those who
cannot afford formal abortion procedures usually resort to unsafe procedures, which
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sometimes lead to death or complications. Despite the introduction of NHIS in 2003,
the incidence of unsafe abortion is high among married women and women with
no education. There have been several calls by civil societies and non-government
organisations for the NHIS authorities to include free abortion in the insurance
package in order to reduce unsafe abortions and the maternal mortality rate.
The analysis of abortion by women’s age groups reveals that having health
insurance reduces the number of abortions among young women aged 15-19 years.
These estimates suggest that the financial burden, especially the antenatal and
postnatal care expenses that hinder most pregnant women particularly young women
from getting regular antenatal check-ups, has been reduced significantly by the NHIS.
This may have encouraged young women to keep their baby rather than terminate
the pregnancy. Women aged 15-19 years are mostly students, therefore, there is a
trade-off between their education and the pregnancy. Thus, a young pregnant woman
is faced with the decision to either terminate her pregnancy in order to pursue her
education or to stop schooling, see the pregnancy through and deliver the baby. The
results suggest that most of the young women drop out of school in order to take care
of their pregnancy, this also has an implication for women’s education. However, the
study observed an increase in abortions among women aged 30-39 years, and most
women in this age group are married. Whether this is a form of birth control for
women in this age group is unknown. Further study is needed to ascertain if that is
the case.
There are other factors besides reduction in expenditure on antenatal and
postnatal care that contribute to women’s decision to abort or continue their
pregnancy. One is the cost of the formal abortion procedure, which is high for most
young and unmarried women, and therefore they cannot afford it. The high cost of
legitimate formal abortions has made unsafe abortion the predominant choice among
most young and unmarried women in developing countries such as Ghana. The
unsafe abortion procedures also has some consequences, and this sometimes affects
young women’s decision to terminate or continue their pregnancies. It is therefore
recommended that abortion be decriminalised and free abortion be included in the
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NHIS package to help young and unmarried women to make a proper decision that
will help to improve their lives and welfare. Policymakers should also take practical
steps to enforce mandatory enrolment in the NHIS for all women in Ghana because
its voluntary nature allows women to opt out of the scheme, and this could affect
Ghana’s quest of achieving the SDG target of reducing the global MMR to less than
70 deaths per 100,000 live births.
Overall, the results suggest that providing women with health insurance increases
maternal healthcare utilisation and reduces the incidence of abortion among young
and unmarried women. Different estimation techniques were employed to check
the robustness and sensitivity of the baseline results and the estimates show that
the baseline results are robust. The IV estimates also show the robustness after
considering the potential endogeneity issue in the analysis.
The study has some limitations. First, the data captured abortion in general,
but failed to capture formal and unsafe abortion separately in order to understand
the clear difference between the two in terms of the NHIS effect. Second, the PSM
controlled for observed factors, but there may be confounding factors influencing the
unobserved time-varying factors which could affect the estimates. Finally, most of
the healthcare outcomes in the DHS survey are self-reported and may suffer from
measurement errors. These reporting errors could correlate with other covariates
that can lead to biased estimates. Despite the limitations, our study makes some
important contributions to the literature on health insurance, abortion and maternal
healthcare utilisation in the developing countries context.
4.7 Conclusion
Maternal healthcare access and abortion contribute immensely to maternal mortality
in sub-Saharan Africa. Unsafe abortion is the second largest cause of maternal
mortality in Africa, and alone it accounts for about one-third of maternal deaths
in Ghana. Despite these challenges, the study on the relationship between health
insurance and abortion in sub-Saharan Africa context is limited. This study,
therefore, employs non-parametric and parametric estimation strategies to examine
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the effects of health insurance on maternal healthcare utilisation and abortion
in Ghana. The study finds that health insurance increases maternal healthcare
utilisation and also reduces abortion numbers among young and unmarried women.
Increases in abortion are also observed among married women and those women with
no formal education. These mixed results suggest that abortion is still an issue of
concern. Further studies need to focus on the impact of health insurance on unsafe
abortion and education among women in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Appendix C:
Table C1: Combined CEM and NNMDM estimates of heterogeneous effects of
health insurance on maternal healthcare utilisation
Outcome variables At least 4 First 3 Facility Postnatal
ANC visits ANC visits delivery check-ups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Living in urban areas
Health insurance 0.022 -0.017 0.034 0.012
(0.014) (0.021) (0.022) (0.018)
Observations 3,991 3,991 1,738 3,991
Living in rural areas
Health insurance 0.064** 0.046*** 0.139*** 0.054***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.022) (0.018)
Observations 4,579 4,579 2,759 4,579
Married
Health insurance 0.043*** 0.028 0.110*** 0.037***
(0.011) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018)
Observations 5,353 5,353 3,943 5,353
Unmarried
Health insurance 0.030** -0.100 0.134** 0.017
(0.011) (0.014) (0.045) (0.012)
Observations 3,217 3,217 554 3,217
Formal education
Health insurance 0.017** -0.009 0.076** 0.014
(0.007) (0.016) (0.028) (0.017)
Observations 5,251 5,251 2,244 5,251
No formal education
Health insurance 0.045** 0.043** 0.166** 0.046**
(0.015) (0.023) (0.027) (0.025)
Observations 3,319 3,319 2,253 3,319
Standard errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: Results in panel A and
B are for combined Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM)and Nearest Neighbour Mahalanobis Distance
Matching (NNMDM) estimates.
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Table C2: NNMDM estimates of heterogeneous effect of health insurance on
maternal healthcare utilisation
Outcome variables At least 4 First 3 Facility Postnatal
ANC visits ANC visits delivery check-ups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Living in urban areas
Health insurance 0.021 -0.017 0.032** 0.013
(0.014) (0.022) (0.020) (0.017)
Observations 4,735 4,735 2,069 4,735
Living in rural areas
Health insurance 0.066** 0.029** 0.149*** 0.062***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018)
Observations 5,485 5,485 3,384 5,485
Married
Health insurance 0.041*** 0.021 0.111*** 0.043**
(0.010) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 6,321 6,321 4,669 6,321
Unmarried
Health insurance 0.028** -0.015 0.126** 0.012
(0.011) (0.014) ( 0.037 ) (0.013)
Observations 3,899 3,899 784 3,899
Formal education
Health insurance 0.014** -0.019 0.054** 0.007
(0.007) (0.015) (0.026) (0.017)
Observations 5,999 5,999 2,571 5,999
No formal education
Health insurance 0.050*** 0.030 0.165*** 0.048**
(0.014) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
Observations 4,221 4,221 2,882 4,221
Standard errors, are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: Results in Panel A and
B are for Nearest Neighbour Mahalanobis Distance Matching (NNMDM) only.
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Table C3: Combined CEM and NNPSM estimates of heterogeneous effect of health
insurance on maternal healthcare utilisation
Outcome variables At least 4 First 3 Facility Postnatal
ANC visits ANC visits delivery check-ups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Living in urban areas
Health insurance 0.018** 0.015 0.050** 0.064**
(0.009) (0.024) (0.018) (0.015)
Observations 3,991 3,991 1,738 3,991
Living in rural areas
Health insurance 0.066** 0.027* 0.179** 0.065***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015)
Observations 4,579 4,579 2,759 4,579
Married
Health insurance 0.057** 0.021 0.126** 0.081
(0.008) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Observations 5,353 5,353 3,943 5,353
Unmarried
Health insurance 0.017*** -0.026** -0.005
(0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 3,217 3,217 3,217
Formal education
Health insurance 0.020*** 0.031 0.086*** 0.050**
(0.006) (0.015) (0.024) (0.014)
Observations 5,251 5,251 2,224 5,251
No formal education
Health insurance 0.063** 0.045** 0.040** 0.096
(0.012) (0.015) (0.022) (0.019)
Observations 3,319 3,319 2,253 3,319
Standard errors, are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: Results in Panel A and B
are for combined coarsened exact matching (CEM)and nearest neighbour propensity score matching
(NNPSM) estimates.
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Table C4: NNPSM estimates of heterogeneous effect of health insurance on
maternal healthcare utilisation
Outcome variables At least 4 First 3 Facility Postnatal
ANC visits ANC visits delivery check-ups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Living in urban areas
Health insurance 0.009 -0.003 0.025** 0.034**
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Observations 4,735 4,735 2,069 4,735
Living in rural areas
Health insurance 0.048** 0.055*** 0.123*** 0.068***
(0.011) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018)
Observations 5,485 5,485 3,384 5,485
Married
Health insurance 0.047*** 0.045** 0.087** 0.068**
(0.009) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021)
Observations 6,321 6,321 4,669 6,321
Unmarried
Health insurance 0.008 -0.009 0.111*** -0.004
(0.009) (0.017) (0.042) (0.013)
Observations 3,899 3,899 784 3,899
Formal education
Health insurance 0.001 0.001 0.077** 0.011
(0.006) (0.029) (0.044) (0.029)
Observations 5,999 5,999 2,571 5,999
No formal education
Health insurance 0.045** 0.071*** 0.094*** 0.102***
(0.013) (0.019) (0.025) (0.021)
Observations 4,221 4,221 2,882 4,221
Standard errors, are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: Results in panel A
and B are for nearest neighbour propensity score matching (NNPSM) only.
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Table C5: Marginal effect estimates of heterogeneous effects of health insurance on
maternal healthcare utilisation
Outcome variables At least 4 First 3 Facility Postnatal
ANC visits ANC visits delivery check-ups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Living in urban areas
Health insurance 0.018*** -0.002 0.050*** 0.024**
(0.006) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
Observations 4,735 4,735 2,069 4,735
Living in rural areas
Health insurance 0.075*** 0.028** 0.178*** 0.085**
(0.009) (0.12) (0.015) (0.011)
Observations 5,485 5,485 3,384 5,485
Married
Health insurance 0.064*** 0.038** 0.132*** 0.093**
(0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Observations 6,321 6,321 4,669 6,321
Unmarried
Health insurance 0.023*** -0.017 0.125*** -0.001
(0.006) (0.010) (0.030) (0.010)
Observations 3,899 3,899 784 3,899
Formal education
Health insurance 0.023*** 0.002 0.075*** 0.030**
(0.005) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011)
Observations 5,999 5,999 2,571 5,999
No formal education
Health insurance 0.072*** 0.030** 0.157*** 0.087**
(0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
Observations 4,221 4,221 2,882 4,221
Standard errors, are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note:Results in panel A and B are
for Simple probit without CEM weight. Coefficients are marginal effects measured at the mean.
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Table C6: Marginal effect estimates of the effects of health insurance on abortion
Outcome variables Abortion 15-19 20-29 30-39 40-49
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Health insurance 0.011 -0.017** 0.008 0.033 0.029
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.018) (0.021)
Observations 10,220 1,492 3,533 2,965 1,929
Outcome variables Married Unmarried Urban Rural Formal No formal
Panel B education education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Health insurance 0.038** -0.026** 0.001 0.016 -0.003 0.025**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Observations 6,321 3,899 4,735 5,485 5,999 4,223
Standard errors, clustered by region, are shown in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note:
Results in panel A and B are for Simple probit without CEM weight. Coefficients are marginal effects
measured at the mean.
Table C7: The IV estimate of the effects of health insurance on maternal healthcare
utilisation
At least 4 First 3 Facility Professional Abortion
ANC visits ANC visits delivery check-ups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Second stage IV estimates
2SLS 0.047** 0.106 0.282*** -0.207** -0.039
(0.027) (0.96) (0.072) (0.049) (0.045)
First stage IV estimates
Regional-level average NHIS 1.117*** 1.117*** 0.988*** 1.117*** 1.117***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.079) (0.057) (0.057)
F-statistics 384.2 384.2 157.5 384.2 384.2
Stock&Yogo critical value(15%) 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96
Under-identification test(χ2) 347.5 347.5 146.1 347.5 347.5
Observations 10,220 10,220 5453 10,220 10,220
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank
F-statistic is a weak IV test. The under-identification test is the Kleibergen-Paap rank LM-statistic. The
Stock and Yogo critical values correspond to the maximal rejection rate one is willing to tolerate if the true
rejection rate is 5%.
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Table C8: The IV estimates of heterogeneous effect of health insurance on maternal
healthcare utilisation
Outcome variables At least 4 First 3 Facility Postnatal
ANC visits ANC visits delivery check-ups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Urban
Health insurance -0.013 0.068 0.164** -0.199***
(0.025) (0.061) (0.072) (0.062)
F-statistics 251.7 251.7 103.5 251.7
Stock&Yogo critical value 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96
Observations 4,735 4,735 2069 4,735
Rural
Health insurance 0.108** 0.131* 0.407*** -0.230***
(0.051) (0.078) (0.121) (0.078)
F-statistics 147.4 147.4 68.3 147.4
Stock&Yogo critical value 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96
Observations 5,485 5,485 3,384 5,485
Married
Health insurance 0.075** 0.162** 0.266*** -0.309***
(0.042) (0.075) (0.081) (0.077)
F-statistics 218.8 218.8 127.8 218.8
Stock&Yogo critical value 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96
Observations 6,321 6,321 4,669 6,321
Unmarried
Health insurance 0.008 0.026 0.360** -0.072
(0.029) (0.051) (0.160) (0.049)
F-statistics 173.3 173.3 34.08 173.3
Stock&Yogo critical value 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96
Observations 3,899 3,899 784 3,899
Formal education
Health insurance -0.067** -0.044 0.188** -0.286***
(0.027) (0.059) (0.090) (0.061)
F-statistics 244.7 244.7 81.21 244.7
Stock&Yogo critical value 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96
Observations 5,999 5,999 2,571 5,999
No formal education
Health insurance 0.228 0.330 0.398*** -0.077
(0.057) (0.086) (0.111) (0.082)
F-statistics 146.3 146.3 79.18 146.3
Stock&Yogo critical value 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96
Observations 4,221 4,221 2,882 4,221
Standard errors, are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note:Results in panel A and B are for
Simple probit without CEM weight. Coefficients are marginal effects measured at the mean.
180
Table C9: The IV estimates of the effect of health insurance on abortion
Outcome variables Abortion 15-19 20-29 30-39 40-49
Second stage IV estimates
2SLS -0.039 0.132 -0.211*** 0.057 -0.065
(0.045) (0.057) (0.092) (0.088) (0.097)
First stage IV estimates
Regional-level average NHIS 1.117*** 1.085*** 0.943*** 1.223 1.326***
(0.057) (0.142) (0.098) (0.101) (0.131)
F-statistics 58.90 58.90 88.04 147.6 103.1
Stock&Yogo critical value(15%) 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96
Under-identification test(χ2) 347.5 54.02 88.04 128.3 89.21
Observations 10,220 1,793 3,533 2,965 1,929
Standard errors, are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: The Kleibergen-Paap Wald
rank F-statistic is a weak IV test. The under-identification test is the Kleibergen-Paap rank LM-statistic.
The Stock and Yogo critical values correspond to the maximal rejection rate one is willing to tolerate if
the true rejection rate is 5%.
Table C10: The IV estimates of heterogeneous effect of health insurance on abortion
Outcome variables Married Unmarried Urban Rural Formal No formal
education education
Second stage IV estimates
2SLS -0.134** 0.066 -0.141*** 0.079 0.015 -0.111
(0.067) (0.056) (0.062) (0.066) (0.057) (0.073)
First Stage IV estimates
Regional-level average NHIS 1.044*** 1.125*** 1.221** 1.027*** 1.113*** 1.143
(0.071) (0.096) (0.077) (0.085) (0.071) (0.095)
F-statistics 198.75 164.9 251.7 147.4 244.7 146.3
Stock&Yogo critical value(15%) 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96
Under-identification test(χ2) 197.1 157.4 222.3 128.3 222.0 131.6
Observations 6,321 3,899 4,735 5,485 5,999 4,221
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank
F-statistic is a weak IV test. The under-identification test is the Kleibergen-Paap rank LM-statistic. The
Stock and Yogo critical values correspond to the maximal rejection rate one is willing to tolerate if the
true rejection rate is 5%.
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75% 0.7208 0.9267 Std.Dev 0.1450
90% 0.8078 0.9271 Variance 0.0210
95% 0.8486 0.9276 Skewness -0.2442
99% 0.8960 0.9377 Kurtosis 2.7382
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Table C12: Propensity Score Estimates- probit regression
Variables Coefficient Standard error p-value
Age 0.040 0.010 0.000
Age at first sex 0.002 0.002 0.330
Employment 0.093 0.034 0.006
Electricity 0.486 0.033 0.000
Ref. Rural
Urban 0.141 0.031 0.000
Ref. Traditionalist
Christians 0.580 0.072 0.000
Muslims 0.527 0.075 0.000
No religion 0.267 0.096 0.005
Ref.Other Tribe
Akans -0.082 0.100 0.414
Ga Dangbe -0.028 0.114 0.802
Ewe 0.007 0.107 0.949
Northerners 0.078 0.122 0.526
Other tribe 0.038 0.100 0.706
Ref.Divorce
Married 0.154 0.058 0.008
Unmarried 0.231 0.047 0.000
Ref.Two Ideal Children
One Ideal Child -0.181 0.275 0.511
Three -0.239 0.213 0.261
Four -0.234 0.209 0.263
Five -0.284 0.208 0.173
Six -0.338 0.210 0.108
Seven -0.425 0.210 0.043
Ref.Central Region
Western 0.352 0.057 0.000
Greater Accra 0.083 0.062 0.183
Volta 0.464 0.073 0.000
Eastern 0.523 0.061 0.000
Ashanti 0.060 0.056 0.289
Brong-Ahafo 0.831 0.062 0.000
Northen 0.632 0.070 0.000
Upper East 0.809 0.073 0.000
Upper West 1.066 0.079 0.000
Number of obs 10,224 PseudoR2 0.069
LRχ2(30) 938.11 Probχ2 0.000
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Table C13: Overall covariates balancing tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome variables Samples Pseudo-R2 LRχ2 P>χ2 Mean Median B R
Bias Bias
At least 4 ANC visit UnMatched 0.142 675.45 0.000 10.5 9.6 0.7 1.11
Matched 0.007 148.65 1.000 1.2 1.0 8.6 1.26
First 3 month ANC visit Un Matched 0.057 260.97 0.000 11.2 10.7 58.4 1.12
Matched 0.001 9.72 1.000 1.1 0.9 8.6 1.28
Delivery UnMatched 0.056 260.56 0.000 11.1 10.7 58.4 1.12
Matched 0.001 9.66 1.000 1.1 0.9 8.5 1.29
Postnatal check-ups UnMatched 0.056 260.56 0.000 11.1 10.7 58.4 1.12
Matched 0.001 9.66 1.000 1.1 0.9 8.5 1.29
Abortion UnMatched 0.087 747.86 0.000 14.1 11.0 77.2 0.62
Matched 0.002 8.42 0.998 1.3 0.9 9.8 1.45
Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Pseudo-R2 shows
the extend covariate explain the probability of participation. Likelihood ratio test shows a joint significant
before and after matching and is expected to be statistically significant before matching indicating differences
between treated and control groups, and insignificant after matching. Mean and the median biases in the
model are expected to be reduced considerably after matching and sufficient bias reduction should not exceed
5%. B is the absolute standard difference of mean propensity score index in treated and control group and
is expected to be less than 25%. R is the ratio of treated to control group of the propensity score index and
also expect to fall within the range between 0.5 and 2 for the sample to be considered balanced
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Table C14: Individual covariate balancing test
Sample Treated Control % Bias % Bias Reduction t-Stat p-value
Age Unmatched 29.82 29.37 4.8 2.37 0.018
Matched 29.80 29.62 1.8 62.2 1.00 0.316
Age at first sex Unmatched 15.58 15.28 4.6 2.25 0.024
Matched 15.51 15.40 1.7 63.5 0.93 0.354
Electricity Unmatched 0.695 0.565 27.3 13.54 0.000
Matched 0.690 0.668 4.6 83.1 2.62 0.009
Expected children Unmatched 0.683 0.627 11.7 3.33 0.001
Matched 0.682 0.692 -1.9 83.4 -0.73 0.468
Christians Unmatched 0.748 0.740 1.8 0.88 0.378
Matched 0.750 0.751 -0.4 76.3 -0.24 0.812
Muslims Unmatched 0.202 0.154 12.6 6.13 0.000
Matched 0.199 0.193 1.7 86.7 0.89 0.371
Traditionalist Unmatched 0.023 0.061 -18.6 -9.61 0.000
Matched 0.024 0.025 -0.7 96.2 -0.51 0.610
No Religion Unmatched 0.027 0.046 -10.1 -5.11 0.000
Matched 0.027 0.031 -1.7 83.5 -103 0.303
Other religion Unmatched
Matched
Akans Unmatced 0.371 0.436 -13.4 -6.61 0.000
Matched 0.375 0.383 -1.4 89.6 -0.78 0.435
Ga Dangbe Unmatched 0.052 0.057 -2.1 -1.06 0.290
Matched 0.053 0.054 -0.6 71.6 -0.34 0.734
Ewe Unmatched 0.123 0.124 -0.2 -0.09 0.927
Matched 0.125 0.130 -1.4 -655.5 0.77 0.442
Northern Unmatched 0.029 0.029 0.6 0.29 0.774
Matched 0.029 0.030 -5 11.8 -0.28 0.779
Other tribe Unmatched 0.407 0.335 15.0 7.37 0.000
Matched 0.398 0.384 3.0 80.3 1.62 0.104
Employed Unmatched 0.269 0.240 6.6 3.25 0.001
Matched 0.268 0.275 -1.6 76.0 -0.86 0.387
Unemployed Unmatched 0.731 0.760 -6.6 -3.25 0.001
Matched 0.732 0.725 1.6 76.0 0.86 0.387
Married Unmatched 0.291 0.294 -0.8 -0.37 0.709
Matched 0.293 0.300 -1.6 -107.6 -0.87 0.385
Unmarried Unmatched 0.630 0.600 6.2 3.04 0.002
Matched 0.627 0.615 2.3 62.3 1.29 0.197
Divorce Unmatched 0.079 0.106 -9.2 -4.58 0.000
Matched 0.080 0.084 -1.4 84.4 -0.83 0.404
One Ideal Child Unmatched 0.006 0.006 -0.6 -0.31 0.753
Matched 0.005 0.004 1.2 -82.3 0.68 0.497
Two Unmatched 0.005 0.003 2.4 1.14 0.255
Matched 0.005 0.005 0.5 72.2 0.28 0.782
Three Unmatched 0.074 0.069 1.9 0.92 0.359
Matched 0.074 0.075 -0.3 82.1 -0.18 0.855
Four Unmatched 0.206 0.186 5.1 2.52 0.012
Matched 0.204 0.203 0.2 96.6 0.09 0.925
Five Unmatched 0.334 0.329 1.2 0.61 0.542
Matched 0.333 0.334 -0.4 69.4 -0.21 0.833
Six Unmatched 0.149 0.153 -1.0 -0.48 0.634
Matched 0.151 0.151 -0.1 94.8 -0.03 0.978
Seven Unmatched 0.226 0.255 -6.7 -3.32 0.001
Matched 0.229 0.228 0.2 96.6 0.13 0.899
Urban Unmatched 0.496 0.411 17.0 8.36 0.000
Matched 0.487 0.468 3.9 77.1 2.14 0.032
Rural Umatched 0.504 0.589 -17.0 -8.36 0.000
Matched 0.513 0.532 -3.9 77.1 -2.14 0.032
Western Unmatched 0.103 0.110 -2.4 -1.21 0.228
Matched 0.105 0.106 -0.6 76.6 -0.32 0.751
Central Unmatched
Matched
Greater Accra Unmatched 0.905 0.114 -7.8 -3.90 0.000
Matched 0.092 0.098 -1.8 77.3 -1.02 0.309
Volta Unmatched 0.089 0.087 0.8 0.39 0.694
Matched 0.091 0.096 -1.9 -131.7 -1.00 0.317
Eastern Unmatched 0.101 0.083 6.2 3.04 0.002
Matched 0.102 0.103 -0.2 96.5 -0.11 0.910
Ashanti Unmatced 0.092 0.146 -16.6 -8.36 0.000
Matched 0.094 0.102 -2.5 85.0 -1.50 0.134
Brong-Ahafo Unmatched 0.120 0.070 17.1 8.18 0.000
Matched 0.112 0.115 1.3 92.4 0.65 0.514
Northen Unmatched 0.122 0.120 -2.5 -1.24 0.217
Matched 0.123 0.122 0.4 85.5 0.20 0.839
Upper East Unmatched 0.114 0.085 9.8 4.77 0.000
Matched 0.113 0.110 1.1 89.2 0.56 0.574
Upper West Unmatched 0.098 0.044 21.2 10.05 0.000
Matched 0.088 0.070 7.1 66.5 3.72 0.000
No Education Women Unmatched 0.349 0.377 -5.8 -1.63 0.103
Matched 0.350 0.358 -1.6 71.5 -0.60 0.547
Education Women Unmatched 0.182 0.244 -15.3 -4.42 0.000
Matched 0.184 0.182 0.1 99.6 0.02 0.980
Secondary Unmatched 0.419 0.361 11.6 3.25 0.001
Matched 0.419 0.417 0.4 96.9 0.13 0.896
Higher Unmatched 0.048 0.015 19.4 4.96 0.000
Matched 0.047 0.042 3.4 82.6 1.04 0.300
Bias: standardized Standard percentage difference in means between treated and control.
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Table C15: Estimates of covariate balance
Controls Controls
Covariate Treated Pre Post Treated Pre Post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 29.82 29.37 29.82 89.18 89.00 88.13
Age at first sex 15.58 15.29 15.58 43.77 37.38 37.34
Electricity 0.695 0.565 0.695 0.212 0.246 0.212
Expected children
Christian 0.748 0.739 0.747 0.189 0.193 0.189
Muslim 0.202 0.154 0.202 0.161 0.130 0.161
Traditionalist 0.023 0.060 0.023 0.023 0.057 0.023
No religion 0.027 0.046 0.027 0.026 0.044 0.026
Other religion
Akans 0.371 0.436 0.371 0.233 0.246 0.233
Ga-Dangbe 0.052 0.057 0.052 0.049 0.053 0.049
Ewe 0.123 0.124 0.123 0.108 0.108 0.108
Northen 0.407 0.407 0.407 0.242 0.242 0.242
other tribe 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
Employed 0.269 0.241 0.269 0.197 0.183 0.197
Married 0.291 0.294 0.291 0.206 0.206 0.208
Unmarried 0.639 0.600 0.639 0.233 0.240 0.233
One ideal child 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.005
Two 0.074 0.074 0.070 0.069 0.065 0.069
Three 0.206 0.186 0.206 0.164 0.151 0.164
Four 0.335 0.335 0.328 0.223 0.221 0.223
Five 0.149 0.153 0.149 0.127 0.129 0.127
Six 0.226 0.255 0.226 0.175 0.190 0.175
Urban 0.496 0.412 0.496 0.250 0.240 0.250
Western 0.103 0.110 0.103 0.092 0.098 0.092
Central 0.071 0.132 0.071 0.066 0.114 0.066
Greater-Accra 0.090 0.115 0.090 0.082 0.102 0.082
Volta 0.089 0.087 0.089 0.081 0.079 0.081
Eastern 0.101 0.082 0.101 0.090 0.076 0.090
Ashanti 0.092 0.146 0.092 0.084 0 .125 0.084
Brong-Ahafo 0.120 0.070 0.120 0.105 0.065 0.105
Northern 0.122 0.130 0.122 0.107 0.113 0.107
Upper East 0.114 0.085 0.114 0.101 0 .078 0.101
Upper West
Note Columns (1) to (3) are means and (4) to (6) are variance.
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Figure C4: Differences in standard bias before and after matching for postnatal
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Most people in sub-Saharan Africa are in the low-income group, therefore, they
struggle to generate adequate resources to pay for their healthcare expenses. Ghana
introduced health insurance in 2003 to improve health care and health. Health
insurance has been shown to improve healthcare utilisation and general health. If
health insurance is positively related to healthcare utilisation and health, and health
influences an individuals’ ability to work. Then, it is important to understand the
effect of health insurance on individuals’ labour market outcomes, labour productivity
and healthcare use, particularly in a society where the majority of people are more
vulnerable to illness.
In Chapter 2, the study finds that having health insurance increases the elderly’s
use of healthcare services particularly the number of visits to a health facility and
the probability of being treated by health professionals. This increases the number
of hours worked and earnings of the elderly, which in turn increases their food
consumption. The size of the increase is slightly larger for the elderly in the
high-wealth group than for those in the low-wealth group. This indicates that
subsidising expenditure on health relieves the elderly, especially those within the
low-wealth group, from catastrophic healthcare spending, and the the money that
would have been spent on health care would be channelled to other household
expenditures, such as consumption. The improvement in the elderly’s healthcare
access, earnings and consumption also improves their welfare and this helps to reduce
poverty and the inequality gap that characterises the elderly in Ghana.
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In Chapter 3, the study finds that health insurance has a positive effect on labour
productivity by reducing the extent of illness-related absenteeism at the workplace.
Thus, workers with health insurance miss fewer workdays than workers without health
insurance, with the reduction being statistically significant for male workers but
insignificant for female workers. Overall, the estimates indicate that workers with
health insurance are absent from work less often, and are more productive compared
with workers without health insurance. This suggests that having the NHIS reduces
output loss and increases a country’s production, which in turns increases economic
growth and development.
In Chapter 4, the study finds that, on average, health insurance causes a sizeable
and significant increase in maternal healthcare use. The estimates indicate that
women with health insurance are more likely to meet the WHO recommendation on
maternal healthcare utilisation than women without health insurance. With regard
to abortion, the study finds that irrespective of government interventions to improve
access to healthcare, there is no evidence that the abortion rate responds to health
insurance. However, in subgroup analysis, the study finds a significant reduction
in abortion among young insured women aged 15-19 years and unmarried women.
The increases in maternal healthcare utilisation and the reduction in abortion among
women, particularly those young and unmarried women (who studies show are more
likely to terminate their pregnancies) suggest that health insurance plays a significant
role in quest of reducing maternal mortality in Ghana.
In conclusion, the findings indicate that health insurance significantly increases
healthcare utilisation. This improves the elderly’s labour market outcomes (hours,
earnings and consumption expenditure), which in turn improve the welfare of the
elderly population in Ghana. It reduces illness-related absenteeism at the workplace
and this increases the country’s production through a reduction in output lost. It




The study has some limitations and strength. First, the data used for this study
are observational, therefore, the results should not be interpreted as causal. The
focus of study is to observe the relationship between health insurance and healthcare
utilisation, hours of work, earnings, consumption and productivity to determine
whether the association between them is consistent with the available literature and
economic theory. Second, most of the outcome variables are self-reported and may
suffer from measurement errors which can lead to biased estimates. Some variables
(e.g. hours of work and earnings in the informal sector) are not constant over time,
making it very difficult to validate the self-reported earnings and hours of work from
an independent source. This can bias the estimates. Third, in the PSMDID estimates,
the study acknowledged that the combination between PSM and DID would control
for observed and unobserved factors, but there may be confounding factors influencing
the unobserved time-varying factors. Though the study tested for the validity of
our DID, PSM and PSMDID results, there might be a bias which could affect the
estimates. Fourth, other factors may be available to individuals and households that
have not been accounted for in this study and which can also affect the estimates.
Finally, the investigation of the effect of health insurance on labour market outcomes
and productivity in developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, is very
limited even though the elderly in these countries are the source of the labour force
in the agriculture sector. A major reason for this limitation is data availability. This
study may have some data challenges in terms of the sample size and time intervals
of the survey, but understanding the impact of the Ghana NHIS and its implications
is very important in the context of developing countries’ growth and development.
Despite these limitations, the study makes some important contributions to the
literature on health insurance and labour market outcomes in the informal sector
in a developing country.
Despite the contribution of health insurance to healthcare access and health
in Ghana and sub-Saharan Africa, the mortality and morbidity rate remain high,
therefore, further research is needed on the effects of health insurance to mortality
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and household savings, it is necessary to compare those with free healthcare and
those without it to understand the contribution of insurance on mortality rate.
In terms of health insurance and labour productivity, future research could focus
on illness-related absenteeism in individual firms to investigate and quantify the
actual cost of this absenteeism at the workplace. In relation to health insurance and
abortion, the study finds a significant reduction of abortion among young women aged
15-19 years. Women aged 15-19 are mostly students, therefore, there is a trade-off
between their education and the pregnancy. The finding suggests that most of the
young women drop out of school in order to take care of their pregnancy, this also has
an implication for women’s education. Further studies need to focus on the impact
of health insurance on abortion and education among women in sub-Saharan Africa.
5.2 Policy application
The findings of the thesis have some practical policy applications. The strong positive
effect of health insurance on healthcare utilisation among the elderly working in the
informal sector suggests that the government should extend the exemption of health
insurance premium payments to a large section of the elderly. This could be achieved
by reducing the eligibility age for free healthcare to 60 years, which is the average
age of farmers in Africa. The medical needs, health expenditure and labour force
participation of the elderly aged 60-69 are no different from those of the elderly aged
70 and over. The majority of people aged 60-69 years tend to be engaged in cocoa and
other cash crop production, which contributes largely to Ghana’s economy. As such,
these constitute a large section of the labour force in the country’s agricultural sector.
Therefore, including this age group in the free healthcare policy has the potential to
affect Ghana’s economy positively in the long term.
In Ghana and Africa as a whole, the majority of workers, especially the older
workers, are also household heads and breadwinners of their families, therefore, issues
that affect their health have implications for the entire household. For instance, if
illness incapacitates them in their daily activities, it affects the entire household’s
earnings and consumption. On the other hand, improvement in earnings and
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consumption also improves the welfare of the entire household, which in turn reduces
poverty and the inequality gap that characterises Ghana’s population. It is hoped
that the findings of this study will encourage the government to extend subsidisation
of the health insurance premium to people who cannot afford the current premium
payments. These measures would increase participation in the NHIS and reduce
illness-related absenteeism at workplaces, and thereby improve labour productivity,
earnings and food consumption. With improved labour productivity, the economy
will grow and workers’ welfare will also be enhanced.
The significant increase in healthcare utilisation and the reduction in abortion
found with current NHIS uptake also point to a significant contribution of health
insurance towards a reduction in the maternal mortality ratio in Ghana. This implies
that policy makers should take practical steps to enforce mandatory enrolment in the
NHIS for all women in Ghana, because its voluntary nature allows women to opt
out from the scheme. This could contribute to reducing Ghana’s global maternal
mortality ratio to less than 70 deaths per 100,000 live births to meet the United
Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target envisioned for 2030.
The study observed heterogeneous effects of health insurance on healthcare
utilisation in terms of individuals’ place of residence. The findings suggest that
the introduction of the NHIS has contributed to healthcare utilisation among people
residing in rural areas. There are communities, specifically emerging communities,
slums and hinterlands, where the nearest health facilities are some distance away
and this sometimes affects healthcare use. The provision of mobile clinics to these
communities will help to curb immediate healthcare challenges, because most people
residing in these areas are indigent and sometimes they cannot even afford the cost of
transportation to a health facility. Therefore, providing mobile clinics to these areas
will reduce financial barriers, which in turn will improve healthcare access and the




ATE Average treatment effect
ATET Average treatment effect of the treated
CEM Coarsened exact matching
CHPS Community-based Health and Services Programme
CIA Conditional independence assumption
DID Difference-in-difference
DMHIS District Mutual Health Insurance Scheme
GDHS Ghana Demographic and Health Surveys
GLSS Ghana Living Standard Survey
GSS Ghana Statistical Service
MDG Millennium Development Goals
MMR Maternal Mortality Ratio
NHIS National Health Insurance Scheme
NLS Nonlinear least squares
NNMDM Nearest neighbour Mahalanobis distance matching
NNPSM Nearest neighbour propensity score matching
PSM Propensity score matching
PSMDID Propensity score matching and difference-in-difference
RMHC Rural Mutual Health Care
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
UCI Union of confidence intervals
USAID United States Agency for International Development
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US United States
WHO World Health Organization
CIs Confidence intervals
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